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Abstract
The thesis proposes an account of a notion of ‘practice’, which provides
an understanding of how the world is made intelligible by having thought
which is object-involving. The thesis investigates an ontology of practice,
the nature of which is characterized in terms of object-engagement. On
this account, practice provides content because a subject engages with
objects in the world. My main argumentis this: if the notion of practice is
required in order to account for the possibility of content (that which
provides the normative rationalising force on human action), then we need
an account of practice in which norms are immanent. The basis of my
account is McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following
considerations. I then develop a further supporting argument thatif such
an account of meaningis to provide the possibility of content, then we
need an account of thought which ‘directly’ engages with objects in the
world. That is to say, the only sort of thought which provides such an
account of meaning and thereby provides content is the neo-Fregean idea
of singular thoughts, namely, the idea that thought content is individuated
by particular objects in the world. To gain such a notion of content, the
neo-Fregean view provides an account of thought which satisfies two
basic constraints on content, namely, the objectivity constraint and the
rationality constraint. The notion of practice characterized under the neo-
Fregean view requires an account of demonstrative thought the content of
whichis derived from the way a subject engages with objects in his
environment. On this basis, the notion of practice which I propose
captures both aspects of what constitutes content, namely, the aspect of
the object the identification of which requires the idea of engagement in
thought and the aspect of the subject the characterization of which
requires an idea of agency whose engagement is with objects in the world.
Introduction
the issue of practice and action plays a crucial role in
ethics or moral philosophy whose concern is to understand human
conduct. An example is the Aristotelian notion of praxis (action) whichis
a teleological notion, that is, praxis means action with purposes. The
Aristotelian concept of practice is concerned with the meaning of the
good life, for to understand what praxis is, one needs to take it in the
context of the aim of living of a person. The debate on the Aristotelian
notion of praxis is a separate issue which is not my concern in the thesis;
however, it provides an important clue to our general Of understanding of
what‘practice’ means, that is, a meaningful purposive action or an
intentional action. The point is how to accountfor the distinction of a
meaningful action and a non-meaningful action.” In the context of modern
philosophy, the notion of practice seems to be related with the idea of
pragmatism.’ Classical pragmatism, roughly, holds that objective truth is
to be substituted with a pragmatic notion of truth or a relative notion of
truth which is concerned with a proposition’s value in achieving ends.
Such a notion of practice involves the notion of practice as a purposeful
action, although it has rejected the idea of purpose or truth as an
independent normative constraint on counting what practice is.
Pragmatisim is best seen as motivated by a reaction to ‘Cartesianism’. In
general, Cartesianism means the view that what defines knowledge and
truth is something internally independent from the external world. In
responding to such an idea, knowledge andtruth are defined as whatis
external to whatis internal: whether it may be mind in contrast to bodily
behaviour; private in contrast to public; individual in contrast to society.
The external realm is the realm of action and behaviour. If Cartesianism in
that sense is unsatisfactory, then it seems that the task is to find an
account of what it is for action to pertain knowledge and truth, that is, an
account of a notion of practice.
My thesis is concerned with an account of practice which
underpins an account of whatit is for one to understand meaning; and
thereby to possess thought content. If the point of understanding meaning
in language involves understanding the aboutness or content of human
thoughts; and if thoughts provide whatrationalises human action, then
studying meaning in that sense, namely, the account of meaning in terms
of what thought is about, provides an understanding of human action. Its
implication may be taken in a way that a study of human action provides
an account of whatit is for a subject to understand meaning or possess
content of thought. Human action in that sense therefore has to be
accounted for in terms of action whichis directed to what it is about. In
other words, there is a distinction between action which has content and
that which does not. It is the former notion of action which involves an
idea of practice.
The Wittgensteinian notion of practice can be said to be one of
many responses to Cartesianism as shown in his ‘private language’
argument. The argument shows that the private meaning ofa language
concerning sensations and first-person experiences, such as pain, is
logically impossible because there is no independent criterion for meaning
in such a language. Wittgenstein’s response is to be found in his thesis
that ‘meaning is in use’. It is derived from the rule-following argument:
the argument that whatit is for someoneto follow rule cannot be
accounted for without appealing to a notion of rule which is not
independently characterizableto rule-following. Wittgenstein’s notion of
‘use’, in which norms or rules are intrinsic, provides a ground for
understanding a notion of practice. As Wittgenstein said, practice is the
‘bedrock’ of meaning, i.e. “This is simply what I do.” That is to
say, in a sense, the bedrock is the final justification of meaning. But ‘what
do’ in this sense cannot be taken as ‘what I do’ without constraints,
otherwise, practice will not be different from a mere action of doing
something which has no content. This means that there is an idea of
normative constraint in understanding “what I do’. It is what distinguishes
practice from the mere act of doing something. When we think about
what the notion of practice means, it is indeed this idea of normative
constraint on what we do which is the disputable issue. One might say
that there is a problem about the source of the normative constraint on
content, which is immanent to practice. In particular, there is the question
about what it is for a subject to understand meaning or possess content?
However, whether we should tackle the question as about either
understanding meaning or possessing content, it involves a hidden
assumption about the connection between language and thought. This
point is important because it is whatdrives different responses to the
question from where the normative constraint is derived. That is to say, it
is the issue whether language is prior to thought. The primary meaning of
thought involves the idea of a relation between a subject’s psychology and
the world. So if one thinks that language is prior to thought, there are two
possible sources of norms, namely, the uncontroversial answer is linguistic
structure and the controversial oneis linguistic use. If, on the contrary, it
is thought which is prior to language, the answer maylie in the direction
of the phenomenology of our psychology.
According to the former sort of priority, roughly, the normative
Constraint in a controversial sense has its source mainly in a common
linguistic use. This idea, in general, characterizes the notion of practice in
terms of social practice. One reason for this is the attempt to reject the
Psychologism of meaning, i.e. the idea that meaning is in the mind. In
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other words, it is the attempt to reject a Cartesian picture of mind,
namely, that mind is independently characterized from external context.
But in doing this, it has ignored the notion of point of view which is a
crucial notion for understanding how-the world which is mind-
independent is a constraint on meaning. In order that the notion of point
of view is included in understanding the world, such a notion can be
accounted for in a modest sense of ‘Cartesianism’, namely, a conception
of mind as what provides a way of thinking of the world. In that sense,
mind cannot be characterized independently to objects. That is the
position which takes thoughts to be prior to language.
However, as I said, the former sort of priority can bea
controversial position if it takes the ‘cognitive’ role of a subject in
accounting for meaning and use. But, as I will discuss in the thesis (e.g.
Brandom and Burge’s view in chapter three), such a notion of cognitive
role characterizes mind independently to the world. The problem with this
is that such a notion is frictionless or lacks any constraint from the world.
In general, apart from such views thatI will discuss in the thesis, there are
several other views which hold this sort of idea; such as Winch (1958),
MacIntyre (1981), Dreyfus (1980,et.all), Turner (1994), Rouse (1996).
Such works propose different varieties of the notion of social practice, the
details of which I do not discuss in the thesis. However, they share a
similar assumption with Brandom and Burge that normativity does not
have its source in the world which we directly perceive; tather the source
 
of norms lies in an qpistemic structute (or the idea ofsocial practice) _ bec
which is independently characterized from the world. I show some
examples of such views below in order to illustrate this point.
While Winch concentrates on the idea of rule-governed behaviour
m which what characterizes the notion of ruleis a social practice, Dreyfus
characterizes the notion of practice as a skillful activity whose subject is
an agent who acts toward object in the world. But, for MacIntyre,
practice requires an idea of virtuous act which is more than a mere skill,
and what provides the source of virtue is in the socially cooperative
human activity. (See MacIntyre 1981:187) Turner’s view develops the
idea of social practice in social theory by characterizing it in the sense of a
naturalistic form of practice. It is the notion of habitus (Bourdieu, P.1990)
or what he takes as Wittgenstein’s idea of forms of life, i.e. the idea which
suggests that human practice is a form of biological pattern of living
organisms. The idea of norms, for Turner, is in what he thinks as a
constraint on an account of practice, that is, that account must be able to
answer the question of how knowledgeis transmitted among members of
a social group.
Rouse’s notion of practice claims to be a combination of Winch,
Brandom and Dreyfus’s views, in which an agent engages with the world.
That is to say, he wants both sides of the constraint on an account of
practice, namely, the constraint of the external world which is
characterized by an idea of skill (Dreyfus) and the constraint of norms in a
social world. However, Rouse’s account of practice cannot be said to
meet the constraint of the external world because he thinks that although
“practices are always simultaneously material and discursive”, “practices
are spatiotemporally open.”. (see Rouse 1996:135) That is to say, for him,
the spatiotemporal world is the world which has no norms. To account for
practice as embedding in a causal structure leads to the eliminativist view
that there are no normative concepts like truth, reason in the causal
relation. (ibid.:156) Accordingly, it turns out that the world which a
Subject engages with in Rouse’s sense is the world which is not
Spatiotemporally bound. This means that the notion of practice in that
Sense does not reach out to the world in which norms are originated. The
main problem with such ideas on social practice involves the assumption
that the world which we can have direct acquaintance with is the world
which has no norms, So that norms are found in the sort of world which
we do not directly engage with, that is, the social world. However, the
social world does not provide the constraint of the external world which is
independent from our will. What we gain at most from the social
an inferentialist picture of norms the content of which is frictionless. That [
isto say, as inferentialism is the view that the inferential pattern of
reasoning provides content of thought, the problem with inferentialism as
I address in the thesis is that the contentit provides is the sort of content
which lacks the worldly constraint or friction which can only be found in
the world with which we perceptually engage. The problem of
inferentialism is obviously found in Brandom and Burge’s account of
practice, as I will explain in the thesis.
The thesis suggests a way out by proposing an account of practice
in which we can directly engage with the world and in which norms are
immanent. That accountof practice is based on the neo-Fregean view of
singular thought. Such an account assumes thelatter sort of priority of
thought to language. That is because although language, as the vehicle of
content, places some constraints on thought, the fundamental constraint
concerning whatit is for content to have correctness conditions is not
supplied by language alone; it is supplied by that which content represents
- the world. What I mean by the ‘world’ is that which provides truth-
values to thought. Basically, it is a semantic notion, namely, what
provides a condition for a thoughtto be true. It is in that sense that the
worldly constraint provides friction to thought or the correctness
condition of thought. However, such a semantic notion requires a notion
of the world of spatiotemporal objects as what provides semantic values
for thoughts. The key case which illustrates that idea and which shows
i\
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why a thought requires friction is the case of demonstrative thoughts.
That is because demonstrative thoughts are a fundamental sort of thought
which link thoughts directly with objects in the material world. A
demonstrative thought picks out an object in the physical world as its
semantic value. The content of thought is the meaning of a sentence
whose semantic value is provided by individuation of an object. Thought
in this sense involves the world, in the sense that it needs to be
characterized on the basis of the interweaving of mind and world. This
means that the source of norms lies in the external world which cannot be
characterizable independently from mind.
The notion of practice based on this idea is hence more concerned
with the metaphysics of thought, namely, the account of how mind and.
world are connected. It is that sort of account of the notion of practice
that can be called the investigation into an ontology of practice contra to a
social ontology of practice. If there is the role of mindin the social
ontology of practice, it is what is called the study of the common mind.
But the ontology of practice provides the idea that there is the world
which is mind-independent and constrains our thoughts, but it is the world
which cannot be independently characterizable. If there is the role of a
common mindin this sort of practice, it is what at most can be accounted
for in terms of ‘a capacity for a meeting of minds’. (see McDowell 1984,)
In other words, the possibility of understanding other minds does not
require understanding of a commonality of thoughts; rather it requires the
understanding that the common mindis constituted by no more than a
particular ‘mind’ or person as an object. At most, if there is a social
dimension of practice, it can be said to be involved in the sense that
thought contentis normatively constrained by an engagement with
another ‘mind’ or object. However, this is still not similar to saying that a
Social practice is the origin of norms. One reason is that the idea of social
practice assumes an idea which the notion of practice as an engagement
with an object does not assume, namely, a generalization of a pattern of
practice which is independently characterizable. The rule-following
considerations have shown that such a generalization generates a regress
problem becausethereis no independent
worldly
constraint. An account
of a notion of practice requires both the idea of the world as an objective
constraint on our understanding and the idea of our minds as its rational
constraint. This means that, to answer the question in the previous
paragraph, the notion of practice which provides the idea of what it is to
be a possessor of content requires an account of how those two
constraints are immanent to practice.
This thesis offers an investigation into an ontology of practice.
The notion of practice that I propose is an ontological notion, namely, an
accountof the notion of practice requires an account of how norms
originating from the interweaving of the world and mind are immanent in
practice. This means that an account of content requires constraints,
namely, the constraint from the world whichI call the objectivity
constraint (I use ‘worldly and ‘objectivity constraint’
interchangeably.) and the constraint from the mind which I call the
rationality constraint. On this account, practice provides content because
a subject engages with an object in the world. The idea of object-
engagement is based on the neo-Fregean idea of singular thoughts in
which the notion of content provided is a demonstrative content.
Demonstrative content can capture both constraints on content. This
means that the nqtion of practice has to be accounted for in terms of the
rational link of the subject and object, rather than a pure causal link alone.
The notion of practice which shows whatit is to be a possessor of content
requires the notion of the possessor as an agent who engages with
objects,
In order to elaborate the above idea of practice, the thesis is
divided into five chapters. I first begin with McDowell’s reading of
Wittgenstein’s rule-following consideration in order to provide a reason
why the notion of practice in which norms are immanent is a way out of
the dilemma of the rule-following. Such notion of practice relies on a
model of norms which constrain use of a language in a unitary sense; that
is whatI will call the unitary model of use. As mentioned above, this
account of practice rests on the notion of thought which is a Fregean
notion, namely, thought is the meaning of a sentence, the aboutness of
which is grasped from a subject’s ‘perspective’. The notion of content
hence requires a characterization both in the sense of linguistic content
and mental content. By saying that, I mean the notion of contentis
constituted by both the conceptual element or the inferential structure and
the causal elementor the referential structure. The connection of both
elements is a constitutive connection in the sense that an account of
content which is constrained by norms cannot be reduced to either one or
the other element, The constitutive account of content can be accounted
for as a way out from the dilemma of the rule-following considerations.
Thatis to say, on the one horn, if what determines meaning is independent
from our understanding, the result is either a paradox of rule-following --
whatever we do can be interpreted as following a rule or a regress of
interpretation of what a rule is; on the other horn, if what determines
meaning is in what we do in the sense that there are no norms built in,
then we are atrisk of a frictionless picture of what we do. Hence, an
accountof content which does not full into the dilemma requires the idea
of norms built into what we do.
In chapter two, I elaborate the neo-Fregean idea of singular
thoughts, That is because in order to show how norms are intrinsic to
object-engagement, we need a notion of thought which is object-
dependent, that is, the idea of singular thoughts. A singular thought is a
thought the content of which is derived from an object’s individuation.
The idea of individuating an object in thought thatI bring in here is the
neo-Fregean notion of singular thought. Thatis to say, thought which
singles out an object is the thought which provides content that meets two
constraints on content, namely, the objectivity constraint and the
rationality constraint. The notion of content which is derived from
singular thoughts is a demonstrative content, although the context
sensitivity of such thought applies also to indexicals now, here.
Demonstrative thought is context-dependent, that is, the meaning of the
demonstrative is varied to its reference. The two constraints on content
are possible onlyif they are based on the modest notion of Cartesian
mind-- an account of a subject’s perspective which cannot be
characterized independently from the external world or the objective
framework. So this means that demonstrative content is an externalist
notion of content.
Chapter three deals with the issue of externalism of content in
order to show that the only externalism which can capture both
constraints on content is the neo-Fregean view of singular thoughts. Other
sorts of externalism, namely, the causal-theoretic externalism (Putnam)
and the social externalism (Burge, Brandom, and Bilgrami) fail to provide
either the rationality constraint or the worldly constraint,'This shows that
perceptual demonstrative thoughts provide the possibility of norms
immanentto the engagementof the subject with an object. It is in this
chapter that the contrast between the paradigm of inferentialism and
tepresentationalism helps clarify the picture of the two constraints. The
difference between inferentialism and representationalism is roughly this—
while inferentialism prioritises the inferential structure of thought or
language use to the referential structure or the world, representationalism
prioritises the referential structure to the inferential one. Social
externalism falls into the side of inferentialism the problem with which is
that the notion of content is frictionless. In contrast, the singular thoughts
externalism can provide what both inferentialism and representationalism
want, that is, the idea that content is constituted by both the inferential
and the referential element.
Chapter four and five thereby provide the notion of practice based
on the ideas in the first three chapters. Chapter four summarises the basic
thesis in the previous chapter in order to show that the notion of practice
weneed is not an interpersonal notion of practice. Rather we need an
account of practice as object-engagementwhich is an intrapersonal
notion. The notion of practice in this sense is confined to one particular
person in the sense that is based on the modest conception of Cartesian
picture of mind; however, it is based on the idea that an engagement with
an object provides content only on the basis of the rational link between
subject and object in the external world. In chapter four, I focus on the
object side. The debates among those who hold the idea of singular
thoughts are discussed, e.g. the contrast between two sorts of account of
content (McDowell and Peacocke), the contrasting view on the notion of
object-identification. (Campbell and Brewer). Then in chapter five, I focus
on the subject’s side of object-engagement, thatis, the notion of agency.
The accountof practice as object-engagement provides the idea of agency
the characterization of which involves the notion of self as a body or an
element located in the objective spatio/temporal world. The notion of the
self in this sense requires the owner of experiences who engages or acts
toward objects in the objective world.
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An interesting introduction to history of Philosophical aspect of the issue of practice,
see Bernstein, R.J. 1971
? see McDowell 1980
3 Brandom (1994) criticises the classical pragmatism and proposes his semantic
pragmatism. I discuss Brandom’s view in chapter three.
 Chapter One: Following a RuleIn this chapter, I shall argue that an account of meaning andcontent requires an account of human behaviour in which norms are
intrinsic. Such an accountis crucial as a basis for constructing a notion of
practice. The account is suggested by the role of the idea of practice
found in Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument. The argument shows
that “the meaning of'a word is its use” (PI 43) and I suggest that the idea
of use reveals a concept of practice that provides meaning and content.
(PI 198,199, 202) An account of whatit is to understand meaning
involves an account of the rationality of human acts. In that sense, it may
be said that practice provides a fundamental groundfor rationalising
human behaviour.
The rule-following argumentis introduced because it shows that
the central feature of the concept of meaning is that meaning is that which
accounts for the rationality of our behaviour. Meaning has a normative
rationalising force. Thatis to say, if, according to the tule-following
argument, meaning is understood in terms of use, then the concept of
use’ has to meet two basic constraints concerning the normative
rationalising force of meaning. Such constraints are derived from the fact
that in accounting for meaning, there is a relation between rules and rules-
follower. The first constraint can be called the objectivity constraint
because it is the nature of normative patterns to be independentfrom the
rule-follower or language-user; and the second constraint is called the
rationality constraint for the normative patterns cannot be independently
characterized from their role in rationalising the behaviour of the
language-user,
The idea of meaning as use provides an account of meaning which
|
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can account for both constraints. The first constraint is based on the idea
that: if symbol has meaning, then it must satisfy the basic semantic
constraint that there exists correctness/ incorrectness conditions for its
use. It is the basic notion of correctness conditions that provides the
fundamental normativity to meaning. The normativity supplied by
correctness conditions introduces a basic notion of truth. It introduces a
basic idea of objective standards which supplies a normative constraint on
meaning. I shall argue that the norms of correct use are intrinsic to use. I
argue for this on the basis of my understanding of the rule-following
arguments. The intrinsic of norms means that the language-user plays a
role in accounting for the normativity of meaning and thereby the
objectivity of meaning. The language user’s central role here means that
both the objectivity constraint and the rationality constraint have to be
met at the same time. Both constraints are accounted for in the way that
although the normative constraint is not independently characterizable
from a subject’s understanding or point of view, its objectivity, i.e. the
objectivity of meaning, does not depend on the subject’s characterization
of it.
The two constraints have to be accounted for at once. As I will
propose, if the point of the rule-following argument is to account for what
it is for meaning to be normative, then the argument must be taken to be
concerned with the notion of use in a unitary sense, ie. the use to which
normativity is intrinsic. This is the model of use that I call a unitary model.
Such a model is not a reductionist model in which norms are replaced
with use or vice versa. It is a model which suggests that the objectivity of
Meaning, i.e. with objective correctness conditions, can be directly
without being reduced either to other sorts of conditions or to the
use itself,
By analogy, to understand meaning is to directly ‘perceive’ truth-
conditions, i.e. the conditions under which truth-values/ correctness
values can be assigned to a sentence.’ If such a model of use provides an
jdea of practice which provides meaning and content, we need a notion of
practice in which it is possible to say that one can standin direct
perceptual awareness of that which constrains content, namely, truth-
conditions. One way to think about such a constraint --the semantic
constraint of correctness conditions -- is to think of it as the constraint
imposed on language use by the ‘world’. By ‘world’ I mean both that
which impinges on us in perception and that which constrains word use,
that is, truth-conditions. It is the same thing that constrains our
perception of meaning and our perception of the world. The world is a
constraint on content in such a way that although the world is independent
from our perception and understanding, it is not independently
characterizable from understanding. On that way of thinking, there is a
notion of use and hence practice in which the world is not only intrinsic
but also directly open to perception.
Briefly, what I will argue for in this chapter is the thesis that
following Wittgenstein’s idea of meaning as use, the notion of use must be
the notion which provides the idea that the norms of meaning are intrinsic
to practice. I shall start this exploration by investigating the concept of
use according to the unitary model, in particular, McDowell’s reading of
Wittgenstein, (McDowell 1984,) This investigation is crucial because it
Provides a groundfor developing the idea of practice which I propose in
this thesis. I shall then, in the next chapter, turn to employ the theory of
singular thought as a way of developing McDowell’s reading.
Thestructure of this chapter is divided into three main sections.
The first section provides a general introduction to the problem of rule-
following based on McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein. In doing so, I
show that the substantive point underlying different ways of reading the
rule-following argument is two contrasting notions of ‘use’ according to
the contrasting models of meaning, namely, whatI call the two-
component model of meaning in which the notion of use is extrinsically
constrained, and the unitary model of meaning in which the notion of use
is intrinsically constrained. The second section provides some examples of
the two-component model and then brings in McDowell’s unitary model
for criticising the two-component model. The final section discusses how
McDowell’s transcendental argument provides the way out of the
dilemma thatlies at the heart of the rule-following considerations. This
argument offers the picture of practice as constitutive of normativity
without a need to reject the objectivity of meaning. On this account, the
central question is: How are norms immanent in practice? I provide an
answer to this in the next chapter by examining the idea of singular
thoughts.
1. The Rule-following Argument
What I will do in this section is to identify the problem of rule-
following in a way which provides a reason for taking the unitary model
of meaning. However, I show, at the outset, that although in general the
rule-following argument can be read as a contrast between a sceptical
argument’ and a non-sceptical argument”, the substantive contrast is
rather of the different notions of ‘use’, namely, the notion of use
according to the two-component model and the unitary model. In the
following, I provide a preliminary reason for reading the argument this
way, and then a simple reading of the rule-following problem according to
the unitary model’s approach. In the next section, I will show why the
two-component model -- in particular, as found in Kripke and Wright--
cannot capture the idea of meaning as use and thereby the idea of practice
as being constitutive of norms.
1.1.The Contrasting Models of Meaning
The rule-following argument concerns the nature of the
normativity of meaning. For an expression to have meaning, it is subject
to normative patterns, i.e. the conditions under which an expression can
be judged as correct or incorrect. Such conditions can be called truth-
conditions in the sense that knowing the meaning of an expression is
knowing the conditions of what makes the expression correct or incorrect.
The central puzzle put forwardin the rule-following arguments concerns
the nature and existence of the normative patterns that govern meaning
and use. It seems inescapable that there are normative patterns that
constitute the correct and incorrect use of words. However, any attempt
to state those patterns is met with an infinite regress, for any statement of
the patterns can never fully articulate the pattern: any particular statement
could always be interpreted in more than one way. This seems to render
the very notion of patterns of correct usage unstable. The rule-following
arguments then threaten the following dilemma: if there is such a thing as
the patterns of correct use, they cannot be articulated without fear of
infinite regress, so no account can be given of them. Alternatively, if we
reject the idea of the existence of such patterns, then weare left with no
notion of the normativity of meaning, the very idea of correctness and
incorrectness evaporates.
Neither horn of the dilemma is tenable. It has often seemed that
the way out of the dilemma is to embrace a reductionist account of the
patterns of correct usage in terms that make them stateable without
regress. The reductionist move is one that replaces the idea of truth-
Conditions as the key concept in articulating the patterns of correct usage
with a weaker semantic notion, such as assertability-conditions. That is
because the reductionist account assumes that the notion of truth-
Conditions is different from correctness conditions. Thatis to say, the
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reductionist views the notion of truth-conditions as being stronger than
correctness conditions in the sense that while the idea of truth-conditions
assumes the idea of an objective truth which is transcendent of our
knowledge, the idea of correctness conditions suggest a notion of truth
relative to knowledge. The strong notion of truth-conditions, which the
rule-following argumentis often taken to be against, is the full-blooded
truth-conditions captured in the Platonic imagery of norms as absolute
fixed standards. Whatthe reductionist account offers is to reject the idea
of truth-conditions and replace it with a weaker sort of correctness
condition. But the problem is that to reject the idea of truth-conditions in
such a way means that there is no place for the normative patterns to
provide friction to use which is possible only if they are autonomous from
use. An upshot is that it is at risk of providing an idealist notion of
pattern, that is to say, an account in which there is no independent
criterion external to use which provides a distinction between use which
seems to be correct and that which is correct. That sounds similar to the
problem of the private language argument, namely, the argument that if
there is no independent normative constraint for a language about mental
states, then talking about meaning of a private language is absurd because
what seems right is not distinct from whatis right.’
To be more precise, what the rule-following argument shows is
that if the normativity of meaning is transcendentof use, there isa
dilemma of following a rule: either there is meaning butthen, because of
regress, no account is available, or normativity gets lost and we revert to
use characterized without norms, i.e. the sub-bedrock. Accordingly, the
way out from the above dilemma requires the idea of normative patterns
in which truth-conditions cannot be separated from correctness conditions
because the core idea of truth-conditions is the correctness conditions. In
other words, the pattern of correct usage can be articulated in a way that
the objectivity of meaning is characterizable from within a subject’s
perspective. Such normative patterns do not require a reductionist
unt, and they are intrinsic or immanentto use.®acco
Indeed, it is better to say that the dilemma arises because of a
bifurcation of rules and following the rules or between norms and use.
That is to say, the first horn arises from a wide space between norms and
use, but then once there is no space, the second horn arises as the problem
of no normative friction. To put it in more details, the dilemma arises on a
presupposition that the notion of use itself is non-normative, that is, what
is in the use is merely a descriptive fact-- what we have done, are doing,
and will do with an expression, rather than a normative fact-- what we
should do. Such a notion of use requires norms to be added to use in
order for meaning to be possible. In other words, the use requires
interpretations by norms which are extrinsic to it. But the dilemma of rule-
following shows the problems of such notion of use. The first horn tries to
specify norms that are beyond the characterization of use. But if norms
are rejected as in the second horn, then the notion of use is simply non-
normatively constrained, and thereby there is no meaning or content.
However, meaning is normative, so grasp of meaning requires an
account of the objectivity of norms which is not independently
characterized from the use of the expression and yet which also supplies a
constraint on use. That is to say, the normativity of meaning requires a
notion of use to which its normativity is immanent. This means that we
need a notion of use which has only one componentin which the
normative constraint is immanent and this provides the basic semantic
Constraint on content of correctness conditions which are truth conditions.
Saying that normativity and thereby meaning is in use still requires some
of the autonomy of rules, i.e. the objectivity of rules. The question
of what it is for meaning to be normative requires an accountof the
objectivity of meaning which is both not independently characterizable
from a subject’s understanding and use, and yet autonomous from use.
This means that it is a substantive issue to show the possibility of the
notion of use in which the objectivity of rules can be immanent.
Contrasting models of meaning can be drawn from the above in
the following way.
The main idea is that —
(M) Meaningis normatively constrained.
There are two possible models of the notion of use which account for
(E) Use is extrinsically normatively constrained in such a way that
meaning is composed of two components, namely, the component
of use which is neutral or non-normative, for it is characterized
independently of the normative constraint and the component of
the constraint on use.
From the above model, the latter componentis the notion of norms that
are extrinsic to use. The second model is:
(I) Use is intrinsically normatively constrained in such a way that
there is only one component of what provides meaning, namely,
the notion of use which is normativein the sense that although
norms are not independently characterizable from use, they are
nevertheless independent from us in the sense that they constrain
use.
The two possible models (E) and (1) are the contrasting models of
meaning which I called the two-component model and the unitary model
respectively.’ Dividing the notion of use in this way helps clarify the term
‘autonomy’ or ‘independency’ of norms. There is an ambiguity in this
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term that depends on the way the notion of objectivity of meaning is
characterized. Objectivity of meaning roughly means that for meaning to
be possible, it requires norms for constraining use in such a waythat
norms are independent from use. But the problem concerns the meaning
of the independency of norms. From the two models, there are two
meanings for saying that norms are independent from use. On the model
(E) norms are independent in the sense that norms are extrinsic to use,
that is to say, norms exist independently of the understanding of a user of
language. However, the notion of independence in this sense leads to
more problems, for the obvious treatmentis to take norms as supplied by
interpretation. On that treatment, a familiar regress looms. On the model
(I) norms are independent although intrinsic to use, that is, norms exist
independently of the user, but they are characterized in a way thatis
dependent on the user's engagement with things. A simple example may
be this. Suppose I am teaching a child the game of volleyball. The rules of
the game are independent from me andthechild in the sense that they
cannot be determined by our will. If it is not so, anything can be said to
accord with my own will. Whatever I do with the ball is subject to the
rules or truth-conditions; otherwise the game has no point. So there must
be what makes myplaying correct/incorrect. But the independency of the
rules cannot be characterized beyond my understanding of whatthe rules
are and thereby in my engagement with the game; otherwise, there will be
a threat of regress of interpretation to find the rule as an infinite rail. This
means that it is in playing the game where the rules are engaged from my
point of view, which constrains my understanding of what the rules are.
In sum, the point is about how to accountfor the thesis of
Meaning The two possible models (E) and (1) are the contrasting
models of meaning whichI think is the substantive contrast underpinning
the various readingsof the rule-following argument. Such different
readings are mainly known as the sceptical reading and the reductio ad
absurdum reading. My point will be that although those arguments
propose different readings of the rule-following argument, the differences
are superficial. Indeed, they® share the model of meaning In the
following, I provide a brief outline of whyI think the sceptical argument
and the reductio argument(of the reductionist sort) share model A
more detailed criticism of both arguments, in particular, Kripke and
Wright’s view, will be provided in the later section.
1.2. Varieties of Reading of the Rule-Following Argument
Textually, the main difference between the sceptical and
reductionst readings concerns PI 201. The sceptical reading takes the first
paragraph of PI 201 or the paradox of rule-following as the core idea of
the rule-following argument. The argument’s structure is as follows. The
premise is that for a language to have meaning, there must be some rules
or facts providing meaning to the language. But it is not possible to
establish such rules or facts without facing a paradox that every action of
following a rule can be said to accord with the rule. The sceptical
conclusion is that once there are no facts constituting meaning, language
is meaningless. Meanwhile, the reductio reading takes the whole section
of PI 201as the main argument but in such a waythat the premise under
attack is that of the idea of rules which transcend our understanding. But
it is paradoxical to follow the rule as such because it leads to the absurdity
that there is no distinction between correctly and incorrectly following a
tule. The solution which both sorts of reading suggest is to revise the
notion of rule (or as generally known as the objectivity of meaning or
What I called the full-blooded notion of truth-conditions) into a weaker
Concept of rules. The weaker concept then introduces correctness
conditions that do not transcend knowledge, e.g. assertability
Conditions,
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However, both sorts of reading fall into a dilemma. They take the
point of the rule-following argumentas against the notion of the
objectivity of meaning which transcends use, and that the solution is to
employ a notion of objectivity which does not transcend use. But this
means that what they assumeis the idea of the two-component model,
that is, to take the notion of use as lacking of normative content, so that it
requires another missing componentto provide the norms of meaning.
That is why the two sorts of reading offer a solution in a way that the
normative constraint has to be revised. So, they are threatened with a
dilemma. Either there is a regress in the attempts to specify the missing
component that provides the normative standard, or that missing
component is lost and, with it, normativity. The sceptic faces the loss, the
reductionist attempts to make do with something less than what appears
to be lost by providing a reduced conception of the normative standards.
That is because both sorts of reading share the model of meaning
Having said that, it is probably more obvious to look in particular
at the case of the sceptical reading. As mentioned above, it is thesis (M)
that both sorts of reading take for granted to be the point of the rule-
following argument, namely, that the argument concerns the nature of the
normativity of meaning. In order for meaning to possible, it requires a
standard of correct/incorrect use of expressions or truth-conditions. The
point of knowledge of truth-conditions is that in knowing these
conditions, one knows under what circumstances one should/should not
apply the expression. That is to say, one has knowledgeof a normative
Constraint on expression use. The rule-following argument appears to
Propose a sceptical puzzle that consists in showing that such knowledge
of truth-conditions is impossible. The puzzle arises from reflections that
Show that there is no non-circular account available of whatit is to know
such normative constraints.
The way this idea is usually expressed is to say that understanding
an expression, e.g. the word ‘game’ or the instruction 'add 2' must be to
know what determines correct use. The idea of knowledge of normative
constraint is just another label for the idea of understanding the normative
rule that governs use. The key pointto the scepticism is that the content
of the knowledge required for knowledge of meaning is a normative
content; it is knowledge of what should/should not be done with
expressions. The sceptical argumentinsists that there is no account
available in terms of learning and in terms of what one does that could
constitute normative knowledge. In learning a concept one learns that it
has been used in such-and-such circumstances. The puzzle is how to make
the transition from how it has been used to how it should be used.
Similarly, an account of what one does with an expression does not show
what one should do. The former is simply a record of how the expression
is used and from that it is unclear how to derive an account of how it
should be used.
This way of characterizing the core shape to the rule-following
argument makes plain that the argument assumes that what is available in
an account of use is something that lacks the full-blooded normativity
required for meaning. That is why the scepticism concentrates on the
transition from what is/has been the case, to what should be the case. This
is the model (E) or the two-component model: meaning as such requires
both use, conceived independently of the normative constraint on use,
Plus that which provides the normative constraint. The response to this
argument structure that I advocate, namely, the model (1) can now be
simply expressed. It is the response that allows that the description of use
(Practice) is a description of something thatis intrinsically normative for
the normativity is immanent to use. And thatis the response that requires
that in our use of expressions we can manifest a direct knowledgeof
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truth-conditions.
In sum, whatI have tried to show here is that the general picture
of the two sorts of reading of the rule-following argument -- sceptical and
reductio reading-- should be replaced with the picture of a contrast
between the two models (E) and In the following, I will identify the
problem of rule-following based on the framework of the model (1) by
considering Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument on a textual basis. In
doing so, I divide my review into three main questions. First-- whyis an
account of meaning relevant to an accountof rule and tule-following?
That is to say, why cannot the notion of rule be accounted for
independently from understanding whatthe rule is? Second, if an account
of meaning requires an account of understanding and use, then in what
sense should such an accountbe given? On this point, there is a contrast
~ of an account of psychologism and behaviourism in which norms or rules
are not immanent. So it seems that there is a relation between tule and
use/understanding. The last question is that if such a relation is nota
reductionist relation, in which understanding a rule always an
interpretation, then in what sense should such a relation be accounted for?
That is to say, if the use and the tule are not two separate components of
meaning, then what does it mean to Say that use is constitutive of meaning
because norms are immanent to use?
1.3. The Review Of the Rule-Following Argument According to the
Model (1)
1.3.1, Does an account of meaning require an accountof rule?
In non-linguistic activities, the question about following a rule is
found in, playing a game, say, tennis, where there are sets of rules
Provided as a defining characteristic of the game and also as a standard of
“orrectness, The notion of rule may be accounted for as having two
fanctions, namely, a descriptive and normative function. Descriptively,
rules characterize whatit is to play a game. Though sucha notion of rule
does not prescribe howa player ought to play a game, it provides a
constraint in the sense that in order to be counted as playing such and
such a game, the player needs to follow an instruction of what it is to play
tennis. As rules constrain playing a game, they provide a standard of
correctness which normatively constrains playing a game because they say
what is correct or incorrectin playing the game. But following the
instruction may turn out not to be in the way which the instruction states.
This means that in following the rule, there is a normative element of what
one ought to do, rather than merely a descriptive element of what we
simply do. So it seems that the problem of following a rule is there when
one questions whether what we ought to do is in accord with the rule.
Put another way, understanding the meaning of a game or what
the game is about is not constituted by the rule; rather it is constituted by
the application of the rule in playing the game. That is because even
though it is clearly stated whatthe rules are, the problem still involves the
question of how to follow, or actually how rules are applied in practice.
However, it seems that rules are what establish what meaning is. That is
to say, all the future answers of whatis correct or incorrect are already
fixed by the rules. It is as if all the possible answers have been set in
advance of our applications. (PI 189,190) So that, it is not possible for
the future answers to deviate from whatthe rules state or predict. But
such a notion of rules brings in a problem.
Wittgenstein’s example (PI 143,185) shows the problem. One
learns the meaning of a rule ‘plus two’ by showing the ability to continue
a numerical series, e.g. 2,4,6,8... . If rules determine all the future
answers in advance of all the applications, then in teaching a pupil to add
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two, the pupil must be able to continue the series on the groundthat he is
following the rule of add two. But in judging whether he follows the rule,
we look at his former answers. This means that whatthe pupil has learnt
about the rule is within the finite examples of numbers, say 1000. A
problem begins when beyond 1000, he writes 1004, 1008,1012. Ifrules
already constrain the step or its answer, then how are we to rationalise his
answer in that case? -- whether he followsthe same rule of ‘plus two’ or
he has understood the rule in the way that after 1000 the answer will be
randomly selected or that means he just doesn’t understand the rule at all?
That is to say, such a notion of rule, a rigid machine or the superlative fact
(P1192), brings in either of the two horns of the dilemma — either a regress
of interpretations of the rule or a paradox thatthere is no distinction
between following the rule and conflicting with it. (PI 201)
So although rules provide a standard of correctness, it cannot be
such a notion of rule as the superlative fact, i.e. rules which establish all
the answers beyond the characterization of its use and understanding of
the subject. This means that in order to grasp their normative power, such
grasp must be in the knowledge of use. Knowing how to follow it is
indeed a matter of understanding the rule. The question of what counts as
knowing how to follow rule is hence similar to the question of what
counts as understanding a rule. In other words, the notion of rule cannot
be accounted for separately from the notion of understanding, and thereby
from an account of mastery of techniques or use: practice . (PI 199, 202)
Another wayto reinstate the above issueis this. Even though it is
Clearly stated in the rule about what is correct or not, a problem is still
Possible when weapply the rule, namely, the problem that what we do can
be otherwise from what the rule states. In PI 125, ° a puzzle about the
determination of rule on meaning seems to start when we wonder that
eR even though rules are set, when we follow them, “things do not turn out
as we had assumed”. It seems that weare always ‘entangled’ in our own
rules. But “This entanglementin our rules is what we want to understand
(ie. get a clear view (PI 125). We want to understand it because it
seems that meaning extends beyond whatis stated in the rule, that is,
beyond the prediction of the rule. It is the ‘entanglement’ in rules which
“throws light on our concept of meaning something.” (ibid.)
The possibility of things not turning out as we anticipate even if
weare following rules, illustrates a basic point expressed with the idea of
entanglement. It might be thought that the fact that things turns out
different to what was anticipated shows that whether there are rules
makes no difference to what we mean. In other words, meaning is
possible even if there are no rules. But that is not right because if talking
about rules has no sense, then that would mean that there is no point in
talking about meaning at all. If an account of meaning does not require a
notion of rule, then there is no meaning in what we do. If there are no
tules, then there is no distinction between what seems to be right and
what is right.
Whatthe idea of entanglementillustrates is then this: that even
though we are governed by rules, and in that sense there must be some
Sense to the idea that the rule imposes upon behaviour, nevertheless, the
rule need not be conceived as something utterly independent of behaviour.
We can be entangled in it, What this shows is that although to conceive of
rules as independent of use is problematic and invites either a regress of
explanation or an implausible platonistic metaphysics about the constraints
On Use, it still must be the case that a rule that is intrinsic to use provides
Some notion of imposition; otherwise, there is no standard. The idea of
Sntanglement indicates the core difficulty that needs to be understood,
namely, how can something both be immanent to use and provide
standards for use.
P1142-3 may provide some answers. Although the context of PI
142-3 is about the issue of whether understanding is the source of norms,
what underpins it is this idea that if there is no distinction between
whether what we do is subject to the rule or not, then what we do is just
‘broken’ or ‘comes to an end’, that is, it has no ‘meaning’ in what we do.
So there has to be a notion of standard, even if it is not one that is
extrinsic to use.
In PI 142, Wittgenstein distinguishes between a— case: the
use of words is prescribed and an abnormal case: if the rule became an
exception and an exception the rule, then a language game loses its point.
An example is the case of trying to fix the price of a lump of cheese which
grows or shrinks by the turn of the scale. There may be two possibilities
to understandthis case, namely, we need the notion of rule which is fixed
or independent from what it measures or else we need the notion of tule
which is varied to what it measures. In the latter case, there will be no
friction supplied by the rule.
That is more obvious in the example provided in PI. 143. An
example is of teaching an order of numbers 0,1,2,3,4,....to a pupil. A
normal case is that in learning the order, the pupil can be wrong or make a
mistake, But an abnormal case is the case in which the teacher takes what
he does as a variation of what the pupil does. If understanding the order
of numbers is in the sense of the abnormal case, it means that the pupil's
Capacity to learn from the teacher comes to an end. That is to say, once
ules are not independentfrom use, then there are no rules or no criteria
for doing correctly or incorrectly at all. Accordingly, an account of
meaning requires a notion of rules the objectivity of which is both
independent from our use in following it and also intrinsic to use. The
further question is if rules cannot be entangled extrinsic to the use, then in
what sense are they intrinsic to use? Thatis to say, we need an account of
understanding which provides meaning.
1.3.2. What it is to understand a rule?
The ‘entanglement’ with rules illustrates the notion of use which is
governed or constrained by rules. Meaningis related to use in a way that
use is a part of the notion of rule. This is the concept of thick use or the
use according to the unitary model, i.e. the notion of use which rules
intrinsically constrain. It is contrary to the concept of thin use -- the two-
component model-- where rules extrinsically constrain use.'° The notion
of use which provides the idea of entanglementhas to be accounted for as
the notion of use in which understanding of the rules is intrinsic. Basically,
this is the idea such that understanding of meaning does not require
interpretation. But this is different from saying that understanding is
accounted for as a sort of use, which means that understanding is use.
Understanding is not identical with use because it may mean two things:
first, understanding means an outer behaviour or the use; second,
understanding means an inner process, which Wittgenstein calls ‘an
imaginary application’ (see RFM, p.334, no.32).
Problems with the first meaning concern the idea of behaviourism,
namely, the problem that norms are threatened with being naturalised into
use. And the problem with this is that under the naturalisation the
normative 'should' of meaning is replaced with a non-normative This is
the point at issue when Wittgenstein asks whether whenI think that I
understand a rule, I say “now I understand” is similar to “now I can go
On” in the sense that it describes a mental process occurring behind a
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process of applying the rule. (PI 148-154) To expand the point a bit more:
if meaning is use, understanding meaning is characterizable in terms of
use; however, this is not meant in the sense that understanding fits with
the use in an identical sense. Such a notion of understanding is a
reductionist notion or the model which I called that is, normativity is
‘inherited’ in use. '' The inheritance of norms in use means the notion of
use being explained in terms of a description of use. If an account of
understanding is provided in terms of use or is reduced to the use
understood in the thin descriptive sense, then no account seems possible
of norms which constrain use. This is because a normative constraint is
not independent of use, so that there is no distinction provided between
use which accords to the rules and that which is against the rules.
The problem with the second meaning is that if the application is
an inner process in the sense that is not related to the external world, it is
unclear how a normative distinction within the internal mind is possible.
As Wittgenstein said: “Andif it is now said: “Isn’t it enough for there to
be an imaginary application?” the answer is: no. (possibility of a private
language)” (ibid.) That is because “A game, a language, a rule is an
institution.” (ibid.) It means that the application which provides meaning
requires the idea of use which is constrained by the external world. ‘An
institution’ in this sense is the normative constraint on meaning which is
external or independent from the application.
This is also the point in RFM VI —15 where Wittgenstein makes a
distinction between following a rule (“If you follow the rule, you will
Produce this”) and following it as best one can.(“If you follow the rule as
best you can, you The difference is that in the former case, there
is no genuine prediction of following a rule because “the concept of
following the rule is so determined, that the result is the criterion for
a.
A
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whether the rule was followed”. (RFM 317) Thatis to say, following a
rule in this sense, one maybe able to follow it correctly or incorrectly
because the criterion is within following the rule. Meanwhile, the latter
case is a genuine case of prediction because it is the case that one tries to
follow a rule whether correctly or not. In such a case, trying to followa
rule can be characterized as a mental process where thereis no criterion.
For the correctness of following a rule to be possible, following the rule
has to be characterized as a process that is perceptible externally where an
independentcriterion can be applied. However, the external process as is
characterized as following rule or use of a word requires the intrinsic of
the criterion in use.
If meaning is use, then understanding the meaning of a word
cannot be said to fit or cohere with understanding a meaning of a
Sentence. That is because understanding the meaning is when we use a
word or a sentence. But understanding and use seem to be twodifferent
notions. When we understand the meaning of a word that we hear or say
(use), we understandit in a flash (such as in a form of a mental image of
the word); but the use of a word is extended in time. (PI 318) Ifthe
meaning of understanding is characterized in terms of use, it means that
the notion of understanding is not a mental process which is independent
from the external world the direction of which is supplied by the use. The
question is that in whatsense such a notion of understanding provides the
normativity in use?
The notion of understanding occurring in an inner realm
independent of external use suggests the idea that understanding meaning
can be characterized independently. But such a notion of understanding
cannot be a source of norms,
Otherwise, meaning would be what happens
in Sond?the ‘mind’, the Problem of which is that one cannot makea distinction
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between whatis right and what seems to be right just ‘in the mind’. The
distinction is provided in the applications or in the use, which shows
whether one understands meaning, but that is because the notion of use
involves a normative constraint which is in the external world. Having
said that, it means that meaning is not determined by the sort of
understanding which is indifferent to the external world. This is different
from the view that the use lies at the surface of the understanding, which
means that understanding is something detached from the use. The notion
of understanding which does not only characterize the objectivity of
meaning but also leaves a space for the autonomy of objectivity is the
notion of understanding which is interwoven with external
Accordingly, the way out is to accountfor the notion of use which
is constitutive of rules. The pointis that if meaning is in use,
understanding has to be characterized in terms of use in the interweaving
sense that provides the idea of norms being intrinsic to use. That is to say,
there must be the notion of use which ‘fits’ into the rule in the sense that
use is governed by or constituted by rules. Andthis is where the idea of
‘practice’ comes in, that is, the idea that following a tule or use is
intrinsically normatively constrained.
1.3.3. The relation of use and norms
From the above, it also means that the relation of use and norms
or rules cannot be accounted for in the sense that rules are applied in use
in the reductionist sense. If understanding a rule is not an interpretation,
the only way we can talk about the relation of use and rule is in terms of
meaning or content possession rather than in terms of application of rules.
That is because application of rules suggests the idea that rules and use
are two components of meaning, so that there are possibly many ways for
interpreting the rules. I take this as Wittgenstein’s point when he rejects
the idea that the relation of rules and use is a causal relation in which
understanding a rule requires the ability to apply the rule. (PI 162-4) The
idea of causation does not provide the notion of use in which norms are
intrinsic because it merely describes use in the past, present and predicts
its future. But there is no normativity available in such a notion of use.
Accordingly, the question of how rules and use are related needs
to be answered from the model of meaning (1) in which rules are
immanentin use. It is in that sense that understanding does not require
interpretation. However, the rules or norms are still independent from use,
but in such a way that they can be directly grasped without
interpretations. It may be still questionable what it means to have a direct
understanding of meaning. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein talks about
the idea of truth or the ‘genuineness’ of an exgression. Some examples are
expression of mathematical truth, a judgement of colour, expression of
feelings or the genuineness of a glance, gesture. The point seems to be
about whether the truth of an expression in those areas is determined by
experts--agreement of judgement or by rules in which all the possible
answers are determined. Mathematicians may take mathematical truth as
independent from human belief --“Even though everybody believed that
twice two was five it would still be four?” (PI p. 226) If so, it means that
to imagine a race who has differentbeliefs about mathematics would be
Wrong. Butthatis not right because, as Wittgenstein says, mathematics is
not only a branch of knowledge, it is also an activity, which means that a
deviation of the rules is possible. But if the deviation is taken as an
“xception to the rules, then the mathematical games or rules would not be
Called rules anymore, that is, there are no rules. The point is not that
iti are by agreement of judgement, rather
Plays a role in establishing the truth-conditions but in such a
“ay that judgement does not replace truth-conditions with other sorts of
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conditions which are derived from the deviation of rules.
Similarly, the case of the truth of expressions of feeling — e.g. “that
one can distinguish between a genuineloving look froma pretended one”
(PI p.228)-- does not seem to be established by an expert, although one
may say, “There are rules, but they do not form a system, and only
experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules,”(PI
p.227) or that “ “the genuineness of an expression cannot be proved; one
has to feel it.” (PI p.228) The problem is that if other people do not agree
that what we feel is right, then what we mostly do is to take the
recognition of the genuineness of feeling as evidence. But it is
‘imponderable’ evidence, namely, evidence which cannot be predicted to
be a consequence of the rule or that which cannot be stated directly from
following the rule. The notion of evidence brings in a regress of
interpretations, that is, in order to recognise something as evidence, one
needs to interpret it as a consequence of following the rules that has
already happened. Having said that the genuineness of feeling does not
tequire evidence, the point is that it is not that there is no distinction
between true and false, genuine and pretending, rather it is that knowing
such a distinction is not based on evidence. That is to say, it is based on
our direct perception of its truth-conditions, but in such a waythat truth-
conditions can be characterized intrinsically to our experiences. The
notion of genuineness also cannot be accounted for as an independent
inner process as the notion of the superlative fact. It may be said that the
Problem is not in finding ‘how’ we can know such
distinction of
8enuineness and pretending, rather it is in answering the question of how
We ‘possess’ such a concept. An answer which I will provide in the
chapter lies in the idea of a disjunctive account of experience,
namely, either what wesee is manifestly to be so and so or it appears to
80. It s an account which still requires intrinsic truth-conditions which
can be directly grasped.
Moreover, the issue on whether truth-conditions of an expression
are established by a sort of Platonic rules or agreement in can
be summarised as follows. If it is right that the rule-following argument
proposes the idea that an account of meaning requires the idea of rules
which are independent but intrinsically constrain the use, then it is
necessary that judgementhas to directly fit into the world, not fit into
opinion of experts or a community agreement. However, this does not
mean to rule out the possibility of the agreement of judgement in the
community’s sense. As Wittgenstein says, “..the criterion for this
agreementis not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g.,
ostensive definitions-but also an agreement in judgements.” (RFM
39:343) However, the possibility of the community’s agreement is based
on the idea that one can know other people’s judgement without
interpretations. In the following, I will employ the main idea of this review
of the rule-following argument, that is, the account of meaning model
for criticising some examples of the model
2. The Two-Component Model
In this section, I discuss two examples of the two-component
model, namely, Kripke’s sceptical argument and Wright’s reductio
atgument in order to show that both share a similar assumption of thin use
Where meaning is composed of two separate components: descriptive use
and its extrinsic normative constraint. The difference between Kripke’s
(1982) and Wright’s (£1984) is that while Kripke replaces truth-
Conditions with assertability conditions, Wright is reluctant to do so in all
Areas of discourse. Wright suggests that truth and objectivity of meaning
can be constructed in terms of objectivity of judgements varied to
different areas of discourse, e.g. mathematics, ethics, colours. However,
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Wright’s notion of truth is constructed out of use but in the sense which,
as I will argue, is extrinsic to the use. Thereby, for this Teason, it does not
make his position radically different from Kripke’s. This section will show
that Kripke’s scepticism and Wright’s view are examples of model (E) the
account of meaning of which cannot satisfy the two basic constraints on
meaning, and that it brings in the dilemma of tule-following. In the last
section, I provide an idea of how the dilemma can be escaped by
considering McDowell’s transcendental argument. (McDowell 1984) It is
this argument which assumes the model of use
2.1. Kripke’s Sceptical Argument
Kripke’s main idea can be seen from the following quote:
we suppose that facts, or truth-conditions, are of the essence
of meaningful assertion, it will follow from the sceptical
conclusion that assertions that anyone ever means anything are
meaningless. On the other hand, if we apply to these assertions the
tests suggested in Philosophical Investigations, no such
conclusion follows. All that is needed to legitimise assertions that
Someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable
circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and
that the game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in
our lives. No that ‘facts correspond’ to those
assertions is needed,” (1982: 77-78)
Kripke’s sceptical argument on rule-following is, briefly, this — if
4 expression is to have meaning, there must be some facts or truth-
which Constitute meaning. The dilemma that flows from the
arguments invites either a regress in stating the relevant
fact, 8 OF an acceptance that no such facts are available. The regress is not
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tenable and to accept that there are no facts to determine meaningis
paradoxical. Accordingly, the expression has no Meaning. The sceptical
conclusion poses a threat to the idea that meaning is normative. That is to
say, the implication of the conclusion is that there is no substance to
meaning. When we speak or use a language, it is meaningless because
whether there are norms or no norms governing the use does not make a
difference to the use. But that is contradictory to our actual practice of
using a language, in which understanding meaningis possible, Hence,
there must be justification for our actual practice. The
thereby suggests a sceptical solution that meaning is possible because
justifications of meaning are provided by assertability conditions.
The assumption which the sceptical argumentrests on is that
meaning is normative. But meaning is normative in the sense that its
normativity is something to be added into a language because the
language itself does not have normative content. What provide its
normative content are the facts. The notion of fact which the sceptic is
asking for is the notion of full-blooded truth-conditions, namely, the
conditions under which a sentence can be judged as true or false, but in
such a waythat such conditions are beyond the use of the sentence. The
SCeptical challenge is that such a notion of facts brings in a paradox of
following a Tule, namely, the paradox that the sort of rules which fix
Meaning in the way that transcend use obliterates the distinction between
Whatis Counted as obeying the rules and what is not. Rules have power
if determining Our infinite applications in a new case; nevertheless, as they
do not have a normative role in our use of language, the question whether
in a new case is determined by the rules we understand cannot
J This means that meaning cannot be justified by truth-
Conditions.
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Kripke’s well-known example of the rule ‘plus’/ ‘quus’ is raised
here. If one understands the rule governing plus, then one should equate
‘125° to ‘68+57’. Suppose a pupil has never performed this case. But if he
is asked what the sum of ‘68+57’ is, he will answer ‘125° which is the
correct answer according to the arithmetical rule of plus two. A sceptical
challenge is: how can he know that his intention to mean ‘68+57’ is
‘125°? His answer is on the basis of his applying the rule plus twoin the
past. But the problem is that it is possible that in the past he applied the
rule ‘quus’ in which the answer is the normal one in all cases up to 56,
otherwise 5. What the pupil means by ‘plus’ is actually ‘quus’. This means
that if ‘125’ is to be the correct answer, there must be truth of the matter
or facts which determine the meaning of ‘68+57’ as a use of plus, not
quus.
There may be two possible sorts of facts which can be said to
determine meaning, namely, inner facts and dispositional facts. But the
sceptic shows that they fail to determine meaning for the following
reasons. Regarding the former sort of facts, if facts are established by our
inner experiences like sensations, then meaning must be directly accessible
because the inner experiences are introspectible or immediately accessible.
(see ibid.: 39-54) But the problem is, for Kripke, first, experiences of
Meaning are different from sensations, In case of experiences of meaning,
there is a question of how a word relates to the experience. That is to say,
in order to understand the experiences, norms or rules are required for
interpreting how a word got applied in such experiences. For Kripke, this
is the problem of a regress of rules for interpretation. Secondly, even if we
Suppose that there is a state of meaning ‘plus’ in the mind, it would be
logically impossible for a finite mind to be a source of rules the
@Pplications of which are infinite. That is to say, the inner experience is
Anite in the sense that the inner experience of meaning is merely a series
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of present states which do not include the past and future meaning. So it
cannot answer the sceptical question which is asking for the infinite
applications in future cases, that is, “What tells me how I am going to
apply a given rule in a new case?’. Lastly, if meaning is reducible to
experience of meaning, it cannot explain why I should give the answer as
I have done in the past. That question concerns the nature of meaning that
it is normative, rather than descriptive. But experience of meaning is
merely descriptive, not normative. Therefore, there is no such experience
of meaning which can be analogous with the experience of, say, headache,
or mental facts which could be a model for the facts that constitute
meaning.
Alternatively, what constitutes meaning may be in the external
applications rather than the internal facts. But the sceptical challenge is
that the external applications or dispositional facts, i.e. the facts that
meaning is accounted for in terms of dispositions to apply the rule, do not
determine meaning. The main reason is that such facts provide only
descriptive facts of whatI will do in the unexamined case, while “The
relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not
descriptive.” (ibid.:37) So, if one justifies meaning by reference to the
external facts, the sceptical question can still be asked “What tells me
how I am to apply a given rule in a new case?”. (ibid.:43) Similarly, the
internal facts cannot be the sort of facts which justify meaning because the
Same question can be asked our finite minds give rules that are
“"PPosed to apply to an infinity of cases.” (ibid.:54). Such questions can
be raised because there is a paradox that if there are facts justify meaning,
then whatever answers we give can be interpreted to accord or not accord
with the facts. This means that the distinction between what is the right
and what is not is obliterated. That is to say, the normativity of
meaning is obliterated, The sceptic hence concludes that because of the
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paradox that any assertion can be interpreted as following rule, there is
no meaning in what we do with language. In other words, if meaningful
expression requires facts or truth conditions, then “assertions that anyone
ever means anything are meaningless,” (ibid.:77).
But according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein, scepticism about meaning
merely shows the untenability of the idea of truth-conditions. That is
because the sceptical conclusion does not imply that our actual practice of
using a language is meaningless. The point is merely how to legitimise or
justify the use. So the solution to the sceptical problem is to replace the
idea of truth-conditions with justification conditions or assertability
conditions, namely:
assertions that someone means something is that there be
roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are
legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under
such has a role in our lives,” (ibid.:78)
For Kripke, the community is entitled to judge or correct
individual assertions. Practice is accounted for in terms of the
community’s use as the criterion for ascribing content of what one means.
2.2. Problems with Kripke’s Sceptic
Kripke's scepticism implies that something is problematic with the
notion of use according to the model E), namely, af use which
constrained by extrinsic norms, The sceptical conclusion shows an
absurdity of the model that is,
if there are no
the Tule-following
the absurdity that there is no meaning
conditions. Whatis not right in Kripke’s reading of
argument is that -- instead of focussing on the notion of
on Wittgenstein’s main idea of meaning in use by showing the
SC
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possibility that norms are intrinsic to the use, Kripke suggests a solution
by replacing the notion of norms or rules,
The difficulty is about how to understand the possibility that such
a notion of use (E) can deliver norms without facing the problem of either
horn of the dilemma. That is to say, the upshot of the attempt to escape
from one horn of the dilemma, i.e. the idea of transcendent truth-
conditions, leads the sceptic to the other horn, i.e. the situation where
there are no norms. Scepticism turns out to show that the dilemma is
unavoidable, so that if meaningis to be sustained, there is a need to justify
it. But the problem with the sceptical solution is that the justification
conditions bring in the problem of regress for interpreting the conditions.
That is because if the thesis (M) that meaning is normativeis right, and
that the dilemma poses the threat to then to account for meaning in
terms of justification conditions does not overcome such a threat. On the
contrary, it brings in the regress problem of what justifies such conditions.
However, Kripke thinks that that is not to be the problem because
Wittgenstein’s answer is in the idea of practice or custom. That is to say,
what stops the regress is the brute fact that people agree. (ibid.: 109)
However, that answer does not seem to be right because as the fact is
brute, it means that there is no normative content. Justifications are
required in order that normative content is possible, that is, the normative
“onstraint must be provided. But once such a constraintis not intrinsic to
the fact that we agree and use language, it means that the constraint
‘ranscends use, the problem of which is the possibility of regress of
interpretations, This is surely not the problem which Kripke wants to
because it shows what Kripke himself had shown, that is, the
Problem of following a rule arises once we think that what we do with
© ls nothing but a mere descriptive fact of what we do with
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language. This means that there will be no such a problem if what we do
with language is intrinsically normative, that is, the notion of use
according to the model
The sceptical reading has been also criticised on other grounds.
For example, what worries many people is the sceptical solution, Kripke’s
idea of the justification conditions is provided by the idea of community’s
criterion, but it does not fare better than the individual criterion which he
argues against. If the idea that internal facts fix meaning cannot be
justified, then the external facts as the community’s criterion cannot be
justified either. That is to say, the sceptical question: “whattells the
community how it is to apply a given rule in a new case?” can be raised.
Apart from that worry, manydisagree with the sceptical reading on the
ground that Wittgenstein’s idea is not to propose a sceptical question;
rather he proposes a reductio ad absurdum against the concept of platonic
rules, An example of the disagreement can be found in Wright who thinks
that Wittgenstein argues against the notion of the objectivity of meaning
on the assumption that there will be an absurdity of taking meaning to be
in the mind, rather than on the assumption of the absurdity of no reality of
meaning. I turn now to Wright’s idea.
2.3. Reductio Argument
According to Wright’*, there are two points on which he agrees
muh Kripke. First, the target of Wittgenstein’s argumentis to reject the
idea of a Platonistic reality of meaning. Second, what provides normativity
for meaning is in the community practice. However,his disagreement with
Kripke is this: firstly, Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument is not a
Sceptical argument, rather it is
Which shows that the premise
nterpretation is false, rather
a reductio argument, namely, an argument
that understanding is always an
than showing that there is no reality of
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meaning; and secondly, Wittgenstein does not suggest a sceptical solution
that truth-conditions have to be replaced with assertability conditions,
rather he suggests the idea of grammar of meaning and thinking. In other
words, for Wright’s Wittgenstein, there is a reality of meaning in the sense
of objectivity of judgement, thatis, it is ‘constructive’ in the use and
thereby in the linguistic practice. However, we can take Wright’s
disagreementin the way that while the first point concerns the rejection of
the Cartesian conception of mind in the sense of a self-standing state of
mind, the second point concerns the rejection of Platonism of meaning or
the objectivity of truth-conditions. Both points share the same sort of
rejection, namely, the rejection of self-standing states of affairs. That is
because Wright takes the point of the rule-following argument as similar
to the Private Language Argument, that is, they reject metaphysical
realism. (e.g.,1998:40, 1986:295-297) I look at the second disagreement
first by expanding his disagreements in a way which shows that Wright’s
account of meaning is however an example of the model
2.3.1. The Ordinary Notion of Intention
According to Wright, the premise which the rule-following
argument argues against is that understanding is always an interpretation;
and its conclusion is that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an
‘nterpretation.”. What Wright means by this conclusion is:
“...that something other than the exercise of interpretative
(rational) faculties enters into the capacity to ‘read’ another’s
linguistic behaviour. And the additional something is, crudely,
human nature: certain sub-rational propensities towards
Conformity of response, towards ‘going on in the same way’,
which alone make possible the formation of the common
Conceptual scheme within which our rational capacities can be
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exercised.” (1987: 394)
According to Wright, grasp of meaning does not only require
interpretation in the sense of the rational faculties, but also require the
sub-rational disposition of humans to agree. This means that, as I take to
be Wright’s idea, understanding meaning requires both interpretation and
something adding to it, which makes the interpretation works, That is to
say, understanding meaning does not require interpretations in the mind.
The reductio of meaning arises if knowing meaning is reducible to
Cartesian internal states where one needs to look for meaning within. (cf.
ibid.: 403) So, what provides meaning is not to be inferred internally,
rather it is in what Wright calls ‘the additional something’, namely, as I
take it, an outward response of human behaviour. However, knowledge of
meaning is, in a sense, self-knowledge that can be known without
inference or interpretation in the mind. What Wright proposes is the
ordinary notion of intention in which a subject is non-inferentially
authoritative with respect to its content; in other words, the subject
knows the meaning in the past, present, and future case without
interpretation, and that knowledge has an infinitary characteristic, to
which content can be ascribed. However,I will argue later that such
notion of intention faces the dilemma of rule-following in the following
Sense: instead of rejecting the self-standing state of mind, such a notion
turns out to embrace a platonic sort of inner state the problem of which is
4 regress of interpretation,
Wright’s ordinary notion of intention is a response to the problem
Which Kripke’s sceptical argument has posed concerning the internal facts
that even though they have an immediate and introspectible character,
they do not constitute meaning. That is because the internal facts provide
Only the present state of what the subject means while the sceptic asks for
ET
a justification of whatI had formerly meant and whatI intend to mean ina
future case. Wright thinks that that is true only if it means that knowledge
ofa present meaning is also inferential. That is to say, what the sceptic
actually assumes is that my intention to mean something cannot be known
directly; otherwise, the answer to the sceptic by citing my former meaning
would have been satisfactory. (see Wright 1984) This means that the
problem, for the sceptic, is mainly that the internal facts themselves are
finite, so that we can know only the present meaning; hence the internal
facts cannot provide the infinitary applications for a new case, which is the
characteristic of rules or facts which constitute meaning.
According to Wright’s response to the sceptic, ifa notion of
intention can be provided in the sense that it is non-inferential and infinite,
then such a notion would block the sceptical argument. That is to say, we
need an account of self-knowledge in which the ordinary or intuitive
notion of intention has both characteristics-- non-inferential and imfinitary
knowledge. Wright’s main idea is that meaning is not within the inner
states, rather it is in a sort of quasi-dispositional state of a subject. That is
to say, although access to an intention is non-inferential, ascription of its
content which is infinite requires knowledge of what is external to the
intention, that is, in the ability or performances of the intention. In
Particular, this is accounted for in terms of attitudinal avowal of intention,
to which content can be ascribed under circumstantial conditions. (Wright
1987) In the following, I expand this point in order to consider how
ascription of contentis possible according to Wright’s ordinary notion of
intention,
There is a difference between knowing what I am now thinking
and knowing my intentions relating ‘to all situations of a certain kind’
(Wright 1984:1 13). In the former case, it is infallible to say whether what
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] am thinking now is P, e.g. whether I am having a headache. While the
latter case includes the knowledge of the former case but in such a way
thatit is fallible, because knowing my intention that ‘I am having a
headache.’ can be judged by relating to circumstances and outward
expressions. For Wright, the former case is characteristic of a Cartesian
conception of mind, namely, within the inner states of mind, there is no
fallibility of thought: ‘is right’ and ‘seems right’ are indistinguishable. To
reject Cartesianism, the latter case is required, namely, the idea of the
ordinary notion of intention-- it is fallible to know myintention relating
‘to all situations of a certain kind’. That is because, as Wright takes it, the
inner mind is not independent from the subject’s judgements. That is to
say, my intention has “no end of distinct responses, in distinct situations,
which I must make if I remember this intention, continue to wish to fulfil
it, and correctly apprehend the prevailing circumstances.” (ibid.)
Briefly, the ordinary notion of intention is “the phenomenon of
non-inferential, first-person knowledge of past and present meanings,
tules and intentions” (1989:236), and it has characteristic of mind--
alongside thought, mood, desire, and sensation--that a subject has, in
general, authoritative and non-inferential access to the content of his own
intentions, and that this content may be open-ended and general, may
Telate to all situations of a certain kind.” (1984:113) The infinitary
characteristic of the intention or the open-ended responses to the intention
accounts for how the normative ability in unexamined cases is possible on
the basis of the finiteness of former responses. This infinitary knowledge
has, what Wrightcalls, the general content which has the ‘infinity’ in a
similar sense as capacity of any universally quantified conditional.
Gx), to yield indefinitely many consequences of the form, Ga,
»When conjoined with corresponding premises of the form, Fa,
ibid.)
Put another way, according to Wright, the phenomenon of non-
inferential and infinitary knowledge can be accounted for in terms of what
he calls the phenomenon of avowal, namely, the phenomenon of
authoritative, non-inferential self-ascription. (1998:14) This phenomenon
includes both the non-inferential and infinitary character of knowledge of
the self For Wright, the phenomenon is composed of two sorts of
avowal: phenomenal avowal and attitudinal avowal.
The former are the occurrences of mental states or consciousness
and sensations which are not content-bearing states, namely, states to
which content cannot be individuated. (ibid.:15) Meanwhile, in the latter
sort of avowal, content can be individuated in the form of propositional
attitudes or ‘intentional direction’, e.g. “I think that the sky is blue.” , “I
am thinking of my mother.” The two sorts of avowal have epistemic
asymmetry. That is to say, the former illustrates the phenomenon of first-
person access which is groundless or baseless for answering the question
‘How can you tell?’ because evidences to support my avowal, say, ‘I have
a headache.’ are not only not necessary, but it is also absurd to say‘I
don’t know whetherI have a headache.’. By contrast, the latter is the
attitude or the interpretation of the mental phenomenon or, as what
Wrightcalls, the process of self-interpretation of which criterial
justification involves third-person testimony. As the phenomenal avowal is
an avowal regarding inner observational realm, it is non-inferential and
infallible. Wright takes it as the Cartesian model of mind in which the
truth-value of the avowal is immediate to the subject in the sense that only
the subject knows whether the avowal is true or not. However, it is
infallible because there is no independent criterion for distinguishing what
is right from what seems right for the subject. Whatis inferential, reliable
and fallible lies in the outer observational realm, namely, the attitudinal
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avowal. It is in this sort of avowal that content can be ascribed and is
infinite.
So, for Wright, the phenomenon of avowals provides an account
for how both non-inferential and infinitary knowledge of the self is
possible. Such a phenomenon accounts for the ordinary notion of
intention. As he distinguishes the avowals into two sorts, it shows the
asymmetry of first-person/third-person self-knowledge in the sense that
the phenomenal avowal is prior to the attitudinal avowal. That is to say,
knowing what an intention is is prior to recognising its content. (see
1984). It is not the other way round. Otherwise, he thinks that it will be
open to “unwelcome interpretation” (ibid.:113), and the sceptical question
will be raised, what principle could I assure myself that those (or
attitudinal avowals, my quote) were the thoughts on which I should be
concentrating, rather than some other recent (ibid.:112)
However, although Wright’s point is to resist the sceptic by
employing the intuitive notion of intention, it is rather apparent from my
review of his idea that his notion of intention also belongs to the two-
component model as well as the sceptic. This can be seen from the way he
makes the distinction between phenomenal avowal and attitudinal avowal
such that the former is prior to the latter. It means that content or
Meaning is something needed to be added to the descriptive phenomenal
avowal which turns out to be the self-standing mental phenomenon. But it
is the self-standing phenomenon which Wright wants to reject as, for him,
the problem which the tule-following argument has shown is the problem
Concerning the untenability of Platonism of meaning. But to reject
Platonism in that way is to embrace the model But, as I already
Showed, that model is actually the problem which the rule-following
argumentis supposed to deal with. Before expanding my criticism on
 
Wright’s idea, | first look at his argument against the sceptical solution
that assertability conditions be replaced with truth-conditions.
2.3.2. The grammar of meaning and truth: objectivity ofjudgement
Wright argues that the sceptic turns outto be self-contradictory in
rejecting the notion of truth. Thatis to say, in rejecting truth, it also
makes the statementof the sceptical solution -- what determines meaning
is assertability conditions-- not true. But that is absurd for Wright. This
means that we need an accountof truth which allows ascriptions of truth-
values to be possible. Thatis the notion of truth as objectivity of
judgement whichis constituted by our linguistic practice.
According to Wright (e.g.1986), Kripke’s sceptic has a Humean
basic assumption, namely, a contrast of factual statements with projective
statements. The latter includes statements concerning emotion, moral
values, and causation. Once the sceptic can prove that meaning statements
are not factual statements, then it means that meaning statements are
Projective, namely, meaning statements are never true. For Wright, such a
conclusion brings in a question whether the sceptical conclusion that there
is no meaning is also projective. That is to say, the sceptical conclusion
and also the sceptical solution are not factual or not true. If that is the
Case, then the sceptical argument would be absurd. This means that in
Order that the sceptic can make sense of their conclusion and solution, the
Notion of fact or truth which Kripke’s sceptic rejects has to be the notion
whichis sufficiently substantial, that is, it is not the notion of truth in the
“ense of being factual which is contrasted with being projective. What
Wright Proposes is that the notion of truth-conditions which is to be
has to be the notion of truth being independent from our ability to
Know it in the sense of Lockean primary qualities.
31
This means that although to endorse assertability conditions is to
reject the notion of truth in the sense that provides an ‘objectivity of
meaning’ ,i.e. as Wright puts the belief that what determines the
truth values of these statements is wholly independentof human
assessment of them and, at best, contingently correspondent with it.”
(1986: 283) However, this does not mean that a meaning-statement will
never be true or is globally projective or that “...every judgement of the
truth of a statement, so every Statement, becomes non-factual”
(ibid.:275). That is because meaning and intentions are secondary qualities |
in the Lockean sense thatis, knowledge of intention and meaning is not
independentfrom our ability to determine or track its truth-values. That is
to say, such knowledge is defeasible, ie. acquired evidence can defeat or
discount the avowal of intention, The idea of defeasibility is what
accounts for the notion of objectivity; in other words, truth is secondary,"
Although to reject the objectivity of meaning is to Teject the
substantial notion of truth, there is ‘truth-value’ or content which is not
Substantial in a statement. (ibid.:274) For Wright, there is such a thing as
a “basic statement’ whose truth is not substantial, but has objectivity in the
Sense of objectivity of,Judgement. That is to say, there is a class of
Statements which has real subject matter of fact, as apt to be correct
OF incorrect in virtue of how matters stand in certain objective states of
affairs which may be the objects of human cognition.” (ibid.:281) This is
the class of statements which are non-factual but true in the sense of being
Correct given human recognitional capacities. The point is this: the
Content of such Statements or their correctness is determined by practice
in the sense of ‘our ongoing linguistic behaviour’ which is grounded on
Sur basic perceptual judgement or our basic common recognitional
“Apacities to have a disposition to use language correctly. That is to say,
the only objectivity or Correctness we can find in basic statements is the
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objectivity of judgement which is not independent from human cognition.
This means that basic statements do not get their content only
from the perceptual or basic judgement, but also from other inferential
processes, namely, the reliability of judgements. Briefly, basic statements
are statements the content of which is derived from recognitional
capacities and/or inferential processes. So, their truth-value is not only
determined directly by basic judgement or common perceptual abilities in
normal circumstances but also by the consensus of members in that
circumstance. Consensus means the sharing of basic concepts, or the
sharing of the disposition to agree in basic judgement. (see ibid.:285) For
Wright, although consensus merely enhances the likelihood ofjudgement
among members rather than provides a certainty, consensus of human
response provides the ground for correctness of judgement. That is to say,
the correctness of judgementis accounted for in terms of ‘genuine
warrant’, rather than in terms of the strong notion of truth or the
objectivity of meaning.
Wright defines his thesis of ‘truth’ in terms of genuine warrant in
the following way:
“T: For any context C, agent X, and statement S: ifX acquires the
belief that S in C, then there will be certain basic statements
Telating to the circumstances and process whereby .’s belief was
acquired such that (1) if he did not actually do so, X could have
assessed any of these statements in the course of arriving at his
belief that S: and (2) X has acquired impeccable, a fortiori genuine
Watrant for his belief that S onlyif each such statement is
true.”(ibid.: 291)
The first condition is aboutthe possible condition of acquiring the
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belief S, so that it provides the explanatory condition for the unexamined
statement. The second condition provides the concept of truth as ‘genuine
warrant’ which is defined by three sorts of defeasibility. The first sort is
that a belief is false if there is other stronger or equally strong defeating
evidence. The secondsort is to show whythe original evidence is
available. The last sort is to show that some features of the gathering
evidences are disqualified. For example, “..the disclosure of pressure leaks
in the apparatus, drunkenness in the observer, or a powerful magnetic
field which may have affected the gauges.” (ibid.:290) But it is the last
sort of defeat which constitutes the genuine warrant because it questions
the validity of data, while the first two sorts, though accepting the data,
question the capacity of evidence to warrant belief. The validity of data
constitutes genuine warrant in the sense that for a particular belief to be
genuine warrant, it is necessary that a large class of relevant basic
judgements be true. (ibid.:291) So genuine warrant provides true beliefs in
the sense which is based on our recognitional capacities.
What Wright attempts to show is that to reject the objectivity of
meaning does not commit one to Idealism, rather the objectivity or truth is
constructive. That is to say, truth is constructed within human cognition
or is within ‘practical controls’ (ibid.:294), in the sense of genuine
watrant. This means that our cognition can be fallible because there is an
independent object of knowledge, which Wright has put it in terms of
basic judgements or perceptual judgements. But because we have
agreement of so the idea of consensus which grounds our
Tecognition of truth is unavoidable.
Although it is right as Wright said that “The price of objective
meaning is an absolute conception of truth: a conception absolved from all
Practical controls.” (ibid.), the ‘practical controls’ in his constructivist
view turn out to be threatened by the regress problem. The problem can
be seen from his account of human cognition in the waythat there is a
distinction of basic judgements from basic statements in the similar way as
he distinguished the phenomenal avowal from the attitudinal avowal in
case of intention. While basic judgements are ‘unarticulated’, basic
statements are the expressed forms of such judgements. It can be said that
the content of basic statements is derived from recognitional capacities
which are based on judgements plus inferential or defeasible processes.
But sucha distinction is the characteristic of the two-component model.
2.3.3. Problems with Wright’s Idea
As I mentioned above, Wright takes the point of the rule-
following argumentand the Private Language Argument that they reject
metaphysical realism or, as he takes it, the conception of self-standing
states of affairs. This means that Wright equates platonism with
Cartesianism. The problem is that the rejection of the self-standing states
of affairs turns out to be the rejection of the autonomy of normativity of
content. The upshot is the dilemma of the rule-following, namely, the
problem of regress of interpretation of the intention and the problem of no
norms.
I take it that what Wright means by platonism and Cartesianism is
this. While platonism about meaning means the idea that truth-conditions
are beyond our ability to recognise their obtaining, Cartesianism means
the idea that mental content is beyond public accessibility. Wright
Conflates them together in the way that both share the idea of independent
States of affairs. So to reject such an idea means to reject any independent
States of affairs. In rejecting platonism of meaning, Wright offers the idea
of objectivity of judgement; andin rejecting Cartesianism, he offers the
idea of ordinary notion of intention. But the main idea behind such
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rejections is the assumption that content is not possible within the self-
standing states of affairs. To reject that idea, for Wright, is to say that the
states of affairs are not beyond our cognition, in the sense that it requires
someother interpretative method to access such states. However, the
problem is this-- once the self-standing states of affairs are separated from
our conceptual abilities to recognise them, this brings in the problem of
the dilemma of rule-following because there is a problem of understanding
requires interpretation.
This can be seen from the way Wright separates two sorts of
avowal, as mentioned above. Such a separation, instead of resisting the
sceptic, brings in the question which the sceptics ask, namely, how is it
possible that the two avowals are connected? There must be justification
for how meaning is attached to phenomenal avowal. Wright is offering an
account of how that connection is possible with the model of self-
knowledge in which content is to be ascribed by having the attitudinal
avowal or self-interpretation. But the problem is this model brings back
the threat of regress of interpretation of the self.
Wright is assuming that there is a pure ‘self’ which requires
interpretation, and the interpretation lies in the way concepts are formed,
that is, in our performances or linguistic practice. In that sense, within the
‘self, there is no concept or meaning, rather the formation of concepts
is co-eval with the developmentof intentional linguistic activity. The
having of a concept....is immanent in, rather than underlies, competent
linguistic performance.” (1991:140) But that is the issue of how concepts
are acquired, which does not answer the question of how possession of
Concepts is possible. It is different because asking the latter question is
based on the assumption of the model (I) which the rule-following
argument has shown to solve the dilemma which arises from the model
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The model (E) confuses learning or formation of concepts with
possession of concepts. If the model of self-interpretation is to work, we
need to accept that there is a ‘pure’ and non-conceptual self in order that
the process of forming the concept can be assigned to as the interpretation
of the self. But that still begs the question against the sceptic about how
that process is possible. So Wright’s model of self-interpretation looks
unconvincing.
Accordingly, it is legitimate to say that Wright’s idea of use is the
two-component model. This is quite obvious from his responses to
McDowell’s criticism. (Wright 1998) What Wright wants to reject is the
picture in which, as mentioned above, content can be ascribed to the self-
standing states of affairs of the mind. The main issue of the debate is that
he thinks that McDowell’s mistakeis in thinking that mental states are
conceptual. That is because, for Wright, it is not always true that we
always have concepts involved in those states. For example,
“ .. a dog can be tired, or afraid, or have an itch, without having any
conceptof those states.” (ibid.:22) Having a concept is a matter of the
ability to ascribe attitudinal states to the subject. For Wright, if McDowell
is right, then the private linguist can be an autodidact, which is the
Cartesian model of mind. For him, we can teach someone to vocalise and
thereby to conceptualise his inner phenomenon, in the same way as we
can take that somebodyis in pain from his behaviour though we cannot
see what happens in his mind. (see ibid.:27) The phenomenal avowal
Which is the Cartesian model of the mind can allow that,
some point, a subject’s competence in the linguistic
toutines in which, in both the inner and the outer cases, he is
trained, will amount to the possession of concepts. And the
identity of the concepts then possessed will supervene on the
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linguistic intentions of the subject: on the patterns of use which he
will be willing to uphold.” (ibid.:28)
The reason why he does not wantto accept that mental states are
conceptual is because it is the view that the mindis self-standing, to which
the epistemic access is not possible. What McDowell would say in
response to Wrightis this-- in rejecting that view, there is no need to
separate the mental states from its conceptual element. That is to say, the
pointis that it is not necessary to find the explanation or the justification
for how we possess concepts. McDowell would certainly agree with
Wright that we cannot always know whatis in another person’s mind.
But, for McDowell, that impossibility arises only when we start from
thinking that there is something real ‘in itself? independently determining
what we seem to see. (see McDowell 1991) Then we are proneto find a
connection between what one sees in others’ behaviour and whatis its
cause. But that is a mistake for we will end up with the regress of
interpretations of others’ behaviour. However, for McDowell, it does not
mean that there is no objectivity in what one seems to see. I will come
back to this point in the next section.
However, it may be argued that in rejecting platonism, Wright
does not endorse the model This can be seen from his suggestion that
in rejecting platonism,
“..the content of a subject’s intentional states is not something
which may merely be accessed, as it were indirectly, by
interpretative methods....but is something which is intrinsically
sensitive to the deliverances of best interpretative methodology.”
(ibid.:29)
That is to say, instead of taking content as intrinsic to the subject’s
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intentional states, it is something intrinsic to the interpretative methods or
the subject’s judgements. So there is no platonist mythology because an
intention, which determines its subsequent conformity and non-
conformity, is not independent of the subject’s judgements, (ibid.)
However, the accountof the subject’s judgements is not to be done in
terms of a dispositional account. To argue for that point, Wright employs
the idea of the view, as in the following.
The best interpretative methodology which is not independent
from our judgements involves all the infiniteness of the subject’s sayings
and doings. Ina similar manner to the case of self-knowledge, the
‘default view’ is the constitutive principle of intentional states which says
that psychological claims are primitively constituted in a subject’s
opinions about herself, which is
authoritative and default-limitative: unless you can
show how to make better sense of her by overriding or going
beyond it. Her active self-conception, as manifest in what she is
willing to avow, must be deferred to. The truth-conditions of
psychological ascriptions are primitively conditioned by this
constraint.”(ibid.:41)
For Wright, the execution of an intention is not a disposition in the
Sense that it is characterized by the consequences of that state, rather it
has to be accounted for in terms of what is constitutive of that state. The
Constitutive principle has to be understood under the idea of the
objectivity of judgement, which can be detected by whathe calls the
Control of correctness of judgement. The control of correctness is
accounted for in the form of Euthyphro Contrast, i.e. the biconditional of
the difference between truth as judgement independent and truth as
jud,Judgement dependent. (Wright 1989) The point of the control is to show
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that truth is constitutive of judgementin a way which can be detected
whetherit is dependentor not on the judgement. However, a problem is
that if the distinction between truth and judgement is obliterated, then the
constitutive principle has no point. This can be briefly shown as follow.
Wright designs a test for examining which side of the biconditional
is prior for language about, e.g. mind, color, and shape. The test is called
the order-of-determination test which "concerns the relation between best
judgement- judgements made in what are, with respect to their particular
subject-matter, cognitively ideal conditions of both judge and
circumstance-and truth." (ibid.:246) The cognitively ideal conditions are
what form our best judgementor best opinions, i.e. the normal non-
defeasible conditions of human responses. If judgements fail the test, then
it means that the best opinions determine the extension of the truth-
predicate of judgements ,and "there is no distance between being true and
being best; truth, for such judgements, is constitutively what we judge to
be true when we operate under cognitively ideal conditions".(ibid.) An
example is judgements of colour. If judgements pass the test, then they
are extension-reflecting judgements which track independent states of
affairs that confer the truth-value on them. An example is judgement of
shape or Lockean primary quality.
To put it briefly, the test is about whether a judgement either
determines or tracks the extension of truth. In case of a judgementof
Colour, Wright claims the judgement fails the test because it fails to track
the extension of truth or objectivity of colour. So colour is judgement-
dependent or judgementdetermines extension. But a judgement of shape
Passes the test because it tracks the extension under the ideal condition;
that is, it is judgement-independent. Tracking the extension has to be
“counted for under ideal conditions --the condition in which the
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operational criterion is applied, namely, a ‘normal’ condition which
ensures the correctness of the judgements. For example, the lighting
condition is good enough to rule outa visual illusion. However, this
means that although the judgementof shape passes thetest, it is
judgement-independentin the sense which is still under the ideal condition
or the determinate condition of tracking the extension. That is to say,
Wright’s idea of the test on the objectivity of judgement does not really
provide the contrast between determination and tracking the extension
because even in the case of the tracking judgement, it still employs the
method of determination in setting the ideal conditions. That may be due
to his rejection of the objectivity of meaning the upshot of which is that
once truth is not independent from judgement, then there is nothing to
guarantee that there is an independentobject of tracking for the tracking
judgement. So Wright’s idea of the control of correctness seems to fail to
provide the idea of tracking the truth.
However, Wright might argue that this control of correctness
relates to the constitutive principle which states that the independent state
of affairs is primitively constitutive of the subject’s opinion or judgement.
The point is only that the tracking judgement manifests responsiveness to
independentstates of affairs (1998:42), such as in the case of first-person
Psychological claims. Judgement about mental states requires, what he
calls, the Positive-presumptive or the no-self-deception condition
(1989:251) or the ideal condition as in the case of other sort of
Perception, However, what Wright presupposes is the idea of agreement
of human response to truth, in which correctness can be tracked. But, as
already mentioned, this is problematic because he conflates truth with the
tool of tracking truth. The problem is that once there is no distinction
between them, it is not possible to talk about meaning. It is the paradox of
Tule-following that the correct response cannot be distinguished from the
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incorrect response.
In sum, the main flaw of Wright’s ‘default view’ is his rejection of
the combination of conceptual content with mental states, which is the
idea of the model The upshot is the attempt to find a connection for
them, or the need to construct an accountof possessing concepts. As
McDowell (1991,1998,) says, the default view is just an interpretation of
the conceptual mental states of a subject, which he already possesses. So
the attempt to link concept with mindis in vain, and finally leads to the
paradox of rule-following. Briefly, Wright’s view on both issues
concerning objectivity of judgement and self-knowledge are not
convincing on the groundthat they are threatened by the dilemma of
following a rule. The idea of objectivity of judgement requires the idea of
basic agreement of human responses to the correctness condition, but this
idea falls into the second horn of the dilemma where there are no norms at
the basic level. The idea of self-knowledge requires the idea of a no self-
deception condition in order that a correct self-interpretation is possible,
but this idea falls into the horn where there is regress of interpretation.
The main flawed assumption in both issues is the idea of meaning and use
according to model namely, the idea that normativity is extrinsic to
the behaviour or the use. That is the idea that meaning or concept cannot
be combined with the self-standing state of affairs.
This also brings in a problem which concerns the notion of
Practice. Wright’s notion of practice is employed in order to be a
“onnection or a justification of how the self-standing state of affairs has
Meaning. But such a notion of practice --our ability or our on-going
linguistic use-- does not provide the normativity of meaning as it is
intended to do, Rather it tums out to be the idea of justification, namely,
= defeasibility conditions which proposes not only a reductive account
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of meaning, but also conflates the method of judgement with the criterion
of judgement. But the idea of defeasibility provides merely a symptom of
meaning: it is not constitutive. '® Accordingly, I conclude that Wright’s
account of the notion of use and practice is driven by the two-component
model. If we accept that the thesis (M) that meaning is normative is a
correct thesis, then the dilemma of rule-following is a real threat to an
account of meaning. This means that we need model (I) the idea of which
is that normativity of meaning or truth-condition does not lie beyond a
context in which our minds play the rational role in understanding human
actions. So I turn to the idea of the unitary model of use, which is based
on McDowell’s view or as he calls it the ‘transcendental argument’
(1984,: 353) in the following section.
3. The Transcendental Argument
The rule-following considerations show that it is in our use or
practice which normativity of meaning is embedded. Butif the dilemma of
tule-following is the problem of understanding meaning and practice, then
what we need is an account of practice which is not only an act without
interpretation but also subject to a rule. That account, according to
McDowell’s Wittgenstein, requires the idea of belonging to “a custom (PI
198), practice (PI 202), or institution (RFM VI-31)”(ibid.: 342).
However, the idea of ‘communal practice’ has to be accounted for on the
8round which does not fall into the dilemma of rule-following, namely, the
Sround that understanding meaning is not an interpretation. That is the
idea of McDowell’s transcendental argument.
The transcendental argument is what McDowell calls the ‘non-
conception of meaning (ibid.:350). It says that the account of
istic use requires the notion of meaning within that account in which
‘mowledge of meaning is not arrived by interpretation. That is the idea of
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the model It is contra to the mode! which underpins the ‘anti-
realist’ conception of linguistic. The problem which McDowell has
indicated, especially in Wright’s idea, is that the account of following a
rule turns out to be the sub-bedrock accountin which there is only the
‘meaning-free’ resemblance of each individual behaviour. According to
the transcendental argument, the account of linguistic use requires an
account of meaning which is not external to a context of a linguistic
community. But it is the sense of a linguistic community which is
«.,.bound together, not by a match in mere externals (facts accessible to
just anyone), but by a capacity for a meeting of minds.”(ibid.:351). The
‘meeting of minds’ is the way one can know another’s meaning without
interpretation. So, in that sense, the ‘communal practice’ is not what we
employ as an interpretation of meaning, rather it is the context within
which meaning lies.
However, that does not mean that the objectivity of meaning is
lost into the communal practice. Rather meaning is not autonomous from
use within a context. The rejection of the autonomy of meaning is only in
the sense that the pattern of use extends of itself to new cases without our
Perspective about the pattern. Saying that the normative constraint of
Meaning lies in practice means two things. First, the truth-conditional
Conception of meaning cannot be reducible. For the non-anti-realist, truth-
Conditions are given in the language that we use and understand. That is
0 say, when we know that “P” is true if and only if P, whatis given on
the right-hand side of the schema is the world. Of course, the sense of
‘world? here ig not the ‘world as it is in itself’; rather it is, in Kantian
srs, the empirical world, It is the world as already conceptualised, but
a there is no other conception of the world. The
ae of the worldin itself provides the sort of fact the
vity of which is extrinsic; the latter sort of fact—the empirical
world -- contains normativity intrinsically, However, that does not mean
that facts depend on us. So, the secondpoint is that there is the objectivity
of meaning which is the constraint on our use. The autonomy of meaning
is rejected only in the sense that it can extend its pattern of use of itself
without our epistemic/ontological involvement. The epistemic
involvement means the involvement of ways of thinking about an object.
In that sense, ontologically, we are engaging with the object, However,
the involvement cannot be understood in the sense of verification or
evidential proof because the evidential proof merely provides an idea that
the conceptual involvementis extrinsic to the self-standing facts, which
will bring the paradox of tule-following. The example of the problem with
such idea of evidential proof has already been shown in the above
discussion on Wright’s idea of defeasibility conditions,
The idea of objectivity of meaningis suggested in McDowell’s
idea of a disjunctive account of perceptual experiences.’° (McDowell
1986:151) The disjunctive account of experiences is based on the idea
that there are no common characteristics between experiences of
appearance and experiences of reality. But they are interwoven with each
Other in a disjunctive way, namely, “that an appearance that such-and-
Such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-
Such is the case making itself perceptually manifest to someone.”
(1982:386) This means that involvement with objects is possible to
discriminate even if it is not transparent to the subject, the implication of
Which is the possibility of an independent objective constraint on
®xperiences, However, this account does not rule out the idea that error
°F illusion ig Possible. Error is possible, for there is a difference between
the two
Similarly, Perception of meaning is a sort of experience. So, the
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idea of objectivity of meaning can be accounted for in a similar way, that
is, experiences of meaning can be accounted for disjunctively. The
disjunctive account of experience of meaning is that P appears to be true
is that either that P is manifestly as so and so or that it seems to be so and
so. Such an account provides the idea that the objectivity of meaning
cannot be characterized independently from experience of meaning;
however, the normative constraint is independent from our own
construction. That is the idea that truth-conditions are intrinsic to
experiences of meaning. That is contra to the idea which assumes that
there is the ‘highest common factor ’of experiences (McDowell
ibid.:386), that is to say, the factor of a common experience between
veridical and illusory/ true and false drives the idea that the normative
constraint is extrinsic to the experiences or, in case of language, to the
language-use. The disjunctive account of experiences refuses that idea,
and thereby, implicitly refuses to employ a generalisation of rule for
rationalising human behaviour.
The reductionist view is based on the two-component model
which tends to employ the idea of, what I call, hypothetical account of
experience, namely, the account that an experience is to have meaning if it
is justified by a normative constraint that is extrinsic to itself. Once norms
ate extrinsic, they are generalized to be a sort of rigid rules which provide
‘explanations’ or predictions of experiences and behaviour. Such norms
ate generalized to be a universal form of rule, that is, the form that in such
and such circumstances, a subject will do so and so. Experiences are
Merely described as a sort of natural fact to which norms are not intrinsic.
On the contrary, the disjunctive account of behaviour does not endorse
“uch a universal rule of experiences and behaviour for norms are
into the form that “what he will do if he sticks to his
Pattern”, (ibid.:349) This means that on the unitary model, there is no
behavioural type which wecan generalise.
The transcendental argument’s project does not provide an
‘explanation’ of meaning, rather it provides an account of what it is to
‘understand’ meaning. That is to say, ‘explanation’ of meaning merely
points to a descriptive fact of meaning, not a normative fact. For example,
one may explain the phenomenon that the red sky may ‘mean’ rain. But
‘meaning’ in that sense merely signifies or predicts what will happen, not
what should happen. Explanation of meaning thereby does not provide the
idea of normative fact of meaning. On the contrary, if meaning is
normative, then what we need is an account of understanding meaning. In
understanding meaning, one knows whatone should do with an
expression, in such a way that the normativity of meaning is not extrinsic
to the use. That is to say, understanding is not always an interpretation
because its normativity is already intrinsic to use ina way which is
Particularized to its norms. So the notion of use cannot be accounted for
as a descriptive fact which requires an account of how meaning or content
is connected with it.
However, an objection maybe this -- if norms are intrinsic to use
or behaviour, then one cannot tell which of two similar types of behaviour
oF use with different intentions is normative or meaningful.” For example,
a hand in a conference is a behaviour as it is meant to
be a sign of communication. But this is different from a hand rising up in a
Conference, The latter may happenas that person is suffered from
Parkinson disease. That is merely a descriptive fact of a situation of that
Person which happens independently from the subject’s intention while the
former case is the case of a normative fact. The response from the unitary
odel would be this-- that there is a criterion for differentiating one case
f behaviour from the other, that is, the criterion is in the object that the
fi
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behaviour is about or thecriterion is in the behaviour. The point is that an
extrinsic criterion is not required. That is because constructing such a
criterion is merely begging for the problem of tule-following, In other
words, the dilemma of rule-following arises once one is trapped with the
question of how to constructa definitive criterion for differentiating a
common characteristic type of experience or two similar sorts of
behaviour. Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument merely points to the
fact that there is a grammar of the use of what it is for one thing to be
identical with the other, that is, there is the grammar of the idea of
resemblance. Such grammaris the idea that the use of symbols is
normatively constrained intrinsically, so that it is possible for the grammar
to provide meaning.
In sum, the transcendental argument provides the idea of the
unitary model of use, in which norms are intrinsic to use in such a way
that norms cannot be only characterized transcendentally to the use but is
also transcendentto the use. The former is shown in the idea that truth-
Conditions are available in a language-use. The latter means that the idea
of objectivity of meaning is possible in a disjunctive way. On this model,
the idea of practice is world-involving, in particular, object-engaging.
Based on the idea that the generalisation of rule is not plausible, the
World-involving sense of practice can be illustrated by the idea ofa
‘singular thought’-- the thought of which meaning or content can be
singled out in the form of having demonstrative thoughts. It provides the
which content can be individuated in terms of the
engaging with the object of our attentions. I will
in the following chapter.
idea of Practice in
Petceptual activity
discuss this issue
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4,Conclusion
This chapter argues that in order to account for the thesis that
meaning is normative or rule-governed, the unitary model of use is
required. The two-component model brings in the problem of the dilemma
of following a rule. This means thatif the thesis that meaning is normative
is right, the dilemma is the real threat for an account of meaning which
separates use from its normative constraint. I have shown that two
examples of the two-component model—Kripke’s sceptical argument and
Wright’s reductio argument—cannot escape from such a threat,
Meanwhile, the unitary model which is foundin the transcendental
argument provides a way out of the dilemma, On this basis, the unitary
model provides a ground for developing my accountof a notion of
practice. That is to say, the notion of practice which provides meaning or
content involves the idea of use which is world-involving. Use involves
the world both in an epistemic level and ontological level; namely, it
involves our ways of thinking of an object and involves the object of our
involvement. In the next chapter, I show how content can be derived
from world-involving use. This requires an idea of thought which picks
Out objects in the world directly, that is, demonstrative thoughts.
Notes
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1 See Evans&McDowell (eds.) (1976) in the introduction,
2gee Kripke (1982) and also Wright (1980)
non-sceptical reading includes the reducti
aig which takes the rule-following argument ae nadine, that is, the
rule which is beyond the ability of rule-followers to characterize ane Platonic
of grouping the readings of the rule-following argument is by di, rather familiar way
communitarian view and individualist view. The former can be viding them into a
and a weak communitarian. The strong one takes the notion of separated into a strong
ice, such as Bloor (1997); M. Williams (1999). The weak commen
takes the notion of practice in a socio-linguistic sense such as view
M.McGinn (1997); and other works such as Wright (1984 ff); Brandom a fe f;
(1979 passim). An obvious individualist view is in McGinn, C. (1984) where
that isolated rule following is possible. Kripke’s sceptical solution for the nde
reading can also be counted as a communitarian view. However, my point will be that
those ways of grouping the readings are not quite right because they merely reflect the
dilemma of rule-following which is supposed to be dissolved.
* Based on McDowell’s reading of the argument, this is the dilemma of Scyila and
Charybdis. (see 1984,: 342) The structure of the dilemma can be put like this—
1, Scylla is the situation where following a rule or the use is governed by the sort of
super-rigid rules, the problem of which is the regress of rules-interpretation.
2. Charybdis is the situation where there is no normative constraint for following a
rule, if a rule is rejected
The point is that the dilemma is a production of the model in which use is subject to
extrinsic normative constraint — call this model Once use and norms are separated,
there will be the problem that understanding a rule or meaning is always an
interpretation, and thereby the dilemma. will elaborate this issue in more details in
the next section.
5 Although the private language argumentis another main issue which requires more
discussion, it is not my direct concern in this chapter. However, the essence of the
argument is linked with the singular thought thesis which will be handled in the next
chapter. That is to say, I take it that the private language argument is the argument
against a strong Cartesian picture of mind, rather than a modest Cartesian one.
The idea that norms are immanent, for the characterization of grammar cannot be
done independently of the perspectiveof the subject, is labelled “grammar is
perspectival’ in Luntley, M. (2003 forthcoming).
” However, there is a variant of (E) which seems to be similar to namely,
Use inherits normativity
is actually what McDowell calls the Charybdis of the dilemma. It looks
like the unitary model because use is not extrinsically normative. But the difference is
that according to norms are naturalised or ‘inherited’ in our behaviour toward
expressions, so that it does not have a normative rationalising force because such
notion of norms is not autonomous or independent from the use.So I count as
belonging to the two-component model as well. Generally, is known as a
naturalised model, such as, Quine (¢.g.1960), Millikan (1984), Dretske (1995).
» 1 wi i i | here in the thesis because I think that as
However. will not discuss this sort of mode that the notion of use is
the model is merel i odel in the sense
y a variant of the (E) m
Proposed to be a reductionist notion. That is to say, norms are revised into a factual
form of use. (E) also commits a sort of reductionism, so it is enough for the thesis to
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show some weak points of the (E) model,
8 what I mean by ‘they’ is the sceptical readin
ad ‘ ig and a 4
revises truth-conditions into other sorts of condition, I maker Freductio reading which
exclude other sorts of reductio reading which are not reducti @ Note here in order to
call McDowell’s reading a sort of reductio as such Onist, for example, one can
terms of textual reading, the rule-following argument is
138-242. Although T am not concerned with the 4 taken from PI
a clue to the argument.
Mink this section provides
10 The thick notion being employed in the thesis is in
The thick notion means the notion in which the union of fa
3 ct i
Williams attacks the idea of a thick notion or ethical Notion eet
1s
attached to the descriptive or naturalistic fact. However, he does not employ the
terminology thin notion to represent the descripti .
the idea of thick use in the unitary sense, as I Williams wants is also
See footnote 7
notion of understanding being elaborated here is accordin
mind I call the modest Cartesian picture of mind which I will ia
chapter.
3 This means that the notion of ‘privately’ following a rule should be taken in the
sense of the interweavingpicture of ‘privacy’. It is such notion of ‘privacy’ which
grounds the idea of practice. So this is not contradicted with PI 202 ‘obeying a
rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is
not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying, a rule would
be the same thing as obeying it.”
4 see e.g. PI 241, RFM 30:331, 39:343, 49:353
'5 Wright (1980) shares some idea with the sceptical reading; but from 1984fE, his
reading is more on the side of the reductio reading.
16 Wright defines the notion of truth in the sense of secondary qualities or
‘euthyphronic’. Briefly, he employs the idea of Euthyphro Contrast or the control of
correctness, i.e. the biconditional of the difference between truth as judgement
independent and truth as judgement dependent. Wright designs a test for examining
which side of the bicondition is prior for language about, e.g. mind, color, and shape.
The test is called the order-of-determination test which concerns the relation between
best judgement or judgement made in cognitively ideal conditions or normal non-
defeasible conditions of human responses and truth. (Wright 1989:246) However, this
issue is a separate issue which I will not discuss here because what concerns me about
Wright’s idea in this chapter is only to show that his reading of the rule-following
argument is an example of the model
"Wright takes Wittgenstein’s ‘agreementof judgement’ as the agreement
specific class of judgements: those which we make responsively, without articulated
Teasons, under the causal impact of those aspects of our environment which we can
most directly perceive” (ibid.:276)..
Such a notion of understanding which is in the use n
not a symptom (PI 354). The
We see the use, we see the understanding’. (sce PI
understanding is what is hidden or behind the use. It is in this sense that ae is the
Symptom of the understanding. But the notion of criteria is different. A
Provides normativity for what we see. But the criterion has to be ofthe ai
Rot whe i it cannot be characterized in afaeer im the sense that it A of norms and the usc. This means
from what we see; otherwise, there is no distinction
common with Williams (1985).
eeds to be taken in the sense of
of a symptom is that of when
That is to say, the
that the notion of understanding cannot be taken to be a detached inner
ind the use, rather it is constitutive of the use,is behin
19 1 will elaborate this issue in the: next chapter,
20 is the sort of objection found in argument from
will recur in following chapters,
twin-earth thought experiment
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Chapter Three: Varieties of Externalism
In the last chapter, I argued that there is no
dichotomy between representationalism and inferentialigm following the
neo-Fregean (NF) account of singular thought. In other words, there is no
need to accept that there is a sharp division between two choices, That is
because singular thoughts, in particular demonstrative thoughts, are
thoughts whose inferential structure cannot be characterized
need to accept the
independently of their representational Structure, i.e. the structure in
which we have direct contact with the world. This means that
demonstrative thoughts individuate content on the basis of our
engagement with objects, which provides the idea that objects are
independentto thoughts. It is in this sense that objects provide a
normative constraint to thoughts; put another way, according to the NF
singular thought, contentis constrained by the world. The world in this
sense is a semantic notion, ie. what provides truth-conditions to thought.
However, it is the semantic notion which involves many classes of
thoughts in which the world that provides truth conditions to thought is
the world of material objects occupying space and time. A demonstrative
thought picks out an object in the physical world as its semantic value.
That is because demonstrative thoughts are a fundamental sort which link
directly with objects in the material world.
On this accountof content, the NF idea of singular thought is an
view, namely, a view in which individuation of content involves
4 constraint from objects in the external world or context. NF externalism
hence can be called a world-involving externalism which requires a
Characterization of practice as object-involving. This chapter will focus on
views on externalism in order to show that understanding a
“onstraint on what it is to possess content requires the notion of practice
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which can be characterized as object-involving Practice or world-
involving practice, rather than as a social Practice or linguistic practice,
This is because the world-involving practice individuates contentin a way
that accommodates both the account of the world as objective and thereby
supplying the worldly constraint on having thought, and the account of
mind as that which has rationalising force. ‘Thig concept of practice
therefore satisfies both the worldly constraint and the rationality
constraint. The sort of content deriving from this sort of externalism is
content which cannot be separated into narrow and broad content. It is a
non-bifurcationist content.
To achieve this sort of notion of Practice, I will not directly
elaborate the NF account of externalism, Instead I will mainly consider
three sorts of externalism, namely, Burge’s social externalism (1977 et
Brandom’s socio-semantic or discursive practice (1994) and
Bilgrami’s public externalism (1992). I will show that, from the point of
view of the NF account of content, these versions of externalisms are not
sufficient for understanding a constraint on content which is world-
involving. Thatis to say, none of these satisfy the worldly constraint, for
they fail to show that contentis constrained by truth conditions that
Capture a genuine concept of error, rather than deferred error. These
€xternalisms share the central flaw of inferentialism, namely, that the
“onstraint on contentis not independentfrom its inferential structure. My
Objection is that for thought to have content, it requires a constraint which
is independentto it; otherwise, there is a paradox: if no thought could be
made to be individuated by an independent constraint, then any thought
can be made out to have a content. (cf. the paradox of rule-following PI .
201) Ifso, it would be impossible for a thought to be individuated. That is
the problem which I had called a frictionless notion of content. As such,
these models of externalism do not overcome the dichotomy of
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representationalism and inferentialism, This is not to denythat there can
be a social dimension to practice in addition to the idea of engagement
with objects. It is onlyto insist that the former ig Constitutive of the
concept of practice in so far as practice Provides the Condition for the
possibility of content.
This chapter is divided into two main parts, In the first part, I look
at the background debate of externalism and internalism, In particular,
Putnam’s account of externalism (PE) (1975) and Fodor’s account of
internalism (FI) (1987). This part shows why the bifurcation of content is
unsatisfactory. The second part is concerned with the counter-
bifurcationists: three sorts of externalism (Burge, Brandom, Bilgrami) are
discussed and criticised. I will argue that the only tenable externalism is
the worid-involving one in which Content-individuation requires an
account of practice as object-engagement, Although there is a social
dimension of Practice, it needs to be accounted for on the basis of the
engagement with objects. Without engagement with objects the
dichotomy of Tepresentationalism andinferentialism will be reinstated,
This is the problem which happens to other sorts of externalism
Considered --they fail to provide a normative constraint on content. The
discussion of externalism in this chapter will contribute to the idea which
Will be developed in the following chapters, that is, in order to gain the
Ton-bifurcationist notion of content which meets both the worldly
“Onstraint and the Tationality constraint, we need an account of
demonstrative thoughts in which the notion of practice as object-
plays a crucial role.
1 Content-Bifurcation
Bifurcationism is the view that what determines content can be
“<Parated into two sides, namely, the internality of mind and the
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externality of mind. These two sides are set apart as with the strong
picture of Cartesian dualism which separates mind ftom world. Twosorts
of bifurcationism on content are: externalism and internalism, The
classical examples of these bifurcationists, which
will discuss, are
Putnam’s idea of externalism and Fodor’s idea of internalism. As their
ideas are mainly based on a semantic background, namely, the notion of
intension and extension of meaning, I will explicate the Significance of
these semantic notions first before going on to discuss their views,
Semantically, meaning or content ig accounted for in two ways:
namely, contentin intensional context or content of a sentence in the
context of the propositional attitudes; and content in extensional context
or content ofa sentence which remains the same under substitutions of
coextensive or truth-value identical components. For example, from the
sentence in intensional context: "x believes that water is drinkable." and
the sentence in extensional context: "Water is HO .", it cannot be inferred
that "x believes that HO is drinkable.". This is because the last sentence
may be false as x may not believe that water is H,0, though the first two
Sentences are true. In other words, the truth-value of these sentences is
hot preserved under substitutions of co-referring expressions. This means
that the content in those different contexts are not intersubstitutable, i.e.
4S Usually said that extensional content is transparent, but the intensional
One is Opaque.
However, as the belief-content in intensional contexts is related to
the subject's attitudes, it has a distinctive property: the property of
or explaining the subject’s behaviour, whichis different from
the Property of content in extensional contexts: truth-conditional
Property. The latter provides content in the sense of the meaning of a
“sntence, Which is derived from the reference or truth-value of thought,
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that is, content in the sense of "Proposition". As when one thinks that a
sentence "The water is drinkable." has the same Meaning as a G
sentence "Das Wasser ist trinkbar." These two Sentences express the
attitudes is individuated by the attitude's role in Tationalising the behaviour
of the subject.
Considering the notion of content under these two different
semantic contexts Suggests that content can be characterized into two
sorts-- that which is individuated by external Conditions and that which is
that explains human behaviour. Bifurcation of content arises from the
understanding that the world or truth-conditions can be characterized
independently of our thoughts about it. In the following, I will look at
how PE and FI Provide the notion of Content which is bifurcated, and why
that is not Satisfactory, The main Problemis that while PE cannot offer
the sort of content which rationalises behaviour, FI does not offer an idea
of content which Captures the notion of aboutness. The deeper flaw lies in
their assumptions about the conception of mind, namely, the strong model
of Cartesianism,
LL PutNam's Account ofExternalism (PE)
PE (Putnam 975) is the thesis that the external world or reference
“etermines meaning. For Putnam, the concept of meaning is understood
‘ruth “Onditionally, His main idea is that the meaning of a term cannot be
identifieg with ‘concept’, if is something related to mental states.
Me thinks that there is a problem in the confusion of varieties of
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‘meaning’. This problem is concerned with the theory of meaning (like
Frege's and Carnap's) which says that extension is the set of things the
term is true of; and intension is the ‘concept' with the term,
This sort of theory, for Putnam, rests on two false assumptions, that is,
firstly, knowing the meaning of a term is a naITOW psychological state:
and second, intension (mentally the Meaning of a term or having
‘concept') determines extension. That is to say, if meaning is taken as the
‘concept’ of a term, then extension is determined by intension or ‘concept’.
That is unacceptable because having a Concept turns out to be a matter of
being in a psychological state in a narrow sense which Putnam calls the
methodological solipsist's assumption, i.e, beingina Psychological state
presupposes a logical possibility of no other subject besides the subject of
the psychological state itself It is the assumption that extension is
determined by the Psychological state that Putnam challenges,
Putnam designs a thought-experiment in order to show that
intension in the Sense of psychological state cannot determine extension or
Meaning. If meaning is taken as being determined by psychological state,
then the truth-conditional account of meaningis at stake. So, the thought-
€xperiment shows two aspects of meaning: the extension of meaning is
causally determined by objects in the external world; intension which
Picks out no more than the subject's epistemic criteria for reference where
these might fall short of determining reference without embedding in a
Socio-linguistic Context that includes experts.
The thought-experimentis about the meaning of natural-kinds
terms, Suppose that the term ‘water’ is employed by a twin subjects in
"win Worlds, The meaning of ‘water’ in world one is H2O, whereas the
"88 Of ‘water’ in the twin world is XYZ. This means that, on the first
*SPect, What determines the meaning of ‘water’ is not the mental states of
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the twin subjects. If mental states of the twin determine whatthe term
refers to or its reference, then it would be logically possible that a
duplicate mental state understands ‘water’ in a similar way. And that
would be methodological solipsist, for each mental state, what they can
know is only their objects of thought, The Problem is: once their mental
states are duplicated, the twins cannot individuate the extension or the
meaning of 'water' from their mental States. That is because what makes
the meaning of 'water' different for the twins is the fact aboutthe stuff to
which ‘water’ is indexed or the de re (in "This is water."),
For Putnam, a natural kind term is a rigid designator in the same
wayas an indexical term is, That is, the extension of the term ‘water’ is
dependenton the actual object in the world ("The water around here."),
so the extension can be differentin different worlds. As with the extension
or the reference of 'I' in "I have a headache." is different from my twin T'
when using the same sentence. Although I and mytwin both have a
similar concept of it is not this similarity which individuates meaning,
rather it is the reference of ‘I. In other words, meaning is varied
according to contexts, However, for Putnam, objects which indexicals and
natural kind terms refer to are not tokens or objects which are sensitive to
the subject’s Point of view, because these terms are rigid. That is to say,
those terms index or refer to objects in a way that they have a similar
relation, The cross-world relation is that: “a two-term
relation R will be Cross-world when it is understood in such a way that its
“tension is a set of ordered pairs of individuals not all in the same
Possible (ibid.:232) So, whatever tokens are in each possible
"orld, the indexical terms and natural kind terms function as rigid
“esignators which have a same relation of designation in every possible
World in which the object or stuff exists, that is, the relation from word to
Biect. A natural kind term is a rigid designator in the sense that "the term
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designator designates". (ibid. -23 1) So, the question Of whether the
ning of ‘water' is or XYZis determineg Not by the mental state
of the subject, rather by the extension or teference of the term,
what determines meaning is still not the concept or mental entity, but
State which determines whether 'water' refers to HO or XYZ, rather it is
the collective use of language which sets the Criteria,
The socio-linguistic account of meaning answers the
epistemological question of how we can know that the indexicality of a
term provides a correct criterion to our understanding of the term. For
Putnam, metaphysical necessity does not entail epistemological necessity.
That is to Say, though truth is defined by the existence of objects in the
“orld which is defined by indexing to objects, the fact that language is
"sed for talking about the world is what constrains our knowledge about
the world, However, this does not mean that if the meaning of ‘water’ is
Partly determined by scientists or experts in the world to which that
© belongs, then truth is an intra-theoretic notion, viz. truth is
“ependent °n.a theory. The notion of truth and extension is closely
“nected, For him, to define the notion of truth as an intra-theoretic
ig like saying that intension (in the sense of psychological state)
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fixes meaning, But truth should be characterized
instead of an empirical relation, which Provides
relation from extension to intension, In this
88 a theoretical relation,
the epistemological
Sense, intension can be taken
as the socio-linguistic criteria of meaning,
However, that seems to show something problematic about
Putnam’s view. Whathetries to establish is that Meaning is externally
determined in the sense that it is indexed to objects and socially
dependent. In other words, context is defined in both ways--indexical and
social. It looks as if content is context-dependent, or what content is
depends on the context in which words refer. But the twins in Putnam’s
thought-experimentare set to have common mental states which can be
said to be not varied in different Contexts, so this means that there is a
notion of content thatis not context-dependent. In other words, it may
hot be legitimate to call it ‘content’ because what defines content requires
the possibility of being individuated from the subject’s perspective. In
Particular, the sort of context which Putnam characterizes is the context
which is characterized independently from mental states. It can be said
that his externalism falls into a sort of representationalist view because
Tepresentationalism is the view in which objects or references are
accounted for as not sensitive to a subject’s point of view. Consequently,
tt content is externalistically individuated as Putnam perceives it, then it
does not provide an explanation of behaviour as we ordinarily think, that
understanding why people act differently toward an object
“count of the rational psychological role of a subject toward the object.
The issue of the explanatory role of contentis also the ground on which
Fodor thinks that PE is not sufficient.
1.2. Fodor’s Idea of Internalism
Fodor (1987) argues that PE Provides o
nly a sort of relative
content or broad content; namely, nalTOW content relative to context
provides truth-condition, which does not capture the explanatory role of
“content? is Possible once it has semantic
value, namely, narrow content is not a real Content because it is syntactic,!
But once narrow content is semantically evaluable, i.e, given truth-
condition and context, then it has a broad content. Despite the fact that
content. However, for Fodor,
content can be individuated as a broad Content, the content which does
the explanatory role for behaviour is the mental state or the narrow
content. Though Fodor’s view is an internalist view, there is a crucial
point in common with other externalists like Burge and Bilgrami, namely,
mental attitudes are significant in content individuation because of their
explanatory power on behaviour, However, the difference between FI and
externalists like Burge and Bilgrami is that while those externalists
attempt not to bifurcate contentin order to gain its explanatory role, FI
bifurcates content into broad and narrow content. However, the main
Point Fodor argues concerning PE is that it is not incompatible with his
individualism or internalism.
The main thesis of internalism is that content is individuated by
Mental states alone, According to Fodor, externalists like Putnam and
Burge (1979)° are looking for a causal explanation of mental states. They
Sound their assumption about individuation of mental attitudes on a
"elation between mind and brain. For Fodor, at least, what
Putnam/Burge's thought experiments show is that the mind does not .
“Uervene on brain, Their argumentis this: if mind supervenes on brain,
then ming changes when brain changes; but the Twin-Earth case shows
That When brain does not change, mind changes (because of diffrent
SO mind does not supervene on brain. Fodor thinks that if
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what the externalists want is the causal explanation of the mind/brain
relation, then they cannot violate the Supervenience of mind/brain by
substituting it with the relation of mind and enviro:
no causal mechanism for such a relation,
mment, because there is
According to Fodor, the only tenable causal explanation of the
mind/brain relation is the supervenient relation in which mental states are
narrowly or individualistically individuated, According to such an
explanation, different causal properties distinguish different things. That is
to say, mental states and brain states have identical causal properties
irrelevant to their relational Properties (e.g. properties that relate them to
speech communities). So, the twins' mental States do have the same causal
powers. This may be explained by the fact that the same behavioural
effects are caused by the same events, that is, mental states have causal
powers for explaining behaviour. Different behaviours are explained in
terms of being caused by different mental States, not by other relational
States. So, the twins maybe in different environments, but they would act
the same wayas their physical bodies are identical. For example, when
they feel thirsty, they drink a glass of water. Though one drinks H,O, and
the other drinks XYZ, they act the same way because their mental states
have the same causal power.
Briefly, the above passage shows thatin addition to the
mistake in proposing an untenable causal mechanism, their
"otion of content does not provide explanations of behaviour. For Fodor,
mental states are natrowor non-relational, and these have the right causal
Power for explaining behaviour. However, he thinks that his internalism is
incompatible with PE in the sense that his is individualistic, not
“lipsistc, I turn to this point below.
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that psychological states are individuated With respect to their causal
powers. Methodological solipsism is the doctrine that Psychological states
are individuated without respect to their Semantic evaluation," (1987: 42)
For the methodological solipsist, mental States are narrow in the sense
that they are just potential content. They do not have Content because
they cannot be evaluatedas true or false. But methodological
individualism does not deny the relational Properties of mental States; "it
just says that no property of mental States, relational or otherwise, counts
taxonomically unless it affects causal powers." (ibid.) So, Fodor’s
individualism and PE are not really contradictory in this sense because, for
Fodor, the externalist only relativizes a narrow content to context in order
that the narrow content can be semantically evaluated or have truth
conditions. In other words, a narrow contentis a function from contexts
and thought onto truth conditions (ibid.: 47). To relativize a narrow
content to context is just to broaden the content. And to have a broad
Content is still irrelevant to the causal powerof mental states. For Fodor,
in sum, the mind supervenes on brain because the mind’s causal power
Supervenes on brain states. Content (meaning) is determined by the
Mind’s causal power, rather than by relativizing it to a context.
However, Fodor’s individualism is unsatisfactory for two main
Teasong’, First, Fodor thinks that though a narrow content does not have
Semantic value, it is a “fully intentionalist account’ (ibid.:53) of the causal
Power of Mental states, But the problem is that if what matters for mental
is only the Pure schema of thought, which is non-semantical, it
makes the context of thought which provides the semantic aboutness
"relevant to the causal explanation. This can also mean that content is
Andif so, then mental states as such or the pure
do not have semantic aboutness or representational power, which
isa characteristic of content and Seco
pased on a line of reasoning that if the explicandum
explicans must be the same, that is if behavioural
then they have the same cause, ie. mental States,
nd, Fodor’s view ig
is the same, then the
are the same,
But that cannot be right.
- Though the twins may
dispose to act in the same way, they look for different
Suppose the twins believe that "Water is here,"
"here-water",
Their experiences are not in common because what gives content to their
thought is the object in their environment which is indexed to their points
of view. In other words, there is a possibility of contextualising the
explicandum or the behaviour, so the twins do Not act the same way. So,
it cannot be generalised that thereis the law of same effect/ same cause.
Indeed, these issues reflect the main flaw of Fodor’s idea, namely,
the idea that thought content which rationalises behaviour is determined
by symbols, the content of which is not anchored to a subject’s
Perspective. This can be seen from his view aboutthe case of
demonstratives the anchored content of which does not rationalise
behaviour, (ibid.:50) Fodor thinks that demonstratives have ‘anchored
Content’ when they are “used’, that is, whenever we use the sentence
Containing demonstratives, such as ‘I feel pain.’, the content of ‘I’ refers
directly to the speaker, the content of which nobody can share. However,
this is not the sort of content which rationalises behaviour. For Fodor, it is
the “unanchored content’ or the narrow content which has causal power
human actions. This sort of content is derived from when we
‘mention’ that sentence (‘I feel pain’.), By mentioning a sentence, we get
the Shared Content because mentioning a sentence is just to refer to the
form of words,
ntentWhatis Not right about Fodor’s view is that the sort of co!
hic he takes to be what rationalises behaviour is the unanchored
content or merely a symbol whichis not legitimate to be lled a content
because it has no causal-rational power. Thatis to Say, Once a symbol
no anchor fo its ‘use’, then there is a gap needed to be filled in
between the symbol and the use, We need to fill in the Bap because we
want to rationalise behaviour, and for that We need the use, not the
symbol. Put another way, although, for Fodor, demonstratives in ‘use’
provide content which is anchored to subject, the problem is that it is not
the sort of content which rationalises behaviour, That is to say, the sort of
content which rationalises behaviour has to be anchored to the subject ina
sense that is sensitive to the subject’s perspective and allows different
thoughts about the object to possible. However, the sort of content which
Fodor proposes to have explanatory power turns out to be the
unanchored content which is only a form or symbol. But the problem is
that symbols as such do not have causal-rational power. It is only when
we think about symbols as anchored to use or perspective that we can say
that they have causal-rational power. This means that whether symbols
tre meaningful or have content requires an anchor to the subject’s
Perspective. That is the idea of Fregean rational space-- the rational
Possibility of different thoughts toward the object. Accordingly, the
notion of content cannot be the notion of unanchored content, as Fodor
thinks, which is actually a mere symbol irrelevant to use. Otherwise, we
Will not be able to understand or rationalise human actions which requires
the account of egocentricity of thought. In the next part, I will look at
diferent sorts of externalism which seem to be non-bifurcationist and
a
urcationist’ Externalism .
In general, the following three sorts of externalism which I will
in this part can be called ‘non-bifurcationist’ externalism. That is
What is in common among their views is the reaction to content-
pifurcation in PE which precludes the Psychological or Cognitive role of a
subject in accounting for content. Actually, the dispute among their views
js concerned with the question about the role the idea of ‘cognitive’ plays
in accounting for content. All of them accept the role of Frege’s idea of
‘sense’. However, the main problem concerning their views is briefly this.
Burge’s externalism (1977et al.) takes Frege’s ‘sense’ as a
‘cognitive’ role which involves a communal description of linguistic
meaning, his externalism appears to be not much different from PE. The
only difference is that, for Burge, it is not social-linguistic practice (in
Putnam’s sense) which is the normative constraint on reference, rather it
is linguistic use in a social context, but that is relevant to a subject’s
cognitive reasoning. Brandom’s position seems to be close to Burge in the
sense that social practice provides the normative criterion in which
rational individual beings play a crucial part in characterizing the norms.
However, he criticises Burge’s view for making a mistake in separating
Conceptual from contextual or causal relations, so that Burge’s
cannot accommodate both representationalism and
inferentialism without falling into a regress of interpretations of the causal
Brandom is right, but the problem is that his criticism is based on
his socio-semantic externalism which is dominated by the inferentialist
entality, The upshot is that such an account of content is not constrained
Sy norms which are independent from inferential structure. The notion of
independent of inference is the key to the worldly constraint (or as
‘called the objectivity constraint) which is derived from the idea of
It is the notion of normative constraint which can be
"ound in the World as a truth-condition of our thoughts. Concerning
lgrami’s externalism, his attempt to unify content, or combine
with inferentalism, is suspicious for it is unclear
his insisting on the idea of ‘general’ thoughts,
‘singular’ thoughts is convincing, Bilgrami takes his
Position as not a
‘content- externalist’, rather he insists on being a
‘concept- externalism’.
dichotomy of
representationalism and inferentialism, which req
they are connected. But that is also because B
The problem seems to be that he endorses the
lifes an account of how
ilgrami relies too much on
the inferentialist side. All these will be €xpanded below,
2.1. Burge’s Social Externalism
According to Burge’s externalism, the basis of content
individuation is the intensional aspect of content that picked out by the
propositional attitudes. His aim is to combine the explication of thought in
terms of linguistic use with the explication of meaning in terms of thought
(see 1986: 718). Meanwhile, Putnam provides only the explication of
meaning in terms of use and reference. I will argue that in Burge’s
externalism, although he accepts the psychological or cognitive role in
individuating content, his notion of content is not constrained by the
world, but rather by language use or social linguistic practice. In
Particular, though his externalism does not provide an account of content
Which forces the bifurcation of content into narrow and broad, it still
bifurcates Conceptual content from non-conceptual context. This is partly
due to his misunderstandingthat to go against the Cartesian individualism
is to g0 against all sorts of Cartesianism; and that the notion of the world
We can have at most is whatis ascribed under de dicto (linguistic)
But the problem is that the ascription of such a notion of the
World does not give the notion of the world which provides the aboutness
four attitudes. I will focus on two main questions -- the reasons why he
' not satisfied with PE and why his alternative is not convincing.
What und, is the assumption
i t underpins Burge’s criticism’of Putnam isme i and that PE implies Cartesian
means anti-individualism,
individualism, i.e. the view that mental Content can be individuated
independently from context. He thinks there are two mistakes in
view. First, according to Putnam’s thought experiment, the twins? mental
attitudes are constant in the varied environment, that is, although their
mental content is affected by context, the mental attitudes are
characterized independently from the Context. That is because, for
Putnam, what individuates content is the differences of extension, not the
differences of intension or mental attitudes of the Subject. This means that
Putnam views the mind or the subject's thought as being not sensitive to
context. This is similar to a Cartesian individualism which views the mind
as independent from context,
Second, Burge thinks that Putnam makes a mistake in giving an
accountof the examples of natural kind terms in terms of indexicality.
That is because Putnam’s thought-experiments do not employ natural kind
terms as indexical terms in the ordinary sense, namely, in Burge’s view,
indexicality always requires de re belief or belief which is purely
(contra to de dicto belief which is purely conceptual). For
Burge, attitudes concerning natural kind terms are de dicto which
Presuppose de re attitudes, in the sense that without de re attitudes,
a language is not possible. In other words, those terms are
"Ot always beliefs de re, but even if they are, the account of such terms
"equires an account of the psychological role which provides the
“Planatory role on (linguistic) behaviour. The account of the
Tole for Burge is an account which involves
Although Putnam takes the social context as the epistemic criterion
9 Meaning. his externalism cannot account for differences of thoughts
"he standard use in each linguistic community’, and thereby i me
“lent for understanding content which involves beliefs and we
main idea o f externalism is that the cognitive role which is
rebaae Argues that it is not right that beliefs about the reference (de
eo ) are completely conceptual. That is because de re beliefs are
nesta So, it is not true that de re beliefs are completely de dicto.
S10 say they are two separated sorts of belief. Once the distinction
ate, he thinks that the account of the constraint on cognitive value as
Pellet is justified because it means that his externalism can
"Modate both beliefs about the world and the psychological role of
within a Structure of language-use on which social practice is the
ig
constraint. In other words, beliefs de re/de dicto represent two sorts of
0
guage-use: the referential use and the attributive use, This means that
Burge does not see that distinction as a bifurcation of Content, because the
connection between them can be accounted for in terms of language use.
This can be expanded as follows,
Burge (1977) elaborates the notion of sense or what he calls
cognitive value in order to show that de re attitude/belief (reference) is a
necessary condition for using and understanding language, and de dicto
attitude/belief (sense) presupposes de re. He explains the de re / de dicto
distinction in the following way. A de re belief is “a belief whose correct
ascription places the believer in an appropriate nonconceptual, contextual
relation to objects the belief is about.". (ibid.:346) However, what he
means by ‘nonconceptual’ does not rule out the idea that in making a
Statement about de re belief, one requires ‘concepts’ when one applies the
notion of de re belief or how the belief about the relation between the
object and concepts is acquired. That is because although the object
affects one’s perception, one requires concepts in having a perceptual
belief. However, because de re belief does not always require perceptual
Contact with the object, the perceptual contact only shows the sort of
independent of semantical or conceptual application that is
to the notion" .(ibid.) Put it another way, Burge’s conclusioni
that though de re belief does not always require perceptual comtact with
the object, the perceptual contact is what shows that there is the
"nconceptual element in the notion of dere belief. De re beliefs
because it is not wholly determined by mental the
tes . rceiving an
the dee semantically, is "a
belief in wns eee one completely expressed
Which the believer is related only to that is fully
(dictum). The epistemic analogue is a belieft
conceptualised.” (ibid.:348) The de dicto belief is a fully conceptualised
content oF fully expressed as a Propositional content.
So, de re belief is more fundamental than de dicto belief because in
order to understand a languageor propositional attitudes, one needs de re
attitudes, i.e. attitudes that we have when asserting a proposition
containing indexical expressions or when having perceptual contact with
objects. A de re attitude hence should be considered as an ability (on the
part of the subject) to recognize a direct contextual relation holding
between a thinker and the object of that thought. So, for Burge, the de re
attitudes are noninformative because they do not provide more
information about the object other than the object itself. Indeed, de re
attitudes are the ability to understand the referential use of singular terms.
By contrast, de dicto attitudes are expressed by non-indexical expressions
(or descriptive expressions) which are attributively used, and so they are
informative for understanding objects. Hence, for Burge, because de dicto
beliefs are conceptual, they are not fundamental as de re beliefs are.
However, the separation of the nonconceptualised context from
the conceptual contentin this waystill leads to the problem of how
content can be individuated if not by the context. When content is taken
88 conceptual but noncontextual, this means that content can only be
individuated linguistically and hence is free-floating from context. This
that, as mentioned from the outset of this chapter, content is
Fictionless, for it is not clear what, if anything, can constrain it Burge
“"sWers this criticism unconvincingly by saying that de dicto belief is ae
because what is presupposed in understanding a language 1S
“ere attitude, so our de dicto beliefs presuppose 4 beliefs. And
se e has a communicative function, 4¢ r¢ attitudes of other
"ple are presupposed in the linguistic This means that, in
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purge’s view, context is characterized in terms Of social practice, and it i
shat which plays the role in individuating Mental content? ms
isthe social context which presupposes the extra-linguistic world or the
pert eptual world. However, it still looks unsatisfactory because the
‘presupposition’ in question does not seem to allow the possibility that the
world can be external to thoughts even though it is not characterized
That is to say, it
independently from our thoughts. However, to be fair to Burge’s
externalism, let’s look first at how heelaborates a normative constraint in
terms of the connection between cognitive role and the role of social
context by employing thought-experiments.
An example of his thought experiment(1979) is this, Suppose
that, in an actual situation, a subject has a wide range of attitudes about
‘arthritis’, but one of these attitudes is false, namely, he thinks that he has
‘arthritis’ in his thigh. It is false because the standard use of ‘arthritis’ in
his community that defers to the doctors’ knowledge is that ‘arthritis’ is an
inflammation of joints. However, the thought experiment continues, we
can think of a counterfactual situation in which the counterfactual subject
is Physically identical with the actual subject and has a similar
understanding of the expression ‘arthritis’, but what is different is the
Standard use in this situation, namely, the meaning of ‘arthritis’ includes
both what happens in the thigh and also to other inflammations. The point
Of the thought-experiment is to show that when holding the physical
Subject and the subject's understanding of the expressions constant, wile
the standard use of the expressions in both situations varies, the extension
is not determined by the internal states of a person, rather by
the external or social factor. According to Burge, to say that internal
“Ales fully determine meaning wouldbe a sort of Cartesian view
Cubt, Since Cartesian individualism takes s¢
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what provides content, the necessary condition of understanding the truth
must be full understanding. But, as Burge said, "much mentalistic
attribution does not presuppose that the subject has fully mastered the
content of his thought”. (1979:105) So, the requirement of full
understanding misrepresents the individuation of mental content.
According to Burge, attribution of content involves having a concept
about an object, thatis, it involves the ordinary possibility that a subject
can have incomplete understanding, including the possibilities of
misunderstanding and partial understanding of a notion. Perspectival or
incomplete understanding of expressions is the characteristic of
mentalistic discourse, i.e. intentional discourse.
The point, for Burge, is that a process of characterizing the norms
of meaning is a dialectical process between the conventional meaning and
different perspectives of the language’s users. In other words, the
normative constraint on content or standard use can be viewed from
different understandings or cognitive values of an expression, andis
changeable according to the interaction of the understanding of concepts
between the users and the experts in each community. This is what he
(1986) thinks as the application of Frege's test, namely, the possibility of
doubting identity statements means the possibility of finding them
informative, So, the conventional meaning or standard use can be doubted
or changed according to different cognitive values. The dialectical process
uF ™eaning-changing is what Burge calls the normative characterizations
(ibid +793) which to some extent will reach the point of ‘reflective
“quilibrium (ibid.:716). So the normative characterization is defeasible,
but Sufficiently reliable for any speaker in a community to identify the
“onventional Meaning. Briefly, the process of meaning change may be
d eaeSfined as the dialectical relation between social context and individual
“OBtitive values,
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However, the idea of the dialectical process of normative
characterization does not seem to be useful for answering the question of
how content which has the aboutness of thoughtis individuated. It is not
useful because it is a process the constraint on which is not independent
from the process itself. Burge’s account of externalism seems to bring the
world into the inferentialist account, so that it is not a conception of the
world about which wehave different thoughts, rather the world appears
to be manifest in the inferential structure. To put the criticism following
McDowell (1984,): by taking de dicto attributions to be fully
conceptualised content in the sense of a fully expressed proposition,
Burge confuses content with the vehicle of content. Thatis to say, it is the
confusion of "concepts as parts or aspects of the content of
representational state, such as belief," or "whatis expressed by words"
with "concepts as means of representation" or "what does the expressing:
to the words themselves" (ibid.:286). Burge makes this mistake because
he takes de dicto attributions which are composed of means of
representation or linguistic symbols as what have content. But that is the
confusion, because, in themselves, means of representation have no
Content. So, Burge needs to provide an account of how they can be
that is, the account of context. Accordingly, it appears that the
Rotion of content is independent from the notion of context or what fixes
the meaning of symbols,
In other words, in Burge's view, sense or a de dicto belief does not
have content or Tepresentational power providing that it cannot be fully
“xpressed. But the problem is that the necessary condition of having de
dicto belie depends on the vehicles of content, not the object which the
Vehicle ig about. However, for Burge, as the de dicto presupposes the de
"e, the de dicto seems to have ‘objects’ among its constituents. The
Problem is that this is not a notion of ‘objects’ which are independent of
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the subject’s thoughts. This problem looks like Russell’s notion of an
object, namely, the object about which different thoughts are not possible
because once the objects are not independent from thoughts, then
whatever thoughts take objects to be, there are no possibilities for
thoughts to be false. This means that one cannot talk about whether such
thoughts are true or false at all: there is no content of thoughts. This is a
notion of object which is insensitive to the subject’s point of view. Indeed,
the notion of points of view cannot be applied at all. What is implicit in
Burge’s view is that concept can be independently characterized from its
contexts, namely, objects or the semantic conditions under which a
thought is true or false. It follows that content is individuated
independently from context. That is the implicit upshot of Burge’s
assumption, which is the point on which he criticised PE. Moreover, the
problem is that it forces Burge to find an explanation for how content is
possible when concept and context are separated, that is, he needs an
account of the connection between them. But this leads to a similar
problem to the regress of interpretations in the rule-following argument.
That is to say, ifa rule is characterized independently from our
understanding, then there is a regress of interpretation of whatthe rule is.*
According to the NF view, that connection is not necessary
because there is a contextualised conceptual content. That is the notion of
de re senses as McDowell (ibid.) calls it. The thesis of de re sense is the
thesis that each sense (mode of presentation) directs to its own res or
referent.’ If there is no de re sense, there is no content. This is because
“Ia Fregean theory, utterances and propositional attitudes have thoughts
°S their contents, and thoughts are senses with nothing but senses as
“Onstituents". (ibid.:284) Burge's view on indexicality is similar to
Russell's idea of propositions: objects are constituents of thought. By
“ontrast, de re senses are object-dependent which provides content of
 |
|
a
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thought: demonstrative modes of thought of which senses are
constituents. De re senses determineor are individuated by their own
reference according to our different ways of grasping objects in the form
of different modes of presentation,
An example is this: sentences containing an indexical term, such as
can be grasped in different ways, though its objectivity is not
necessarily communicable. The objectivity of an ‘I *-thought is the truth-
value of that sentence, which is not only mind-independent but also
determined by the sense of the indexical The reference of ‘I’ is
determined by the sense of the first-person grasping of the object The
sense is not a description (de dicto) of as ‘someone who is referred by
the term De re senses provide the idea of how ways of grasping an
object cannot be separated from the object itself, McDowell hence
criticises Burge's de re belief thatit is barely true or free-floating because
“the belief relation has to secure the presence of the predicational tie all
On its own" (ibid,:292). In other words, as Burge’s de re belief is
Separated from a dedicto belief, the content of thought is not provided by
binding with an object, but rather by binding with the predication of the
vehicle of content (proposition). This means that thought is not
Constrained by the world, but rather by the vehicle of thought itself.
To summarise, Burge's attempt to connect use with the thought by
the dialectic between meaning and thought, which is bound within social
*8teement, is not successfull. The main reason is that his social extemalism
Still bifurcates content by pulling out concept from context. By doing this,
thought does not have content about an object; it requires context for
Object directed content to be possible. Accordingly, he employs social
as the connection of concept and context. Indeed, Burge does
NOt see how that connection can be realised by a conception of
contextualised conceptual content. Burge's externalism begins from anti-
individualism, or aims at anti-representationalism by acknowledging the
role of thought into his externalist view; but at the end, his view turns out
to be similar to the representationalist, in the sense that the world is set
apart from thought.
In the following, | will discuss Brandom's socio-semantic
externalism’” (Brandom1994) which, contrary to Burge, takes both
notions of de dicto and de re as conceptual. He takes inferentialism as
prior to representationalism, and attempts to combine both the use and the
thought by the concept of meta-use, namely, the account of semantics in
terms of pragmatics. His project is relevant to my project because his
explication of the notion of ‘practice’ is also grounded on similar
strategy as mine, that is, by employing the notion of Fregean thought, he
attempts to provide a non-reductionist account of content by steering a
middle way between the poles of the rule-following dilemma. However,
his view on normativity of content is different from mine, that is, for him,
norms are embedded in discursive practice, or pragmatics. However,
Brandom's view fails in a quite similar way to Burge's, that is, Brandom's
notion of practice turns out to be constrained by
sort of
notion of norms. In other words, the normativity of content does not
Provide a worldly constraint on content.
2.2.Socio-Semantic Externalism
Brandom's main aim is to show how semantics can be accounted
for in terms of use or normative pragmatics.'? His explanatory strategy is
that, in an account of thought, inference is prior to representation.
However, we will get the representational content in the end. In other
“rds, representationalism will be incorporated into inferentialism.'* The
Upshot je- : . 3 i oyehot is: the notion of ‘practice’ turns out to be a ‘discursive practice’ in
eer ae
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which norms are made explicit in terms of inferential Propositional content
from the implicit norms which are found in social Practice. For Brandom,
discursive practice, being grounded on social Practice, provides not only
the objectivity of norms but also the perspectival feature of Propositional
content, i.e. the semantic externalism or perspectival
externalism.(ibid.:633)
The thesis of semantic externalism makesa non-reductionist
assumption about semantic content. That is to say, the account of
meaning cannot be reduced either to a naturalistic account where the
intentional or normative aspect of language is lost or to any non-
perspectival (‘bird’s-eye’ view) norms where the problem of regress of
interpretation arises because norms are autonomous and will always
require interpretations, Brandom also characterizes this as the picture of
Wittgenstein's dilemma which McDowell (1984,) calls a Charybdis, i.e,
the paradox of no norms and a Scylla, ie. understanding is always
interpretation. \4 (see Brandom 1994:29) For Brandom, the wayoutis
this. On the one hand, the normative aspect needs to be accounted for as
being constituted in the naturalistic world, namely, the idea of normative
attitudes is constrained by the world which then needs to be assessed
under the meta-normative attitudes. On the other hand, interpretation
Reeds to be accounted for not in terms of rules which are independent of
Practice, rather interpretations require applications of primitive rules to
“top the regress, that is, the sort of normative rules, which provide the
background of practice, are norms of inferences.'° Such norms are
“omposed of inferential relations (sentential level of expressions),
Substitutional relations (repeatable subsentential components) and
relations (unrepeatable tokenings level). Accordingly,
Pragmatics takes the world as norms all the way down where
and thoughtcan be explained by both characteristics --the
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intentional (normative) and the non-intentional (naturalistic). The non-
reductionist middle way assumes that there is a distinction between the
naturalistic world and the world conceived under norms. This requires a
kind of dualism(Kantian But thedistinction ig required, for
Brandom, to ensure
re that norms arenotlost ina naturalistic reduction. He
then explains the normative conception of the world 4in terms of social )
practice, rather than in terms of the world as such, for the ‘world as such’
is the naturalistic worldthat is ‘hormless. Brandomhas elaborated these
ideas ingreatdetail, but I will only consider his view in so far as it is
relevant to this chapter. Thatis to say, I want to consider how his
semantic externalism, which centres on the notion of practice, provides a
normative constraint on thought. In other words, the question is whether
Brandom succeeds in showing Bow the objectivity of conceptual content
is delivered from practice.
2.2.1. Transcendental notion of norms
The notion of ‘norm’ which Brandom employs is the Kantian
transcendental notion. He calls this notion the ‘dualism’ of the normative
and the factual in order to contrast with Descartes’ dualism of the mental
and the physical. The Kantian notion of norms does not characterize the
normative independently from the factual. That is because the factual is
normative. As he said that
“For Kant, rules are the form of the normative as such.
To call something ‘necessary’ is to say that it happens
according to a rule, and everything that happens in nature,
nO less than everything done by humans, is subject to
necessity in this sense. Concepts are rules, and concepts { |
“xpress natural| necessityass well as moral necessity. So
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according to him there is no-nonnormative realm or the
realm where concepts do not apply" (ibid.:624)
For Brandom, the Kantian 'dualist' notion of norm is opposed to
dualism where the two realms of the mental and the physical
are absolutely separated without taking the role of concepts and |
judgements into account.’However, Brandom thinks thatif concepts do
play a role in our judgements about the world, it does not mean that there
is no such thing as the natural world independent from our concepts.
Rather it means that the world is accounted for in terms of aur
That is to say, as goticepts arerule, and rules are norms  ™
then the world being characterized as normative is theworld which is
characterized conceptually. There is no nonconceptual characterization of
the world. The world as conceived by concepts - normatively - is a
transcendental requirement for content to be possible.
However, the transcendental notion of norms suggests the
autonomy of norms from our concepts. Brandom explicates this
Suggestion by making a distinction between the notion of normative
Statuses and normative attitudes, The normative statuses are the statuses
of norms as independent natural law or objective criteria which are
®mployed in assessing linguistic use. Meanwhile, the normative attitudes
Te our attitudes of sensitivity to norms, that is, the activities of assessing
Use. (ibid.:33) For Brandom, the normative attitudes determine the
normative statuses, His argumentis this. According to his normative
Pragmatics, forms of expression or linguistic uses are called commitments
ee “ssertional, inferential, referential). The normative statuses are the
of commitments, or the engagement in linguistic use; and the
normative attitudes are the attributings of commitments. But the
“OTmative statuses cannot be assessed independently from the
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perspectives of attributors. Undertakings of commitments are taken as
being committed only if there are those who are entitled to attribute those
commitments. Thatis to say, the attributings of commitments are
originated in ‘our' normative attitudes, namely, social normative
attitudes.'” So it can be said that the attributors or the subjects of the
attitudes (the normative attitudes) determine the normative Statuses
(ibid.:596).
It is rather obvious that norms are all the way down in his account
of content. However, Brandom said that, "Grounding normative status in
normative attitude does not entail relinquishing the distinction between
normative proprieties and natural properties."(ibid.:52) The question is of
whose properties are the normative and the natural? They must be
properties of the world; but it is the world conceived under a social-
normative use of language (inference). This means that the world has an
inferential structure, which is an objective form of normativeattitudes.
Thatis to say, objectivity is a “...structural aspect of the social-
Perspectival form of conceptual content”. (ibid.:597) This means that
claims about objects in meta-linguistic realms or factual claims have
content because facts are true claims ‘about’ objects, rather than that facts
Somehow “...consist of objects”. (ibid.:622) The aboutness of thought is
the referential relation where talking about objects is assessed by the true
Or the false, namely, truth assessments. Hence, the notion of reference is
Characterized in terms of inference which in the end confers the aboutness
Or the content,
To expand the above point in another way, there is a contrast
between two ways of specifying the content of commitments, namely, de
and de re specifications. According to Brandom, on the one hand,
4 dicto ascriptions involve attitudes concerning whether a linguistic use
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is committed to norms (i.e. normative attitudes); on the other hand, de re
ascriptions involve the statuses of norms in specifying truth or the
objective correctness of the use (ie. normative Statuses). The former
corresponds to the subjective point of view of the attributors, while the
latter conveys the objective correctness of the assessments. But although
there is a distinction between dedicto and dere ascriptions of belief or
between the subjective normative attitudes and the objective normative
statuses, they can be combined by the meta-normative attitudes or the
meta-commitment, that is the social-perspectival form of commitment. It
is this form of commitment which confers conceptual content. The
structural feature of the social-perspectival normative attitudes provides
the objectivity of content because the normative attitudes can be assessed
under the truth assessmentor the de re belief. (ibid.:597) Accordingly, it
can be said that the normative pragmatics holds the view that the world or
objectivity is included into languagein the form of discursive practice or
the inference-making activity in which implicit norms or social practice are
made explicit.
It should be noted here that Brandom’s point does not sound
radically different from Burge’s view. It may be true as Brandom argues
against Burge that by separating the conceptual from the contextual or the
Causal relation, Burge’s externalism cannot haveit both ways without the
of interpretation of the causal.'® However, this criticism does not
‘ake their externalisms radically different. Apparently, what is different
between them is: for Brandom, de re and de dicto beliefs are only two
ways Of talking about content, and they are conceptual because both are
Subject to the meta-normative attitudes. Meanwhile, for Burge, they are
‘Wo sorts of belief-relation — contextual relation and conceptual relation.
i Burge also accepts that they are two sorts of language use--the
use andthe attributive use, which means that their normative
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constraint is social practice. The problem seems to be concerned with the
term ‘conceptual’, Brandom takes conceptual (or inference) in a /
normative sense (contra to causal), while Burgetakes it in a descriptive
sense (contra to indexical/contextual). For Brandon), content and context
_areconceptual, whereas, for Burge, Content is conceptualised and requires
non-conceptual context. But this does not mean that their positions are
really different because their views are both based on the inferentialist
account. Indeed, it seems to show that what Brandom has done is just to
step into a further regress of talking about content by citing whathe calls
meta-normsor primitive rules’ However,I will show later that the
inferentialist cannot individuate content whith is constrained by the extra-
linguistic world. If it is correct that the notion of content has to be
accounted for on the basis of both inferentialism and representationalism,
then they have to be characterized together or non-bifurcatedly in such a
way that the autonomy of the external world provides an objectivity
constraint to thought. Before goingto that point, let me clarify first
Brandom’s notion of ‘practice’ andhis criticism of other sorts of social
xternalism,
2.2.2. Discursive and social practice
Discursive practice or linguistic practice means the inferential
Practice of rational beings who have propositional attitudes. Following
“er, Brandom takes an inferential conception of concepts in terms of a
Practical activity which reveals understanding of concepts. In other words, ]
ofdong (ibid.:91) Discursive practice enpresees
i Actice, namely, social practice or the practice of giving and
i *easons among rational language users. In Brandom's words:
are linguistic practices when interlocutors take up the
“© Scorekeeping stance toward one another.” (ibid.:628) Social
tice ‘ .
Sa Necessary condition for conferring contentful states. ig
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possess content, indeed propositional content, is to be “caught up ina
web of reasons, by being inferentially articulated”. (ibid.:5) Social practice
is a discursive practice that provides content. The Normative force of the
social practice arises when the users of language (saying -we) mutually
identify themselves with others as the Same kind of rational or normative
being. Put it another way, discursive Practice which delivers Propositional
inferential content originates from Social Practice, ite, the activities of
taking others as common rational or normative beings,
However, according to Brandom, the commonality of normative
attitudes or the notion of 'social' norms must not be identified with a sort
of communal assessment approach, e.g. Kripke's Wittgenstein, Burge and
Wright. Although Brandom agrees with Wright's notion of "ratification-
independence" or the idea that social practice can be ratifying as the
objective norm, he thinks that the identification of norms with social
Practice, in which there is a possibility that the community can be taken to
be wrong, Tequires some applications of the objectivity of conceptual
horns. (see ibid.:54) The communal assessment approach cannot offer the
objectivity of Conceptual norms for the reason that the intersubjectivity or
the community is used in the sense of the I-we account instead of the /-
thou account, as I will explain. (see ibid.: 593)
The J-we account takes the commitment of one individual as
with the commitmentof all individuals or the community, so
that the community in the 'we' sense is taken as the one which assesses
*PPlications of concepts, But, for Brandom, this is wrong because
is what is done by an individual, not the collective of
The mistake of the J-we account is to identify the community
Privileged Perspective for which the possibility of error cannot be
“und Meanwhile the /-thou account of intersubjectivity “focuses on the
relation between the commitments undertaken by a sCorekeeper
interpreting others and the commitments attributed by that
Scorekeeper to
those others”. (ibid.:599) This account does not prioritise
an individual to
the community or the other way around as the authority, Rather the only
authority is the structure of actual practice in a Perspectival form, namely,
the rules of inferences. Brandom says that "Whatis shared by all
discursive perspectives is that there is a difference between what is
objectively correct in the way of concept application and what is merely
taken to be so, not what it is --the Structure, not the content.". (ibid.:600)
That is to say, the space between perspectives or the distinction between
the normative status (‘objective' perspective) and the normative attitude
(‘subjective' perspective) provides the perspectival structure which is
shared by all rational individuals, This means that community can be
defined as a normative structure of [-thou relations in which each member
performs the implicit normative social practices, Intersubjectivity in this
sense shows that different perspectives about the world are possible,
rather than merely one relation of the However, the different
Perspectives form the perspectival structure which in tum is what
characterizes the notion of the world.
In sum, according to Brandom, the notion of ‘practice’ means an
inferential activity or linguistic practice from which content is delivered.
Tormative rational force of ‘practice’ is derived from the inferential or
Perspectiyal Structure of a rational community. Such a structure of a
“ommunity can be said to have a derivative intentionality. That is to say,
the Community derives its rational force from each individual who
“tributes normative attitudes to other rational members. So, the notion of
Practice for Brandom, shows how perspectives about the world can
we Propositional content from discursive practice. Brandom calls his
"SY semantic externalism or ferspectival externalism because it is an
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anti-individualist or anti-Cartesian view. This also means that if the
notion of community is defined in terms ofithe relation, then it will
pot face the problem of identification of the we asa Sort of Cartesian self
for whom error is not possibile. Metaphorically, he calls this kind of
externalism.a tactile Fregean Semantic theory, i.e. the model of conceptual
content is a model of grasping senses rather than seeing them which is the
Cartesian visual model. The difference between them lies in their
respective accounts of error: error is possible in the former, not in the
latter. For the tactile Fregean theory, Srasping sense means reaching for
norms by inference making, so a thought can be assessed as true or false.
In contrast, for the Cartesian visual model, the idea of error is not possible
because inference making is separated from representational or perceptual
experiences, so that the world is seen or visualised in separation from
being assessed as true or false. So, seeing the world is immune to error.
The J-we model has such an implicit Cartesianism, for it provides a subject
for whom error is notpossible ~- thecommunity. But then the ultimate
constraintcontentis provided by this plural subject; and it is
questionable whether this provides an independent account of truth.
Altematively, on the model, error ig always possible, but in a way
that suggests itis always deferrable. The question is whether the activity
of inference making (or as Brandom calls it ‘scorekeeping’) is itself
“Onstrained by anything other than scorekeeping? What, if anything,
Takes Scorekeeping sensitive to the world?
orld-Including or World-Involving?
The question to Brandom's view maybe: Is error made possible by
the world with which our thoughtis involved, or by the activity
of “corekeeping? More simply, is scorekeeping a world-involving
non If scorekeeping is not world-involving, it is oaet vem,
Words, if Brandom takes theworld to be included in thought,
then he cannot claim that his is an externalist view. The notion of thought
involving the world is an externalist notion, which conveys the sense of
the world as autonomous to thought. However, the autonomyof the
world does not mean that the world is excluded from thought. That is
because, as I have argued, if the world is excluded from thought, it means
that the world is beyond thoughtin such a way thatthe characterization of
the world does not take thought into account. The problem of excluding
the world is the regress of interpretations of how the world can be a
constraint on content. Brandom's view seems to take scorekeeping as
including the world but gives no account of how the world is involved.
His view should be called a sort of strong form of inferentialism, which,
roughly, goes hand in handwith the strong form of Cartesianism where
content is delivered from the inner representation in which objects cannot
be individuated. The strong form of inferentialism takes the world to be
revealed with the inferential connections or within the structure of
inference.
The way Brandom answers this objection maybe the following.
The representational contents involve social and linguistic contents. But
they are "not merely linguistic-- for they are not entirely up to us in the
Wayin which what noises weuse is entirely up to us". (ibid.:528) That is
because what is not up to us, as mentioned above, is the structural
Perspectival form which provides the normative constraint. However,it is
“ottect for Brandom to say that the notion of practice which provides
“ontent involves not only inference but also the non-inference, namely,
Perception and action. But then Brandom accounts for perception and
“tion in a Way that cannot be accounted for separately from the
- Perception is an observational performance producing actions
*8 intentional Performances. Representational contents are derived by
Something as or according to the normative attitudes. In this sense,
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spractice’ delivers contents because ‘practice’ involves the sort of action
which can be characterized as the performance of the attitudes by making
an inference. At first sight, what seems to be questionable is whether it is
legitimate to equate the notion of action with the activity of inferring.
That is because action is the notion which involves objects in external
world. There is certainly a conceptual aspect of action, which is what
accounts for its intentional aspect. But in order to understand that aspect
of action, it is not possible to ignore objects of action. If this is right, then
inferring can be said to be merely a part of what accounts for action, not
all of it.
Brandom’s accountof the notion of perception is also implicitly
inferential in the sense that perception as the noninferential realm can be
accounted for in terms of an inferential understanding. The problem is that
that sort of notion of perception does not provide an empirical content or
Content which is delivered by (conceptual) perceptual experience where
its aboutness involves the empirical realm. It is this sort of content which
shows that the world is mind-independent. On Brandom’s account, it
Seemis that there is no distinction or friction between the world which is
the extra-linguistic or the empirical realm and our perspectival attitudes
about it or what he calls the conceptual. Although Brandom says that “
The Objectivity of conceptual content- the way in which its proper
*PPlicability is determined by how things are in such a way that anybody
and might be wrong in taking such a contentto apply in
Patticular circumstances-is not by these means to be explained away.”,
ene Contentis in the combination of the serial and
al dimensions of discursive practice” . (ibid.:529) This means
drops out of the picture because the possibility of
r
ings
“ 8 to this picture is the sort of error which depends on
rent“ae Structure. But this cannot conferthe notion of content which
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captures both the world and its conceptual charact,
of thought which provides such a notion of co
sand this criticism below.
crization. The only sort
is singular thought, I
Brandom's view takes the notion of 'practice' as the act of speech
or the act of making inferences, But this notion of practice does not show
how the world is a constraint on thought. The notion of ‘practice’ which
shows the objective constraint on thought Tequires a characterization of
thought in terms of non-inferential actions, for there needs to be a
constraint on inference. The idea of non-inferential actions involves an
account of how perceptual experiences engage with objects. It requires an
account of the notion of ‘keeping track of an object’ in a spatiotemporal
world, and thereby the notion of ‘practice’ is fundamentally related with
the idea of singular thought. However, as we will see in the following that
Brandom’s idea of singular thought cannot account for how conceptual
content can be individuated on the basis of his notion of discursive
Practice. It means that his idea does not pass whatI call the test case for
an account of content.
Brandom tightly explains the reason whythe idea of object-
“ependence is crucial in semantic theory. The reason is that this idea
shows how thought and language possess aboutness-- objects that
Sst be consulted in order to assess the truth of what is believed and
Claimed”, (ibid.:568) But “Treating a claim as true is attributing one
while undertaking another which shares or
inherits its propositional content.”. (ibid.) Thus it is obvious
wet he focuses Only on one aspect of content, ie. the inferential aspect.
Brandom may deny that because, for him, anaphoric chains
Frege’s notion of sense which provides both “...ways in which
Nee “an be given to us, and... determine the reference of the
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expressions occurring in them”, (ibid.:572) However, for Brandom, a
singular/demonstrative mode of thoughtis explained as an anaphoric
claim. Anaphora is a sort of an inferential Connection of Concepts in which
“the relation of a pronoun stands in to its antecedent,» '9 (ibid.:283)
Demonstratives provide examples of anaphoric inference in which the
unrepeatability of demonstrative tokens is related to other co-referring
tokens. So, he would claim that it is not true that his idea cannot account
for representational content. He thinks that his view can account for the
idea of de re sense. He says, “Anaphoric chains of tokenings--explained
in terms of inheritance of substitutional commitments--provide a model
for object-involving, de re senses,” (ibid.:572) De re senses are hence
anaphoric senses which pick out objects by the conceptual or inferential
articulation.
Apparently, it is better to say that the idea of object-dependence
for Brandom is actually anaphora-dependent which does not provide the
hotion of object as that which we engage with in perceptual experiences,
(see ibid.: 579) Anaphora-dependent can be understood in a similar way
a8 a descriptive thought rather than an object-dependent thought. The
Problem with descriptive thoughtis that content cannot be individuated on
the basis of Perceptual object. In other words, the object is not what
content; rather it is the inferential relation among thoughts which
Provides Content. But that cannot be legitimately called content, because
"Teaurement of what it isto be content is that t needs to satity what
ae inferentiatism and representationalism provide, namely, both
iaVconceptual relation and referential/representational relation
“en subject and object. In particular, what is missing in Brandom’s
ism is the idea of the external world as a normative constraint on
notaompr
tt Which performs the explanatory role or the role of rationalising
ext
subject’s ability to perform the inference, That ab
‘perspectival’ as he calls it. But once there is no
ility can be said to be
Worldly constraint for the
performance of that ability, Tationalising of actions is not possible. So, I
conclude that Brandom’s externalism Cannot provide the idea of
objectivity of content which is world-involving, and hence his notion of
‘practice’ is not convincing as an account for content.
To conclude, Brandom's tactile Fregean seems unlikely to provide
a notion of ‘practice! individuating content which is constrained by the
world. The main reason for this is that the world for Brandomis the world
which is already conceived in inference instead of the world which,
although thought-involving, is independent from our thought. In spite of
the fact that at the outset Brandom tries to steer his way through the rule-
following dilemma of no norms and regress of interpretation, it turns out
that his semantic externalism loses norms which can be characterizable
independently from inference. Normativity, according to his externalism,
tums out to be Shareability by the common rational beings who have the
inferential ability, Though he avoids the community approach by taking
acount of social Practices as the perspectival ‘form’ or ‘structure’ of
commitments, this does not help bring the objectivity out of the
shareability, Rather it becomes a normativity which calibrates itself
Without friction with the world. Thatis to say, inferences alone cannot
individuate thought the content of which involves the world as its
Individuation of content requires both inferentialism and
“Presentationalism: otherwise, what we get will be a bifurcation of
“Ontent in Which reductionism of content is unavoidable.
Po Now the question may remain how a non-social externalism is
that What we want is both the world as the constraint on
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thought and thought which rationalises actions, Socio-semantic
externalism does not look compelling on either ground: it lacks the
explanatory aspect for rationalising actiong which involves the external
world, and consequently does not meet the Wworld-constraint but turns out
to rely on the shareability of thought instead, However, as with
Brandom’s externalism, the NF view attempts to Provide a non-
reductionist account of content-- where content Cannot be reduced to talk
on the one hand, and cannot be reduced to thought on the other hand.
Bilgrami's externalism (1992) also offers that sort of account, but the
difference is that for Bilgrami it is not necessary that thought is either
social-dependent or object-dependent, but rather it is public. For Bilgrami,
content is derived from concepts, and concepts are externally derived
from objects; but it does not follow that content is object-dependent.
However, the problem with Bilgrami's view seems to be similar to the
problem which faces Brandom’s externalism; that is, the problem about
the worldly constraint. I will discuss Bilgrami’s main idea and, in
Particular, his argument against NF externalism in the following.
2. 3. Public/Concept-Externalism
The main assumption underpinning Bilgrami’s idea of externalism
is the idea that externalism means anti-Cartesianism. Cartesianism, for
tim, is characterized as an intemnalism or what he understands as
methodological solipsism. In order to reject Cartesianism,
Bilgrami argues thatit is not necessary to choose between two sorts of
“semalism, namely, neither social externalism nor content-externalism.
Contrary to the former, he defines his externalism as a public but not anti-
externalism, i.e. content can be publicly accessed, which
not assume social norms as what constrains content. Contrary to the
Mer, hi ivable from
takes concepts to be externally derivable
j ivable. It is
in the external world, But content is not externally deriva
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individuated from concepts plus a background or pattem of beliefs about
objects. So, his externalism rejects the idea that only singular thoughts can
provide content. Put them all together, his €xternalism holds that the
public nature of meaning and thought requires an externalism of concept.
So, only general thoughtis sufficient for setting the Publicness of thought.
His reaction against social externalism is mainly a reaction to Burge’s
externalism, which I will not discuss further here, What interests me is his
reaction to content-externalism, in particular, NF externalism. In the
following, I will first look at his main idea and his criticism of NF view
and then offer my objections to his view.
For Bilgrami, there are two main aspects of content-- the
unification of content and the locality of content. The first one, which is in
common with the NF view, says that content is non-bifurcated into broad
and narrow. There is only one content which involves the external world
and rationalises actions. It is the sort of content the constraints on which
are both how a subject conceives the world and the external world.
Content or sentence-meaning is composed of ‘concepts’ or word-meaning
Which is determined by external objects. But concepts are not only
differently by different objects, but also by different
“onceptions or background beliefs of a subject concerning the term. So,
“outent deriving from concepts is constrained by external world
(Concepts) and the world as a subject conceives of it (conceptions).
According to the second aspect, content is local or can be ascribed
"a particular context, The context may be understood as a shared-
di may be a linguistic practice, even though different agents have
"background beliefs about the same concept. It is this aspect of
Bi which contributes to what rationalises actions.
is the concept expressed by the term ‘water’. The
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concept of the term ‘water’ is fixed by water in the external orl, The
background beliefs are any sorts of knowledge an agenthas
in a particular context. A chemist, in the context of doing an
experiment with water, employs his background beliefs concerning his
chemical knowledge. But, in the context of drinking water when he feels
thirsty, he may have different background beliefs about ‘water’ which are
not concerned with chemical knowledge, but have a shared ‘water’.
concept with other people in the same situation.
concerning
So, it can be seen that the notion of context, for Bilgrami, does
not mean a social context of language, rather it is the context in the sense
of being ‘public’. That is to say, context is not privately accessible,
However, the notion of context cannot be taken as the external object or
direct reference because, for Bilgrami, there are no norms at that level.
This means that concepts which are derived from external objects are not
nonnative. Different concepts are just different, and cannot be taken as
true or false. The normativity of truth and falsehood of concept use only
arises at the level of relations between sentences and between beliefs, that
is, at the level of Content. Content is hence normative because there is the
Public context. So, the notion of context which provides norms for
“Ontent is neither social context nor direct referential context. That is one
Of the reasons why Bilgrami thinks that singular thought is not necessary
a **counting for content, I turn now to Bilgrami’s criticism of NF view.
2.3.1. Criticism of the neo-Fregean view
The main motivation behind Bilgrami’s criticism of other sorts of
asm, like Burge and NF, is the worry about the of
a I will hot discuss how he argues against Burge's view which
8S common ground with his view than NF. However,
"ORY which turns him against NF idea of singular thought, that is, it
drives the bifurcation of content. I will show why Bilgrami thin that the
idea of singular thoughts is problematic before to the point of how
this idea leads to content-bifurcation,
For Bilgrami, Cartesianism means internalism, ie, the view that
content can be individuated independently from the external world, He
argues that in order to argue against Cartesianism, it is eufiicient to
that content is composed of concepts which are externally derived. So,
when NF externalism argues against Cartesianism by insisting on the idea
of singular thoughts, i.e, the externality of concepts is ‘directly’ fixed by
external objects, Bilgrami says that NF externalism is too demanding.
That is because Cartesianism does not claim that having thoughts need to
be general thoughts, i.e. the thoughts which, as Bilgrami understands, are
not singular or are not ‘directly’ fixed by objects. So, there is no need to
argue against Cartesianism by insisting on singular thoughts. General
thoughts are sufficient for content-individuation which can explain
actions. In particular, the disagreement between Bilgrami and the NF is in
we look to the relevance of the outside of his mind”. (1992: 171)
The relation of thoughtto the external world, for Bilgrami, has a sort of
indirectness, namely, content is indirectly related with the external world
although “it is concepts which are externally constituted out of the causal
that we have with external objects”. (ibid.) This means that if
there ig no external world/objects, having thought contents 1s still
POssible,
izes the
The above criticism is based on the way Bilgrami characterizes
idea of singular thoughts. For him, singular thoughts have a
liminable Psychological role’, What he means by this is the following:
sh ving demonstrative thoughts, one can have the same ve
thoughts) betweena hallucinatory and veridical experience.
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reason is not the phenomenological reason, but a semantic reason”, that
is, the semantic point concerning the inferential role of the concept which
is derived from an agent’s psychology or his conception of things. This
psychological role is ineliminable because indexicality and demonstratives
have an element of reflexivity which cannot be Paraphrasable without
appeal to other indexicals, such as “ ‘I’ can only be replaced by the
‘thinker of this thought’; ‘That’ can only replaced by ‘the object of this
demonstration’ or by ‘the object in front of me’ ”. (ibid.:163) So,
demonstrative thoughts have contents because in a subject’s psychological
role, there is elementof reflexivity, even though there is no external
object”. (ibid.)
Taking the idea of singular thoughts in this way, Bilgrami holds “a
description (or belief) theory of sense or meaning” (ibid.:174) which, he
thinks, does not bifurcate content because “the conceptions of things are
not to be seen as decouplable from the things”. (ibid.) Meanwhile, he
thinks that NF bifurcates contentinto the singular ‘concept’ and the
Conceptions of the object. (see ibid.:172) While concepts are expressed by
different names applied to an object, e.g. London and Londres, different
of the object are different set of beliefs about the object. So,
this means that there are two contents. (ibid.) On the contrary, Bilgrami's
Theory takes the concepts of terms as what convey beliefs, so there is only
Content. He thinks that the NF cannot have it both ways— the
een and the conceptions of things The ony
» Can offer the unification of content is the descriptions theory
mse." Tn the following, I provide some objections to his view.
3.2 efSome Objections to Bilgrami’s Criticism eat
fine My main objection is that Bilgrami’s notion of Cartesianism 1 no
d enough. He clearly states that he takes Putnam's
meth dological solipsism as the only form of Cartesianism which any
account of externalism is set to reject. That is Not correct because NF
externalism does not reject the modest form of Cartesianism, So this
means that his criticism of the NF is based on this misung ling. And
this is a reason why Bilgrami cannot see that there can be an idea of
singular thought which does not involve Content-bifurcation, Another
reason is that Bilgrami does not see the connection between the notion of
thoughts, objects and actions, in other words, the notion of practice. This
may be due to his understanding that Cartesianism means internalism
which also includes phenomenological experiences. (see ibid.: 159) The
phenomenological experience is an inner experience which is infallible. So,
in order to reject Cartesianism, his account of demonstrative thoughts is
provided in terms of a descriptive form of belief which can be semantically
evaluated, rather than thought which requires the idea of object-
engagement.
Before going to the issue of demonstrative thoughts, there is
another obvious issue which seems to be contradictory in the way
Bilgrami constructs his idea of externalism. That is to say, Putnam’s
methodological solipsism’” is the assumption of the individualistic
Conception of mind, but Bilgrami holds that his externalism is not anti-
individualism, The problem is that once one thinks that Putnam’s
solipsism is the thesis which externalism aims to oppose,
it seems that Onehas already adopted the picture of the separation
“en nind and the world at the outset. That picture is an implicit sort
Picture which Bilgrami would certainly not want to accept.
What Bilgrami may sayin reply is this. According to his accourtt
. «+c in which mind
a unified content must meet two constraints in whic
nstraint iSWorld are Not independently characterizable. These co oa
of, ext
and
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constraint of the world as a subject Perceives it and a
external world. (see Bilgrami 1998: 595) Tp. first co
Fregean constraint which he thinks that his account of extemnalism begins
with and then, he proceeds from there to fing Out the account of
externalism. So, this means that he does NOt presuppose the absolute
separation of mind and world at the outset like Putnam’s view, But the
problem is that the Fregean constraint is not incompatible with Putnam’s
methodological solipsism. The point is that the Fregean constraint
requires the idea of modest Cartesianism, namely, the idea that mind and
world are interweaving in the waythat it is rationally possible for a subject
to individuate which experiences of the same object is veridical on the
ground of knowing ‘which’ object one has experience of or thought
about. Since Bilgrami misses this point, it not only weakens his criticism
of NF externalism, but also leads to what is obscure in his own account,
namely, the problem of how his notion of content ‘indirectly’ derives from
Concept-externalism.
Constraint from the
is the
The problem may be due to the issue of the priority of constraint
On Content. This is the problem whichI have stated in the last chapter
about the dichotomyof representationalism and inferentialism that we
reed both semantic properties--reference and inference. On NF view,a
Hestion of what is a constraint on content is a matter of priority in the
following sense. Both the worldly constraint and inferential constraint are
‘letconnected, So that it seems that there is only one normative
“nstraint, namely, the ‘knowledge’ of truth-conditions. That knowledge
"Wolves both Fregean and Russell’s principles. But this does not mean
NF accepts modest Cartesianism where the role
Ww Points of view are what specify the reference, then the ext
ered Out. On the contrary, the reason why we need Russell's
mosig we accept the Fregean principle. In other words, since
158
it is rationally possible for us to have diff tho
ughts about the same
object, the idea of the worldly constraint ig " Y. This accounts for
Prior to the worldly constrai
t function if there ig
the idea that the inferential constraint ig at
in the sense that inferential constraint
worldly constraint.
The problem seems to be Bilgrami’s account of concept-
externalism as a constraint on content. The problem is that if concept
which is externally derived is not normative, as he takes it (see
Bilgrami1998), and the notion of constraint, as I understand, is
normative, then how can the external world be a constraint on content?
To be more precise, Bilgrami says that there are two constraints-- the
world as a subject perceives it and the external world. (see ibid.:595) He
thinks that concepts are externally constituted out of objects in the
external world. But there are no norms at that level: the level of word-
meaning, but norms are at the level of content: sentence-meaning. This
Means that Bilgrami’s externalism separates concepts from content. If
Bilgrami wants to maintain the idea that concepts do not provide norms,
there are two results-- first, he cannot insist on the externality of concepts
48 @ constraint on content; second, it implicitly follows that Bilgrami’s
of concepts makes it looks as if concepts are object-dependent in
sense, namely, the idea of an object about which different
thoughts are Not possible. That is because, for Bilgrami, concepts are not
normative OF rationally accountable. So if there is no Rsy¢ hological ee
ny objects, then the significant upshot is the idea that singular
ts, for him, are not necessarily object-dependent.
i nstrative thought
d This leads him to think that one can have 2 demo
te, Bi of demonstrative terms the content of needs
Objects, But the problem with Bilgrami’s point here is that
demonstrative content turns out to require an inferentialist account of
content, in which the only constraint being Provided is the inferential link
between expressions. But this inferential constraint cannot provide
from the world. The problem is, as with Brandom’s idea of
externalism, that once there is no worldly constraint on content, thoughts
do not have aboutness. Briefly, whatis required in order to capture the
notion of content which has functions of both rationalising behaviour and
providing the notion of objective norms is an account which has both the
inferential constraint and the worldly constraint.
3. Conclusion
I have argued thatif the NF view of contentis right. Individuation
of content requires an account of externalism which offers friction from
the worldly constraint on content. According to the NF idea of singular
thoughts, the world is constitutive of thought. But the world is external to
thought; otherwise, it will not be the world which makes the Fregean
tational space possible. In other words, in order to capture the idea of
Points of view, we need the idea of the external world which provides a
constraint on thought, so that content can be individuated. Accordingly,
the sort of content we getis not only normative but also has a
Tationalising force on actions. Put it another way, I argue that in order to
avoid the sort of rule-following dilemma in accounting for content, we
eed to avoid the dichotomy between representationalism and
thatis, not to fall into a one sided view of content.
. . ae ‘ rt ofWith this picture in mind, I began the investigation with the °
rnalism
a
Fodor’s
viewsof content--Putnam’s idea of exte = hat
OF intemnatism-- in order to show some problems with these idea ¢
e mined three current"hought and world in a separate way. Then, I¢
: share the
NS Of externalism --Burge, Brandom and Bilgrami--who
mmon assumption with NF externalism, namely,0
the assumption that
the connection of mind and world Plays a crucial ro
le in understanding
what it is to possess content. However,| argue that their Views still fail to
offer a worldly constraint on content. This shows that in order to capture
the notion of content which meets that constraint, we need the notion of
that the world ig
constitutive of thoughtis possible. It is the notion of Practice which
uires NF account of demonstrative thoughts. I turn to this topic in thereq
next chapter.
actice which provides an account of how the idea
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Notes
_
! content is radically inexpressibl sat
det gets to be content when-and only whetgsnycontent it's
2However, it should be noted here that there is a difference between (1987-50)
ism -- while Putnam d wae tn ee Putnam and Burge’
s externalism
wi Oes not explain meaning in the intensional or belief
context, since he links the methodological solipsism with the psychological i
intension, Burge's externalism is accounted within the beliefcontext. Fodor ignores
this point.
5 the following points are based on Evans,G. (1982:201-4)
4 As he said, “There is no ascription of a peculiarly de re (en rapport) attitude. At
most, there is a de re ascription ofa de dicto attitude.” (1977:346)
° see Burge,T. 1979 note 2,p.117, although Burge does not provide
full criticism for
Putnam’s view here, I think it can be understood as the way I show here.
®This is an obvious point about how Burge employs Frege’s notion of sense in such a
way that is different from NF view. That is, for NF, the thesis of the rational possibility
of different thoughts is about thoughts toward the same object, while for Burge, it is
about thoughts toward the conventional linguistic use.
TAs he says "Social context infects even the distinctively mental features of mentalistic
attributions. No man’s intentional mental phenomena are insular. Every man is a piece
of the social continent, a part of the social main.". (1979:87).
® See my chapter 1.
*T have already elaborated this issue of the difference between referent and reference
in chapter 2. This should be sufficient for the account that a singular thought has a
‘referent’ in the sense that it has an object in so far as that is conceived semantically as
what it contributes to making the thought true or false.
externalism' is my term. What Brandom uses is 'semantic
See the term ‘frictionless’ in Evans,G.&McDowell,J.
"For Brandom, normative pragmatics is supposed to be contrary to the classical
American pragmatism (e.g. Dewey) or the pragmatism’ about truth, —
whose view is that truth is a property of utility for some end. Brandom criticises Hus
Sort of view for taking norm as an end guiding action independently from the agent's
beliefs and offering a non-normative or a naturalistic account of norms which is hard
Hobe falsified, (see 1994: 286-291)
Representationalism is the view that the representation or the referential relation of
language to the world is what provides content; inferentialism is the view that we
inferential relation, viz. the logical relation between sentences, confers
content. For Brandom, in the end of his analysis, inferentialism ie
of referential properties. But it is reference in the sense ©}
referential Properties, rather than the world which externally ttween
, Brandom proposes a non-reductionist middle way
See my chapter one. with the
Brandom Opposes pragmatist model of knowledge (know-how) which
can model (know-that) and said that the latter
one only by the existence of some m
(bid :23, and also 21) the test case —demonstrative
» 8S we will see that his idea here does not pass cept. (see section 2.2.3)
for showing how the world is independent from our con
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\7The point is the authority of norms derives from th
: eir acknowledgment; in
Brandom's words, ---Our OWN acknowledgment Or endorsement of a Tule is the source
of its authority over us-in short that our normative Statuses such as obligation are
instituted by our normative attitudes." (ibid.:51)
Brandom’s criticism of Burge’s j
anaphora are connected as inferential connections among concepts which provide
conceptual contentor inferential role.
“The intuition that the hallucinating agent has a singular thought and that he has
the same thought as the veridical perceiver is not a phenomenological intuition at all.
The point is rather that the semantic or inferential role of the thought in his
psychological economyis the role of a demonstrative thought.” (ibid.: 162)
For Bilgrami’s externalism, the constraint is:
"When fixing an externally determined concept of an agent, one must do so by looking
to indexically formulated utterances of the agent which express indexical contents
containing that concept and then picking that external determinantfor the concept
Which is in consonance with other contents that have been fixed for the agent (1992: 5,
a underlining, his italics)
What Putnam said is that methodological solipsism is the assumption that “no
Psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any individual
other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed”(Putnam 1975: 220)
 163Chapter Four: A Concept of "Practice"
My main argument of the Previous chapters
that understanding meaning in language involves of content, and
that understanding meaning requires no interpretation, then what provides
content cannot be independently characterizable from use, Otherwise, the
dilemma of rule-following arises, namely, if norms are not inherently
constituted in use, then the upshot will be either a regress of
interpretations of rules or a paradox of no norms in use. The dilemma can
be accounted for in another way by employing the notion of the
dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism. The dichotomy arises
when the notion of contentis accounted for by precluding one of its
constraints — the worldly constraint and the constraint of the inferential
Structure of thought(the latter is what I called the fationality constraint).
The former constraint provides the idea of norms, namely, truth-
conditions for thought, while the latter rationalises human actions. To
Overcome the dichotomy, an account of content requires the neo-Fregean
idea of singular thoughts where thought content is singled out by the
object in the external world. Such an idea closes the gap of the dichotomy
in a way that what provides normativity for thought content is the object
Which is egocentrically grasped. In this sense, what rationalises human
actions are those relations to objects in which the object plays a
“onstitutive role in individuating thought.’ Such relations are
demonstrative thoughts, Consequently, we get a non-bifurcated content,
that is, there ig only one content which satisfies both the worldly
“onstraint and the rationality constraint.
is this. If it is the case
i tion of
An individuation of that sort of content requires @ 10
i ith obj ich normsPractice, ie, a structure of our engagement with objects, £0 whic
i ty aiming at achievingNe intrinsic, In general, practice is taken as an activity aiming
something. In essence, the account Of practice | ‘ani
aes Interested in ig
account of what it 15 0 Be & POSsessor Of content or what i fo an
is for
poth the world and the subject’s point of view, the
Notion of practice we
need is the notion the characterization of which involves demonstrative
thoughts. Demonstrative thoughts are accounted for in terms of the
notion of object-engagement. The notion of Practice hence needs to be
characterized as an object-engagement which involves the idea of an
‘intra-personal’ engagementrather than an ‘inter-personal’ engagement.
The latter is the accountin which social practice is taken as the source
of norms. Some examples of such an account were already discussed as
problematic in the last chapter, namely, Burge’s and Brandom’s views,
The notion of practice as the intra-personal engagement means that the
individuation of content requires an identification of object which is
related to the egocentric point of view. Such an engagement is confined
within a person in the sense that the engagementin thought or the
of thought is characterized under the modest Cartesian
conception of mind. In that sense, content is embedded in a structure of
Practice where the connection between the world and a subject’s point of
view cannot be independently characterized. Hence, without an account
of the world-involving practice, understanding content is not complete.
This chapter proposes the above notion of practice that offers an
of how possessing content or having thought is constituted bye
need connection with the world. That is to say, the account of practice
Nich Provides the content of singular thoughts requires the subject to be
engaging with objects in the external world ina
account shows how the idea of singular thoughts which are
in the sense of Russell’s cannot be separated
M the Fregean principle. So this chapter mainly attempts to
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the object’s
* aspect of the engagement,
chapter
aspect of an engagementand the subject’
which I consider in this chapter and next
The first aspect, which this chapter mainly focuses on, concerns
three elements: the ideas of the object of perceptual attention, spatial
representation and temporal representation, The three elements are
integrally related. The crucial question is how the idea of object which is
the source of normativity provides objectivity for the engagement of a
subject if the engagementis defined as an ‘intra-personal’ engagement. In
the first part, I discuss the connection of norms and behaviour in order to
define the notion of practice as a rule-governed behaviour in which rules
involves objects in the external world rather than rules of language games
or social rules. Then the second part elaborates a notion of practice as an
object-engagement,
Briefly, this chapter will answer the question of how the external
World as the objective constraint of thought should be illustrated in order
"0 See how practice as object-engagement provides an account of content
in Which mind and world are interweaving. The account of content |
Propose is what can be called a one-level account of content but two-
approach The meaning of one-level account (OL) is different from
at of two-level account (TL) in following way.
|. (OL) Content is provided by a direct conceptual engagement
Object, so that both constraints on content (rationality and
“ivy “onstraint) are satisfied at once.
2. (TL) Content is provided by the conceptual mediation
“Bocentrcity of thoughtand its objectivity, so that
on content are characterized independently.
I will show,
staged, namely:
3. It is necessary that although content ig Provided by an
unmediated conceptually structured engagement, thoughts of the same
type whether or not they are true or false do Not have a content in
common. That is because thoughts of the same type are distinguishably
two-staged: the stage in which thoughtis mind-dependentand the stage in
which thought is object-dependent, so that individuation ofa thought
depends on object.
in particular, in Section2.2.1 that OL needs to be two-
An account of contentis two-staged for both the rationality and
objectivity constraint need to be met to individuate a thought. It is this
which guarantees that thoughts of a putative common type-experience
(veridical and illusory experience) do not have a common factor because
mistake is possible in either the sort of thought we haveor the object of
Perception. There is no common factor of thought available in both the
Vetidical and illusory cases. The common factor in thought arises in TL
*ccount because it is staged-less or monolithic, namely:
4. The monolithic account treats the component that satisfies the
Tationality constraint as of the same type whether or not the thought is
"TUe oF false,
The upshot of the monolithic two-level account is that thought is
by, e.g., the rationality constraint alone, for that provides the
“ramon factor independent of truth-value.
AS regards the second aspect of the notion of practice, ie. the
concems“Pct ofa Subject’s engagement with an object, 4 Ga
t ‘ tions (practical
estion of whether objects are individuated by #
ive thoughts can
ifthe idea of objectivity for demonstrative tho
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found in an object-engagement. In other words, in what
objective constraint of thought imply action OF a pract
thought? Put it in Campbell’s way in what
‘detached’ aspect of the subject of thought related to its ‘attached’
aspect? My main contention, which will be further discussed in the next
chapter, is to show how thestructure of Practice provides the Connection
Sense does the
ical aspect of
Sense is the
between thought and world; perception and actions via the notion of
agency. On this account, the notion of ‘practice’ | Propose provides
content which satisfies both the constraint of the world which is grounded
ona perceptual linking with objects and the constraint of the aspect of
subjectivity which is accounted for in terms of actions and agency.So it is
neither perception per se nor the inferentialist notion of belief alone which
individuates content,
1. Practice as Rule-Governed Behaviour
As already mentioned, the notion of practice is essential for
understanding what it is for language to be about something. Indeed, it is
the notion that contributes to the account of how mind and world are
"elated. To understand that relation is to understand how meaning is
Possible in language, and that is, how content is possible for thought.
Given that language is a form of representation, it is the issue about how
"© give an @ccount of representation in order to understand its
Power, or the aboutness of language.
A problem about representation concerns how the rations power,
the normativity of symbols, is possible. That is the question of0
a"epresentation gets its representational power. These
the question of identification of a correct °
°Flanguage, the question is: what is the normative orite seas
"8? The rule-following considerations are the issue here.
Or
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we take the representation as a rule, the question is how a rule determines
bat is counted as following a rule; OF what it is for someone to follow a
rule? There are two possibilities: first, it is the Tule itself that determines
what is counted as following rule; second, it is the rule-following which
tells us what following rule is.
The problem with the first option is that if the tule is determinative
in a way which is independent from our understanding, then there will be
the problem about regress of interpretation of the rule because the rule
which runs by itself needs a further rule to interpret it. Problems with the
second possibility are the following: first, it begs the question because it is
the rule-following itself which is the problem, so we cannot answer what
is counted as followinga rule by looking at following rule. For example,
when trying to explain whata rule is, one might give some examples of
following rule. However, examples do not explain what counts as
following rule.
Second, it is a reductionist answer to explain what it is for
Someone to understand or follow a rule, which is normative, by giving an
count of the action of following a rule, which is a descriptive (e.g.
behaviourist) view, (This point will be discussed more below.) In other
itis just a description of what the agent does, not what she ought
to do, Though a rule-following, minimally, is exhibited by patterns of
‘sameness? of actions or regularity of actions, the regularity of actions by
not sufficient to count as following a rule because infinite
of the actions are possible, such as, the interpretation thet @
ict may change the rule or that he is incorrectly following the rule
this is possible for the simple reason that statements of regularity
tome has happened, not what ought to happen. That eee
exampleof teaching a child 8
pl 185-188) The child may add 2 for a Series of number, say till 1000
put after that he mayrun the series as 1004,1008,1012. a
rule is accounted for in terms of regularity of actions, then we cannot
understand this child’s adding two whether he has just applied a different
rule or he has made a mistake. So, regularity of actions is not sufficient
for accounting for understanding a rule, Indeed, regularity of actions
provides only the description of actions which cannot single out which
action is a correct instances of tule-following. Therefore, what ig counted
as following a rule requires an account which can single out a normative
action, that which manifests a subject’s understanding of the rule;
otherwise, there will be the paradox of Tule-following: PI 201- “no course
of action could be determined bya rule, because every course of action
can be made out to accord with the rule”.
Put it another way, understanding
rule is not individuated by the
sameness of actions, rather by the rational aspect of actions. By the same
token, the representational power of language is not derived from its
feptesentational symbol because there will be regress of interpretations of
the symbol. The regress problem will not arise if the representational
Power is derived from a speaker’s understanding. However, the
understanding in question is not the sort of understanding of the strong
"Otel Of Cartesianism which characterizes the mind as absolutely
from the external constraint. This picture of mind cannot
newer the question of how contentis individuated. In other words, there
‘$0 Normative criterion available in the strong model of Cartesianism. An
°F understanding which constitutes content needs toa
__ of how one acts or follows rules, the characterizat
ST the interweaving of the inner mind with the external world.
"Means that the sort of actions involving understanding cannot te
for in terms of descriptions of actions. That is because the
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rational aspect is already built in there, i.e, the Notion of «
regulated actions. Thatis to Say,
content is constituted by practice which is Constitutively rational or rule-
governed or, as one might say, practice as the rule-govemed behaviour,
To say that contentis ‘constituted’ by practice means that the explanatory
relation of action and understanding is a non-reducible and a rational one,
Practice’ as
of meaning and
A reductionist accountof the relation of action and understanding
is possible in two ways. One wayis to accountthat understanding is
nothing but action. An exampleof this account is a behaviourist view
which takes action as a manifestation of understanding in a descriptive
sense, that is, there is no rational aspect in action. The account of action is
provided, roughly, in terms of non-intentional descriptions of states, e.g.
physical states, But if actions are driven by rules which can be
characterized independently from the belief that one acts according to the
tules, the upshot is the paradox of rule-following: every action can be
interpreted as following the rule. I will discuss further the problem with
this sort of reductionist account below. Theother wayof reductionist
**count is that action is explained only in terms of understanding.’ In
*thet Words, following a rule is nothing but understanding
rule, that is,
One acts to rules which dependon one’s understanding. But
"iss son of an inner grasp of rule and leads to the problem of no
"OMS, So Sither way, practice which constitutes content cannot be
“plained ina non-normative and reducible way.
: the
. The first sort of reductionism can be put in the waythat
of understanding is explained as the causal output o
i i answer
ing. But the manifested behaviour does not provide the
“te ing to rules are
‘ as the causal input and acts according to
“ona ‘de the content we
“onnected; that is to say, it does not provice
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content which explains meaning of behaviour by appealing to context and
truth-condition of the physical structure of the subject. Behaviour in this
sense is not rational. It is also an issue, ag in Kripke’s criticism (1982),
that if we ask how meaning is possible, then the manifested behaviour
does not provide the answer, because behaviour Which is non-normative
cannot justify meaning which is normative.
So the notion of practice which is non-reducible or constitutive
has to be explained in the way that the subject of understanding is also the
subject of action, that is the notion of agency -- someone whose reasons
for action are a part of a causal relation,‘ However, this is not meant to be
the second sort of reductionism: the constraint of understanding is the
subject’s intentional attitudes alone. That is because it must involve the
objectivity of truth-conditions which is world-involving also; otherwise
thee wil be no ffiction for content individuation. Practice hence needs to
be accounted for in the way that a subject engages with the world. It
Means that causal relations need to be accounted for in the sense that
Use and effect is part of a rational relation, that is, the cause of action is
She reason for action of the agent. In other words, the subject is an agent
"ose actions cannot be explained solely in terms of causation, but rather
“tions are Performed underreasons for doing something. That is to say,
We :need a account of practice.
However, this does not mean that we should shun behaviour
to find out what understanding is. Rather, there is a notion
Whichis non-behaviouristic and is constitutive of
i hemig In the following, I look at Campbell (1982) where
*Bainst ion understanding.the behaviourist approachto the notion of
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sis argument provides a reason why a non-behaviouristic
required. Although I may not agree with all of his ideas, his objection to
the behaviouristic approach is correct and helps provide an idea of
which is constitutive of understanding. My dispute with
Campbell’s view will be more obvious in later sections,
approachis
Campbell argues that the behaviourist account camnot account for
how behaviour can be used in individuating understanding of language.
What he proposes is a cognitive account of behaviour. (1982:20) * His
argumentis as follows. According to behaviourism, understanding a
language is accounted for as behaviour similar to the behaviour of
someone who possesses knowledge of a language plus a theory
characterizing the knowledge. Thatis to say, knowledge of understanding
cannot be characterized as a part of the understanding. On this basis, there
are in general two possibilities for a behaviourist to account for
understanding. First, in order to account for what it is for a subject to
have knowledge ofa language, a behaviourist cannot say that possession
of knowledge is the explanation. So, he needs to provide a causal factor
underlying the behaviour, which is the internal neural structure of the
Subject. The problem concerning this possibility is that the behaviourist
account for the fact that the neural structure cannot be
Characterized independently to the subject’s beliefs and desires which are
“atied over time, That is because the theory of knowledge of
does not take account of the variation of beliefs and desires
ie Combined with the neural structure. Second a my
description of beliefs and desires, which may allow tor
wa Variations, But the problem is that this cannot
bet “et knowledge of understanding a language is not rant in
and desires. The behaviourist may argue that what VN
Unting for understanding is the subject’s neural structure, which once
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she subject acquires the knowledgeof understanding, produces patterns of
which are varied to beliefs and desires of the subject, However,
this response still does not work because such a description of the neural
has t0 be similar to what the theory ascribes. This means that,
indeed, what matters for the behaviourist is not the behaviour itself; rather
it is the theory.
The main objection of Campbell is hence this, If following the
behaviourist account, the behaviour of a subject cannot be distinguished
from the one of those who possesses knowledge. It means that we need to
look at something else which is not a behaviourist conception of
knowledge. For Campbell, the alternative is a cognitive conception.
Cognitivism is a knowledge-based account of understanding, that is,
understanding of a language is to be accounted for in terms of possession
of knowledge. However, it does not mean that knowledge is to be
explained in terms of (reduced to) understanding. The problem is how
cognitivism is possible without being circular. Campbell’s reply is that
Cognitivism requires a notion of understanding which is non- verbal. The
circularity of cognitivism arises, if one takes belief or knowledge only ina
form. For Campbell, there are two reasons why knowledge of
ing does not require verbal or propositional knowledge. First,
knowledge is too stable to allow varieties of ways that an object
vane thought of, e.g. I may know what x looks like but I can think of
rgOB, sometimes as seen fils.an
bev Wledge is too definite. Knowledge of und
ot yet being verbally expressed. Accordingly, for Camp
“ORRitive 8Pproach to understanding is not a circular approach if
ing is explained in terms of non-verbal knowledge.
isagrees withThe above issue isthe issue which disagrees
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epowel and Evans’s (ME) accountof und .
‘aks that ME i ding. That is to say
campbell thinks 1s an axiomatic-approach ,
ps0 ach. The axiomatic approach holds that thought j moe* sitionally. Kn wl sna
verbally of ProPO Mnowiedge of the meaning of a sentence
is based on that of words (axioms), For Campbell, his Cognitive
approach will not face the problem of circularity because his can provide
an explanation of how thought and world get connected without
exhausting verbal knowledge. Meanwhile, as Campbell Criticizes, that
problem wil arise in ME’s approach because there ig no explanation for
the perception of meaning. Thatis because, for ME, perception of
meaning which is linked with perception of (inferential) structure is a pure
non-psychic or neural structure, and thereby there is a circularity in
accounting for how understanding is constitutive of knowledgeof a
language.
However, my objection is that Campbell seems to be confused
between language as a symbol without content and language as being a
structure in thought. The latter provides a reason why an account of
thought content requires a constraint of rationality or what rationalises the
way we act or use language. This means that ‘perception’ of meaning is
dot meant to be ‘non-psychic’ or purely physical perceptual experiences
8 Campbell understands ME, rather it is meant to be the notion of
in which its inferential/normative structure is built. The point
Here underpins what I will criticize Campbell’s view later on the issue of
*bject-identifcation, In particular, this involves the idea that individuation
f content of thought is provided by the idea of practice as object-
sment. That is to say, Campbell’s view turns out to be that:
3 oan iourUgh it is the non-verbal knowledge which individuates the behavio
of understanding, what cognitivism states is that such non-
V Boca’
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ing with objects. I will provide some
engagins
this point in later section.on
In sum, I have argued that practice which Provides content needs
actions the understanding
of which does not always require an extrinsic rule or theoretical
jnowledgeof the understanding (interpretations), Rules as norms are
intrinsically in practice. Moreover, the notion of an engagement of agency
with the world is required in the sense that both the agent’s understanding
and action are rationally related underthe objective constraint of the
be accounted for in terms of Tule-governed
world. That is because if the central question Concerning thought and
language concerns how mind and world are related, then, following
McDowell, there is no need to find a bridge for them. That is, the idea
that understanding is not always interpretation, However, that does not
mean that mind and world are identical. Otherwise, it is not Possible to
see how content of thought is individuated. It is under a structure of
‘Practice’ that content can be individuated. The notion of practice
Provides the way out from the dilemma of rule-following. It shows that
are constituted in the way we act. The problem is how norms are
found within Practice. The answer is not the notion of practice as an
engagement. Although I have already discussed this issue in
the las chapter, I provide a short section mainly for showing a contrast
the notion of practice being defined as an interpersonal
and that Which is defined as an intrapersonal engagement.
LL Interne.“onal Engagement
By the notion of practice as an interpersonal engagement, I mean,
“ple, the Wittgensteinian community view and the use theory of
© SUCh as found in Kripke, Wright, Brandom, Burge. A main
a
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why practice is accounted for in this way is the assumption tha
pnguage is prior to thought. This means that language is Viewed as an
independent rule detached from understanding meaning, so thet
pee t0 Jook for an explanation of how language and thought are
comected. The idea of an interpersonal engagement takes the view that i
jsina social context of a linguistic practice that meaning is provided. In
other words, whatbridges the gap between language and und
a public context of language-use. As Geach (1971:3) said mental acts
have no meaning without connection with the Public language-game of
describing thoughts. Thoughts in this sense are the sort of “private mental
lives” which though they exist have no meaning. It is social practice or
how language is used which provides the normative criterion of meaning.
A problem concerning the Community view here is that instead of the
public criterion showing how language has a representational power, it
separates Content from language. Public language becomes
sort of
interpretation of how understanding is possible--a group interpretation
that gets norms by being socially engaged. As an interpretation, it still
faces the dilemma of rule-following, and thereby cannot account for
“ontent which meets the worldly constrain and rationalises action.
is
According to Wittgenstein, the way out of the dilemma is practice.
217, Practice is characterized as the bedrock of meaning, that is,
“there i no justifcation or interpretation, namely, the concept of
Practice as forms of life (e.g. PI 241, PI p.226: Whathas to be accepted,
me ~-.-forms of life.), The problem remains how practice, or a
ni normative, because forms of life cannot be accounted for in
Nei "he natura history of mankind in which there are no norms.°
ee “anit be a Practice as an interpersonal engagement where _—_
"ay down (e.g. in Brandom’s discursive practice) because
dent from
he
*° for judgements which are indepem
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our will, namely, judgements that enjoy friction from
notion of practice requires an account of how norms
independent from our will.
the world. So the
are possible and
Provided that the fundamental question about practice is about the
relation of mind and world, it is a question of how mind or thought has
representational power. As already mentioned from the Outset, the notion
of thought includes the conception or our understanding of concepts in
language. Thought cannot be accounted for in terms of the strong
Cartesian concept of mind where content cannot be individuated, Rather it
should be accounted for in terms of a Fregean thought — thought which
has sense as a constituent. Having a thoughtis to be able to apply a
concept of an object in a sentence. So thought, as an understanding, and
language are crucially connected. However, language is not the bridge
between mind and world. It is not the instrument for expressing thought.
Otherwise, language would be considered as a rigid machine or a syntactic
Sttucture to which semantics or meaning has to be added, and that would
lead to the problem of how that addition makes understanding language
Possible. Rather, language should be considered as a structure of thought
and understanding because language contains an inferential structure of
thought.” In this sense, concepts are already attached to understanding.
However, the inferential structure of thought aloneis not sufficient for
Mierstanding how contentis possible. We need an account of what its
“Outce of norms is. That is to say, normativity lies in external objects our
of which interweave with the way we generate
we It is on this groundthat the notion of practice
In the following, I will show how norms are in
Practicg Which is defined as an engagement of a subject of thoughts and
“ons with Objects,
178
practice as Object-Engagement
Object-engagementis the crucial characterization of demonstrative
thoughts. The notion of practice that is Proposed here requires an account
ofhow perceptual engagement with objects provides content, 1 wl focus
on this point by answering the following three questions -. first, what are
demonstrative thoughts? I answerby looking at the notion of perceptual
attention and its connection with the idea of object-dependence. Second,
in what sense should weaccountfor the notion of object-dependence?
This is the issue of how to accountfor objectivity of demonstrative
thoughts. Third, this issue involves the question of how object-
identification relates with spatio-temporal identification,
2.1. The Role of Perceptual Attention
Although there are different forms of identification of objects, as
Evans (1982) says, -- demonstrative identification, descriptive
identification and recognition-based identification, it is demonstrative
identification which is the most basic form for object-identification.
However, understanding demonstrative identification, which is the
iettiication atthe level of an object and concepts, cannot be separated
fom an account of its structure which provides content, namely, the
inferential structure of thought. If an object is considered independently
fom the structure of thought, then it is only Russell’s idea of object or
and this is not sufficient for understanding actions. Talking
demonstrative identification cannot be separated from
thoughts because it is at the level of content which
Vides the above understanding. So I will talk mainly about
ba native thoughts, * The main point is that demonstrative thoughtsVe
*S their constituents. That also provides a reason why
thoughts are the most basic form of thought. ;
: t a subject
Ve thoughts are object-dependent in the sense un
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object one has thought about, the co
_ d by both the world and the ©gocentric
related to the inferential structure of thought.
Intent Of which is
Point of view which is
Those are the two
constraint, as | will explain.
The two constraints can be accounted for as the need to satisfy
Russell’s Principle and the Fregean Principle. The former provides the
idea that thought content requires “knowing —which’ object one has
thought about. The latter principle Provides the idea that — even though it
is the object which provides a condition for defining truth-values of
thought, thought has a rational value which reflects the subject's
egocentric perspective on the object and which makes it possible for
different thinkers to think about the object with different modes of
Presentation at the same time. In other words, having a thought about an
object a that a is F, without knowing that
is G, is rationally possible
because different thoughts about an object provide rational explanation of
different actions towards the same object. By having demonstrative
thoughts, the source of contentis directly from the world with which we
ate acquainted. The notion of perceptual acquaintance, as already
discussed in the earlier chapters, needs to be accounted for as both
Russellian and Fregean, namely, acquaintance conveys both the object-
dependence idea and the egocentric grasp of the object. So content
Ceriving from demonstrative thoughts is based on our perceptual
Periences which cannot be accounted for independently from the
grasp of an object,
Grasping objects in that sense involves the way a thinker perceives
to an object over a period of time. It is the notion of sense
Whi .Nich defines the experience of perceptual attention to an object with
st demonstrative thoughts are involved. The Westion is how to
the notion of perceptual attention which meets the above two
will look first at the issue Of what the Tole of perceptual
vein is in demonstrative thoughts, And then What it is to Say that the
oa of perceptual attention is Object-dependent,
The notion of perceptual attention isa fundamental idea of
demonstrative thoughts, As Evans accounts for this idea it ig—
“a capacity to attend selectively to a single thing over a period of
time: that is, a capacity to keep track of a Single thing overa
period of time—an ability, having perceived an Object, to identify
later perceptions involving the same object over a period of
continuous observation.”(1982: 1 75)
A question concerns what perceptual attention means. For Evans,
perceptual attention provides a continuous information-link between a
subject and an object. It involves at least three things—the subject’s
Perceptual experiences, the ability to identify and reidentify the object of
attention and a period of time. According to Evans, perceptual attention is
defined as a capacity. This suggests that attention involves, in some sense,
to act towards its object. It means that attention connects the
constraint with the psychological constraint. So perceptual
Mention is a Central notion for accounting for demonstrative content and
an of how a demonstrative thought is a crucial thought
derstanding actions, However, it is a disputable issue in what sense
oettn requires an account of action. eenan
°ok first at what exactly the role of percep
thoughts,
os cial for
The whythe notion of perceptual attention '5 cn
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scooting for demonstrative thoughts is that it is the notion which points
namely, the idea of Object-dependence, When we percei
ive a
wing attentively, we havea ‘this-thought’, if WE accept the neo.
-Fregean
tien of object-identification, namely, the notion of de re sense or the idea
that the idea about an object cannot be separated from our ways of
thinking about it, then our perceptual experience of the Object is already
selective. So the notion of perceptual attention needs to be understood as
attention. It is selective only because it is about the object of
attention. Thereby, the content of thoughtis possible,
Mypoint here hence contradicts Hamlyn (1983:67) who
distinguishes attention into two types—non-selective attention which is a
result of a process of stimulation and selective attention which provides
epistemic information aboutthe object. For example, the lines in the
Muller-Lyer illusion are an object of our perceptual attention in the sense
that they are taken by our perceptionto be different lengths. But, for
Hamlyn, they are non-selective because they are the result of a stimulation
Process. So for him, attention is taken as a characteristic of perceptual
experience. If we follow Hamlyn, there is no point to employ the notion
of attention in accounting for perception and information. That is because
he equivocates attention with perceptual experience which does not
“onvey the idea of an object of attention. In other words, attention turns
Sut to be the experience itself which points to nothing, and hence provides
*© content. If that were so, that would seem to contradict the implication
Of the Notion of attention: the notion that points to an object whichis the
of its content,
in i iveThe notion of perceptual attention I am interested in is selecti
Which is object- dependent.? On this point, Campbell (1997,) is
Tight _ haracterizes the‘0 say that the notion of selective attention is what ¢
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of a perceptual (See 60) However, a problem
with Campbell's View here concerns his basic assumption that the two
seals of objectivity/subjectivity or detachment/attachment
require a mediation (or explanation) for bridging them
together.” For Campbell, as thought can be said to represent the world in
two forms: linguistic representation (or content) and mental
representation (or content), the question is about what links both
representations together. The answer will be what Provides the mediation
between thought and world. Campbell suggests that perceptual attention
provides such a link, and thereby is what mediates thought with the world.
Campbell’s view on this point is important because it leads to an
important issue about object-dependence. Briefly, Campbell (1984-5)
thinks that the object-dependence idea can be accounted for in the sense
of existence-dependence. An upshot of his idea that is relevant to my
point is that he denies any pragmatic implications in accounting for
content. I will argue with his view after showing a connection between the
Tole of perceptual attention and the object-dependence idea. So I look at
Campbell’s view on this point in order to show that the notion of selective
attention cannot be considered independently from the idea of object-
dependence.
According to Campbell, two sorts of content, ie. propositional
“ontent and imagistic content are linked by selective attention. The
difference between these contents is this. While the former requires an
Object for @ proposition to have content, that is, a proposition requires a
“antic value which is provided by the object of reference, the latter sort
Or imagistic content requires perceptual experiences and mental
which might be said to providea practical value. For Campbell,
ie, “selection of information for further processing”
*' 57) provides the link in the sense that for a proposition to have &
content, it requires @ selection of information from Perceptual
experiences.
The notion of attention which Campbell Considers is
pheno menological notion. That is to say, for such a notion to
. Provide an
idea of object, it has to be derived from an argument
concerning empirical
perceptual experiences rather than from an a Priori argument, e, in
Evans’ view. Evans’ argumentis a priori for Campbell because Evans’
account of demonstrative thoughts is based on Propositional knowledge,
rather than empirical knowledge. Campbell argues that the notion of
attention deriving from propositional knowledge is a notion which is prior
to perceptual experiences, so it cannot explain whyperceptual attention
links thought to the world. Evans’ account of perceptual demonstratives
is based on the idea that demonstrative reference can be generated from a
fundamental idea of an object. (see Evans 1982, section 4.4) The
fundamental idea of object is the idea that an object is identified bya
distinguishing knowledge from other objects of a same sort. (8 is F.) For
a spatial object is distinguished from others by its location at a
time. For Evans, such identification is objective in the sense that it does
Mt Tequire a point of view. Campbell takes this to mean that such
identification ig not a demonstrative identification. What provides
demonstrative identification, for Evans, is a non-fundamental idea of
“ference, namely, our egocentric location of the object is identical with
idea of the object. (this man=5 where is a fundamental
According to Campbell, this means that, in Evans’s view,
Teference is derived from a non-empirical idea. An
tisfieg Upshot is that spatial attention turns to be the only basic form
en
. tly fromHOR, because objects cannot be thought of independently
their location. This overlooks the fact that if the notion of perceptual
attention is considered on empirical 8round, other
pesides spatial attention are Possible, e.g.
object-identification does not necessarily require identification, For
Campbell, the reason whyspatial attention is thought to be the basic form
ofattention is because we think about content only of one Sort, namely,
propositional content. This ignores the other Sort of content, imagistic
content, which, for Campbell, requires an explanation of how it is
connected with propositional content. Once We get the explanation, we
will be able to see how thoughtand the world are connected, The answer
for him is that the notion of attention needs to be thought of from the
phenomenological level. What he means by this is that: identification of an
object is possible on empirical grounds because an object has an objective
causal structure which is closely related to the notion of time — “the
causal principle of unity of the thing, the way in which the condition of the
thing at one time depends on its conditions that at earlier times.” (1997,:
63) The phenomenology of objects shows that in referring to an object
demonstratively, spatial attention aloneis not sufficient, because what is
to singular reference is its causal structure. So, the notion of
attention that is central to demonstrative identification involves
the notion of the causal structure of objects. In grasping such a structure,
Wo sides of Content are involved; in other words, there are two sorts of
of causal structure: a practical grasp of causal structure and the
8rasp of causation. The former is shown in the way we act on
ormeienh
deity knowledge (i.e. amet sonal content. Fot
reasoning), and thereby provides propositio
propositional reasoning and action on objects are hence two
ts : .ofa Notion of selective attention.
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be merely schemati “eems that his notion ofturns to merely a schemat c Rotion (i . the of an
object’s causal structure) that does not point to an object in the
gense. A reason behind this may be due to the picture that in Campbell’s
view, propositional knowledge is merely an aspect of content, while he
takes this as contra to Evans’ view that takes such knowledge to be the
constraint of content. A problem with Campbell’s view Concerning this
point may be stated again that he is taking propositional content in the
sense of a structure of linguistic symbol rather than languageas use. This
means that propositional content for him is assumed to be content that is
separated from mental content. Language as symbol does not have
content because content is possible only when the language is used. That
is because the rationalisation of language use requires an account of a
speaker’s psychology. Languagein use hence has content in the sense that
it involves mental content. This can be said to be the idea of Evans’s
notion of fundamental /non-fundamental idea of object. It shows that
thought is structured in the way which its objective norms are intrinsic to
thought, ie, the object which is independentto thought cannot be
characterized independently. Accordingly, Campbell’s criticism that
Evans’ notion of attention is not based on an empirical ground does not
Seem to be Tight. What underlines the problem mentioned here might be
ee lfdemonstrative thoughts are the sort of thought which provide the
“ee tha Objectivity can be intrinsic to thought which is egocentric in
“te, then What needs to be clarified is how the objectivity of objects is
“ated to the €gocentricity of thought. This point is the key to the notion
Of oh: 3 int
the discussion of which mayhelp making my po
Camp bell’s view. I turn to this issue below.
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abject -dependence is Russellian, namely, the Possibility
thought deP mene of an object, However, in Order that the
objet be grasped as something independent of our Fequires the
rational space of objects, namely, the rationality Principle that
gllows different thoughts about an object to be Possible. This allows for
the egocentric perspective of thought. An account of objects, which
connects with language, is the Fregean idea of Object. That is to say, an
object is the condition of assigning a semantic value to a Sentence, Le, an
argument that completes the function of a sentence. But these are objects
grasped under modes of presentation or objects of thought which we have
concepts about, that is, the mode of presentation of an object is its sense,
The content of a sentence is its thought which has senses as constituents,
So a thought derives its content from an object under a mode of
presentation. That notion of object is, as McDowell (1984,) puts it,
characterized as having de re sense, i.e. an object fixed by sense based on
our perceptual experiences. Perception playsa crucial role in accounting
for the modes of presentation of an object because it is what shows that
the object, which can be grasped in different ways, exists independently of
our perceptual experiences. Otherwise Russell’s Principle will not work,
that is, if there is no object, then there is no content. So it is the object
Which exists for perception which provides content of thought.
The central issue of the object-dependence idea is the account of
‘ew Objectivity can be characterized from our egocentric point of view.
i Campbell, the idea of an object is a condition of possessing the itea of
Ne objective world --the objective spatio-temporal order. An objet
in terms of its causal connectedness in time rather than in
OFits position ina spatial array as presented in ee
campbell (1984-5:168-9) hence takes idea o fa recognition-based
is of object, ie. the identification of object based on memories and
tne, as the “ce me Se Bnition-based idea of object is
from a demonstrative idea Of object in the way tht he latter
requires 4 point of view, but the formeris related to the objective
emporal structure. In particular, the Tecognition-based
dependent in the sense that the existence of the object
idea is existence.
iS a condition of the
idea of an objective world. However, the hotion of object involves also
the notion of the self. That is because to Possess theidea of the objective
world is also to be able to recognise oneself a8 a part of the objective
spatio-temporal structure. So, existence-dependence is different from
object-dependence in the following way: while the former is characteristic
of the recognition mode of identification which does not the object
characterized in terms of demonstrative acquaintance, the latter is
characteristic of the demonstrative mode of identification the object of
which exists as being acquainted in time for the subject. However, for
Campbell, the idea of object-dependence can be said to be existence-
dependent, namely, a demonstrative idea of an object also involves the
idea. This means that demonstrative identification of an
Object is existence-dependent only in so far as the object provides
or Semantic value for a sentence, and that
Possession of the idea of oneself as in an objective temporal
169) So the existence of the recognized object is required for
to be applied.
However, it is Suspicious whether Campbell’s idea of an object is
ient for actions because of his attempt to avoid the
Stig, “spect Of object-identification. This can be seen from his .
Si of Peacocke’s view. (Peacocke 1983) For Peacocke, the idea o
°° for intentions is the idea that explaining why
Xacts upon & particular object, one must appeal to an intention which
X 10 that object; which X could not have had dia
that object not
exist.” (ibid.:167). Campbell thinks that Peacocke’s idea
of existence.
dependence does not require objects that actually exist wha:
peacocke is interested in is explanation of actions rather than thoughts
put, for Campbell, the idea of object is crucial not only because it
provides an explanation for actions, but also because it provides the
normativity for having thoughts. This means that the existence of objects
is a basic requirement for the understanding of the idea of the objective
world, rather than for explanation of actions alone. However, the problem
with Campbell’s view is this: as his idea of object-dependence is defined
as a causal relation of temporal order rather than the object of which we
have perceptual experiences and which explains our actions toward
things, his idea of object, it can be said, is not tactile enough to rationalise
the way people behave toward the world. The issue why Campbell ignores
this point is mainly because he tries to avoid the pragmatic view of
Content: he tries to avoid a one-sided aspect of content.
However,there is a common aspect between Campbell’s view and
Peacocke’s view, namely, they both seem to share a two-level account of
demonstrative content Such an account holds that content can be
characterized independently from two levels: the non-conceptual level of
Information link between a subject of thought with an object, and the
application to the information link, That is to say, both
bell and Peacocke account for content in a way in which the
Of the Object can be independently characterizable from the
Whatdrives their ideas toward TL account concerns
ex = What concerns Peacocke is the account
Which do not have content; concern is about the
“al value Of engagement with objects. According to Peacocke’s
“te link Where an object provides
fom the conceptual lnk where a
cognitive abilities pick up the object and Provide an idea of
ype) demonstrative mode of presentation. The problem concerning hig
idea is the problem that thoughts are treated monolithically, in which
of the Se Pe cannot be differentiated by a token objec
with regard to Campbell’s two-level account, as mentioned above, the
objectivity of objects is separated from engagement with the object. But
this can be meant, in a sense, that objectivity is ‘extrinsic’ to the
engagement. It leads to the problem that the account of the objectivity of
objects is not in reach of the rational attention of the subject. Put another
way, Peacocke’s and Campbell’s two-level account of content faces a
problem concerning the two constraints of an account of content, that is
to say, the former faces a problem aboutthe objectivity constraint and the
latter faces a problem about the rationality constraint. I will discuss
Campbell after considering Peacocke’s two-level account.
2.2.1.Object-Engagement and the Objectivity Constraint
An object-engagement-- demonstrative modeof presentation of an
object-- involves an idea of an object being known through a perceptual
acquaintance the content of which is a demonstrative content. An account
ofa demonstrative content requires an accountof in what sense the
Perceptual engagement with an object which is egocentric locates the
Object in an objective frame of reference. Such an account is important
the object in its objective location provides the objectivity
on demonstrative content. It is also an account of what itis for
constraint to meet the objectivity constraint. Such an
i Possible in two senses:
i Object-engagement involves a direct acquaintance with the
Xbicct bei ion which is co-* being located egocentrically in its objective location W
with the egocentric location; ang
0
2, object-engagementrequires the conceptual
abilities of g subj
oo -ordinate the egocentric location With the objectto in the objective
jocation.
The first account (McDowell 1990) is based on what I called one-
jevel account of content. This is an account which takes the objectivity of
content as that which is directly grasped within a demonstrative mode of
presentation; in other words, the objective location of an object cannot be
characterized independently from its egocentric location. The latter
(Peacocke1983, 1991) is based on what I called two-level account of
content. However, Peacockehas called his account an evidential approach
which involves a ‘constitutive role’ of demonstrative mode of
presentations. (1983:109) But, as I will argue, the evidential approach is a
two-level account. Thatis to say, the egocentric space and the objective
space can be characterized independently, the connection of which is the
subject’s cognitive abilities to co-ordinate them in thought.
In the following, I suggest that object-engagement which provides
demonstrative content requires a one-level account of content but two
Stages, that is, the object is actually located in an egocentric space and
thereby the objective space; however, the same type of the egocentric
location can be distinguished in thought. I first consider the main problem
“oncerning the two-level account. Briefly, the problem is that once
“Bocentric space and objective space are characterized independently
“Sronnect them with the subject’s conceptual abilities begs the question of
© of concepts to things. The upshot is that the account
engagement is monolithic or free-floating: the object, which is ihe
of Content, does not provide a normative constraint a thought, so
abe engagement with the object does not provide content.
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nother
words, the monolithic account can acco de
ge Mnodate o
d escriptive thought which is object-indepen, dent, rather a
4 emonstrative thought which is object-q ependent a
Peacocke (1983) calls his account of demonstrative thought an
evidential approach, the approach that a demonstrative mode of
presentation (token)is a constitutive role ofa demonstrative type.
The evidence is each type of demonstrative mp., “which disposes a thinker
to judge thoughts containing constituents of that type.’ (ibid.:110) A
demonstrative mp. is a token indexed to each Particular object. For
example, which is indexed to each subject who addresses such term,
e.g. Peter, Paul, is a token demonstrative mp.. Its demonstrative type is
[selfpeter]. (ibid.:108) An example concerning another sort of object may
be this. When we perceive an apple, its demonstrative mp. is ‘this’ or
‘that’ apple; its demonstrative type is [thisapie]. So there is only one type
of demonstrative mp. which accounts for a demonstrative identification.
In other words, a type of demonstrative mp. is constitutive of a token
mp.. The evidence ''or the constitutive role of a demonstrative mp. is the
type demonstrative mp., which is meant to be the conceptual ability. This
can be seen from his account of such a notion that the constitutive role is
composed of three elements-- a sortal concept (or what fixes the temporal
and spatial condition of the object when a subject has a demonstrative
thought), the role of a psychological state of a thinker and some causal
‘elation between them. It is this notion which enables us to understand
“AY One can changea judgement concerning an object. For example,
when one sees a bowl from a comer of a room, and has a judgement,
“That bow! is made in China.”; and if one walks closer to the bowl, and
looks at the print on the bottom of the bowl, he may revise the judgement
int, “This bowl is made in Japan.” The revision of the judgement requires
this ‘bowl’,
only the Perceptual experience of the object (token bow!:
sat ‘00 but also the constitutive role of a demo
namely, the sortal bowl [this (See ibid,:] 165 nstrative type,
Accordingly, it is obvious that Peacocke’
demonstrative thought appears to be of
to say, the demonstrative identification is composed of evolene is
non-conceptual level of the link between subject and object (the level
where we get the token mode of presentation) and the level which
requires the subject’s epistemic or conceptual ability to identify the first
Jevel (the level where we get the type mode of presentation). That is the
reason why Peacocke (1991) had made it explicit that, for him, Evans’s
yiew on demonstrative identification does not involve only the actuality of
place, but also “an idea of “some epistemic position (the subject) could
get into” (Evans1982: 258)”. (1991: 125) The actuality of the place or
information-link, for him, provides the thinker the ability to locate the
object. (ibid.: 124) Such an ability is the conceptual ability which
Peacocke (1983) calls a sort of evidence; and in his revision idea, he calls
it a possession condition of concept (1991: 131). ”
An example, which Peacocke raises, is the case of a tree seen at @
distance through a haze. Although the haze causes the incorrect
location of the tree, the information link still provides the
Subject with information about the objective location of the tree. What
Provides the co-ordination of the egocentric and the objective location is
the subject’s conceptual abilities to keep track of the object. In this oe
the Subject ig keeping track of the tree by moving from one position in
“hich the tree is incorrectly placed to another position in ‘ohn .
Pace i in the objective location. For Peacocke, it is the seni one
Keep track of the object which is the evidence providing
Thoughts,
peacocke (ibid.) defends such an acco
unt of demo
nstrative
‘ccation because if demonstrative
Entification dogg hot reau?
Tequire the
conceptual ability to organise the information in the
a usintance, then there will be problem that Perceptual
cannot provide a demonstrative content. The conceptual ability allows us
to differentiate between the egocentric and objective identification of
places. According to his debate with McDowell (1990), he argues that
McDowell’s view is counterintuitive, McDowell’s view is this: the
object of perceptual acquaintance is presented as in an Objective location
in the sense that the egocentric location of the object cannot be
characterized independently from its objective location. That is because
perceptual acquaintance directly involves the conceptually structured
information link. So, having a demonstrative thought depends on the
condition of having an actual placing of the object. Peacocke takes this to
mean that, in McDowell’s view, what provides demonstrative content is
the actual co-ordinate point or a correct co-ordination of the egocentric
and objective location, but Peacocke thinks that if so, then perceptual
acquaintance cannot be a demonstrative identification. This can be seen
from the following two cases.
First, suppose that unknown to the subject, due to the heat haze,
the tree actually locates at a position p1, but his egocentric location of the
ttee is at p 2. If following McDowell, having a demonstrative thought
on the correct co-ordination of the egocentric and the objective
then it means that the subject cannot be having @ demonstrative
thought, “Thattree is there.” at p 1 because there is no co-ordination of
Net location at p1; in other words, the tree at p1 is not the actual
location for the subject. But that is counterintuitive. So, for Peacocke,
Wis Provides a demonstrative thought isnot that the tees
located a 11, rather itis the subject’s cognitive
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track of the object by moving toward the object that provides
demonstrative thought. .
Second, suppose bird is Seen near the tree at time 11; and stil
at time 22. The subject has a demonstrative thought of “That bird is
there.” at f1 because she gets the correct location of the bird at 2. But
guppose that it flies awayat72. If, following McDowell, having a
demonstrative thought depends on the correct location at 22, then this
means that the subject cannot be having a demonstrative thought at #1.
So, for Peacocke, it is not the correct placing of the object which provides
a demonstrative thought, ratherit is the ability to keep track of the object
from fl to 12 that provides one with a demonstrative thought.
However, although Peacocke’s account of demonstrative thoughts
is object-dependent, namely, the object provides the source of content, it
tums out that what provides demonstrative thoughts is the conceptual
abilities of a subject. This makes it sounds as if the actual object is not
required in accounting for content. Actually, that is the problem with
Peacocke’s view-- the upshot of his two-level account of content is that
Content is not delivered from the object-engagement, rather from the
conceptual mediation between an object and a subject. McDowell’s one-
level account does not havethat problem because perceptual acquaintance
the conceptually structured information link. His account of
“ontent does not face the problem as the above two cases that Peacocke
Taises, For McDowell, the object is conceptually linked with its mode of
So there is a coordination of the egocentric location “i
ne location in the tree case even though in a heat ean
> the subject can still correctly locate the tree even at pe .
tis correct is because there is the objec, the te inthis case, witch
Makes the Subject’s egocentric location possible. The coordination is
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only when the tree is not there at pi, So this case is not a bt
jor McDowell, rather itis the problem for Peacocke. That ig teonse
cke takes the two spaces-- the egocentric and the objective~as two
a of space, $0 that he requires an account of how these two spaces are
ed, namely, the cognitive abilities to keep track of the object. For
wodowell, if the egocentric and objective locations are two ways of
jocating in one space, they are not two spaces needing to be co-ordinated,
it follows that Peacocke’s view implies that if there is no object in the
then the subject can still be able to have a demonstrative thought
pecause the subject does not loss his cognitive abilities to locate the
object.
The second case might be responded in this way that: for the one-
level account, even though thebird flies away at ¢ 2, demonstrative
identification of the bird is still possible because demonstrative thought is
dynamic thought. The one-level account does not require the ability of
keeping track of the object as an additional factor for the identification
. because such an ability is a characteristic of dynamic thought. This means
that continuity of thought relating to the object is what provides content,
rather than a snap shot of different moments of acquaintance as Peacocke
thinks, The reason why Peacocke thinks that the second case is the
Problem for McDowell is that Peacocke assumes the notion of
‘equaintance in the Russell’s specific namely, perceptual
*quaintance does not last long enough because its object i its sense date
is not independent from the sense, $0 thatit cannot be said fo
Provide demonstrative content. But for the one-level account,
“Perceptual acquaintance which provides content needs t0 be the
requires an object.tian notion, namely, the notion of acquaintance
object for thedynamic thought is possible because there is an
"eit to keep track of.
It is right that McDowell argues that Peacocke’s notion of
does not help US how the general bility satisfies the kan
requirement. (1990: 263-4) Although notion ot we
evidence iS supposed to do a similar function as
Constraint or the conceptual constraint which Evans employs in order to
how that the information-link is not sufficient, for McDowell,
notion of evidence does not do what it is supposed to do.—
Generality Constraint is introduced only to ensure that the
fink satisfies the know-which requirement, that is, without objects,
perceptual experiences cannot provide content. The implication of this is
that different objects are whatdifferentiate perceptual experiences which
seem to be the same. This is the point why Evans’s account is a two-stage
approach, namely, content is conceptually structured in a waythat there is
a distinction between the information-link and the Generality Constraint.
By contrast, Peacocke’s notion of evidence is monolithic, the problem of
which is the implication of a strong form of Cartesianism. That is to say,
the monolithic approach “deals once and for all with all its possible
occurrences” (ibid.: 265) In other words, it deals with all cases
indistinguishably and hence cannot provide the idea of which particular
object a subject has thought about. As such an approach is not sensitive to
each particular and perception in actual cases, it cannot offer an account
ofhow demonstrative content is possible. On Peacocke’s account,
demonstrative thought turns out to be free-floating because the object
“hich is supposed to be the source of content is left out as itis
independently from our conceptual structure.
is that
Peacocke’s two-level account may be defended on ——
demonstrative can settle the truth-value of the predication
case which needs an explanation.
That
j
pot the wal — That is because such a case
4 perceptual concept in delivering content in
that his theory is better because it can Perception. So he
with 8 spatial representational content from a satewanene
roughly covaries with spatial ficts, Bt does not represent then”
( 991:130) What worries Peacocke seems to be the problem concemting
pon-veridical experiences, so that what is important is the search for a
theory which can account for such experiences. However, his theory
resupposes @ split between perceptual experiences as the given and the
application of the conceptual conscious state of a subject for organising
the content. So the main problemis that it leads to the regress of how a
concept is applied to things. But that problem will not be the problem for
the one-level account because on such an account, concepts are applied to
things directly. The veridical and the non-veridical experiences can be
distinguished in thought because thoughts are object-dependent. The
rationality constraint allows that it is rationally possible for a subject not
to know that his perceptual experience is illusory. If that is so, the upshot
is only that he neither knows which object he has thought about, nor
knows which thought he has. (see McDowell 1990: 258 note7and Evans
1982: 173)
The main problem with Peacocke’s account of content concerns
the question of how thoughts get their aboutness or content. Once the
engagement with the object is accounted for in such a way that it requires
‘he conceptual mediator to bring in the aboutness, the engagement in
Westion turns out to be the engagement with the conceptual abilities ofa
through the information link. But that does not provide the idea of
content which is derived from engagement with an
The sort of content which the two-level account provides
® ‘ch tums out to
to share a descriptive content the account of which
be object-independent.
In the following, I look at another sort of
content, that is, Campbell's view. The Problem
rationality constraint. The main issue is about
an engagement which meets the Tationality constraint. This
means that the idea of object has to be within reach for rationalising
human actions toward things. So I turn to the Point on whichI have
criticised Campbell’s idea of object above, that his idea of object does not
seem to be tactile enough because of his avoidance of the pragmatic force
in accounting for content. Moreover, Campbell’s and Brewer’s debate on
this issue provides someclues of what should be a plausible idea of
object-engagement, and thereby, the notion of practice that ] Propose.
two-level account of
With this concems the
how Objectivity of objects
2.3. Objectivity of objects and the Rationality Constraint
Demonstrative identification of an object requires not only the
information-link between subject and object, but also the conceptual
element which is accounted for in terms of the Generality Constraint.
Although both the information-link and the conceptual element cannot be
independently characterized, the former provides the idea that the object
is independent from our will, while the latter ensures that thought about
the object relates to our point of view. The issue about space and time
“oncems the former characteristic of demonstrative identification. It is to
for the fundamental conceptof an object which pro aie
Bective Conception of an object. Thatis to say,
ject WI"sh involves perception and provides content waa959:
can be located under the spatio-temporal structure. (see
20) One ion of object, space
Problem concerns how an identificatio! and temporal
ate ‘ patial
Object-identification may require the § ty
fame of may not be necessaril
However, space and time
sented by Y can be characterized asa frame of
That is to say, space and time
reference. can be *eounted for without
relating to other frames of reference, e.g, object-id, entification so,
account belongs to the two-level account, as already ment net an
to be a characteristic of Campbell’s view, namely, the objectiv:seems »
the
objectivity o
objects can be accounted for in terms of a non-engaged frame of
reference.
In the following, I consider in particular the views of Campbell
(1994,1996) and Brewer (1999). Briefly, view is that the
objectivity of objects is possible only if there is a non-engaged or detached
way of understanding objects. The reason for this is the fact that there is
an asymmetry between place-identification in which object-identification is
not always required and temporal identification which always requires an
object. This phenomenon provides the idea that an object can be
characterized in terms of a causal relation whichis not necessarily an
engaged activity. In contrast, according to Brewer’s view, object-
identification is crucial in both place and time identification. Thatis
because, for him, perception is what provides content and relates with
action, So the objectivity of objects can be provided within the framework
of egocentric perceptual understanding and action. In that sense, Brows
also endorses a notion of practice as playing a central role iil
However, I will discuss the issue of action involving the notion of the self
inthe next chapter,
In this section, I argue that although the notion“=“
Fobjects in demonstrative thoughts requires the idea of object- fc
this idea is not necessarily characterized
° namely, the acount thataa of object of
8iven in terms of action or pragmatic
gu value, Rather te notionof truthvaine the sccount of
iqvolves the egocentric grasp of the Object, or What I have salen,
rational value of thought. The value does not rule out the
possibility of the pragmatic implication in the Sense that the reason wy
rationalising action is importantis because it is what captures the
rationality constraint. However, the rationality Constraint is not possible
without the objectivity constraint. This means that even tho ugh the
account of content turns out to have a pragmatic implication, it does not
undermine the idea that the object which is the source of content is mind-
independent, and thereby that makes the egocentricity of object-
engagement possible.
2.3.1. Campbell’s Notion of Object
As I have discussed Campbell’s idea of selective attention (2.1)
there are two main reasons why, for him, the basic modality of selective
attention is not necessarily visual attention: first, attention in other
modalities is possible, and they do not require object-identification, e.g.
auditory attention; second, it is only because weare worried about the
value of a sentence, that we tend to think that the only form of
Selective attention is visual attention, Visual attention involves space the
identification of which is usually taken as involving object-identification.
for Campbell, spatial-identification does not necessarily require
Object-identification because he thinks that the notion of object can
“etacterized in terms of a causal connectedness rather than as an ext
hichi identifiably related to its location.
. even though
Campbell’ first reason does not seem right because
ise without
“AQ attend to thi such as listening to a noise
i things around us the source of the
i
about it in terms of an object-identifi sp the soo
188 ig ops : gards
stil Object-dependent. However, with re
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», for Campbell, the concern with the semantic value
‘ect-identificatio : *S merely an
of object n, apart from its Pragmatic value That i
mantic value is the object whi . oer to
say, the se yf ch provides for an
application of a concept which in turns requires the selfconsciousness '
a subject in placing herself as an object in an objective framework
Campbell1984-5) Buthis notion of object is essentially ined in a
way which is not the object in a tactile sense. That is to say, his notion of
an object is not characterized in terms of a rational engagement of a
subject with the object which involves both semantic value and practical
value. Rather it is characterized in terms of causal relations, so that they
are sufficiently detached for being a normativecriterion of having thought.
The causal relations, for Campbell, provide the way of thinking of the
objectivity of objects, which involvesa narrative self-consciousness —-
which accounts for how concepts apply to things, in a sense, descriptively.
But that does not seem to be the notion of object which is within the
compass of our rational attention. The problem is that his notion of an
object does not satisfy the rationality constraint on content, the constraint
which cannot be independently characterized from the objectivity
constraint, This means that in order to reach the rationality constraint, the
notion of object needs to be tactile enough for rationalising human action.
In the following, I discuss Campbell’s notion of object, and then provide a
ctiticism of his view by referring to Brewer and view.
According to Campbell, the notion of object in ordinary thought i
ts having two causal structural characteristics, that an tere
“Ausal Connectedness and common causes. An object isc "
‘ag of its causal properties: the formeris the internal after
on ties within an object, thatis, the dependence of what wa“hat happens earlier: and the latter or the common caus? 8 f
“eral telation of causalities among objects. Both characteristics °
2 related to the spatio-temporal stry, ture in
onthe hand, the internal causal Connectedness 9
over time: It is whathelps identify whether the
game on 5 perceived earlier. The internal
the following Sense.
f objects is defined
Causalities enable the
ofan object by temporal identification. On the other hand. of king
» objects can
qunction as common causes of correlated phenomena, (see 199, 4:4)
Objects as the common cause provide informative identity, i.e. if the same
object causes different knowledge or observations, then the thought we
have about the object can be informative. Knowledge about informative
identity of objects helps providing place-identification. But this does not
mean that place-identification depends on object-identification. For
Campbell, the characteristic of objects as the common cause is different
from that of the internal connectedness of the object’s causal structure in
that the latter enables an identification of an object. The reason is this.
The condition, which enables the spatial relation of objects, is the
common cause reasoning. But the common cause reasoning works only if
there is a common cause of observations, thatis, the object which is the
common cause of identity judgements. However, the object of
observations may appear to be indistinguishable; what individuates an
object is hence its own causal structure, that is, the temporal
“onnectedness of the object.
The significance of causal structure as what identifies an
“At be seen from the case in which knowledge of an informative
“Sot involve the common cause knowledge. That is the case in which
te can know an informative identity by tracing the spato-tempors
of objects of the same type at various times. For example,
ha he Morin Star is the Evening Sur by ding
in, ofthe planets light over diferent times. (92°
be said to derive
identity of an object in this sense cannot
fom place-identification because knowledge of the place in this case j
‘ag at various times in the process of finding where the abies is
what provides the knowledge of informative identity of this sort ig be
causal structure of the object or the temporal identification ole
However, the object itself as the common cause is not
identified by place-identification, although, in general, knowledge of place
can be identified by objects. For Campbell, a capacity for identifying a
place is more primitive than a capacity of identifying an object. That is to
say, object-identification does not depend on place-identification, and
place-identification does not dependon re-identification of objects. On
this point, he disagrees with Strawson’s idea (1959) whose view is that
place-identification requires object-re-identification. That is because, for
Campbell, places can be identified by action or the engaging way of
thinking about space, which can be an actual behaviour or a potential one.
Campbell argues for two reasons: first, places may be identified by
their spatial relations to somefeatures in the environment. This is the case
Which Campbell calls the ‘feature-placing’ level of thought, that is, a place
can be defined in terms of features instead of physical objects. For
example, an animal may identify a place from colours and shape, e.g. red
Square at Or that it is possible that we identify a place by using
landmarks which are not necessarily physical objects, @ pool of light
fom a Projector. Second, places may be identified by the subject’s
behavioural relation to its target; in other words, places cast be
i . For
by unconscious action or behaviour toward environment
& ing its OWR
“imple, a rat may find its way out from a maze by keep
indifferent directions. (see 1996: 9) That is to “ee
own movement, thereby a place, t does not seed 0 ink
Ut . vides the“self consciously as a physical object because what Pro
son
ofa place does not need to be an object. (ibid - 10)
However, for Campbell, in order to understand
action, there must be a constraint that Provides the o
s 8 non-engaged, detached or a Conscious
the engagement or
bjectivity of thought
way Of thinking ;
temporal identification. It is a constraint on having te the
ecause it
provides the idea of object-identification which is independent from our
will or from how weact towards objects. The temporal identification ig
characterized by the phenomenon of perceptual attention which isa
central characteristic of demonstrative thought. (see also 1997, : 667)
Attention continues or extends over time and is indexed to an object. But
attention, for Campbell, is not an engaged activity toward the
object (see section 2.1) because attention is a self-conscious phenomenon,
while an engaged activity is non-conscious. As attention is always
selective, it is conceptually structured. The conceptual structure of
attention is the causal structure in which the subject is self-consciously
taking himself as an object in the environment, so that he can expect what
is going to happen next from what had happened earlier. For Campbell,
the reason why the engaged activity is non-conceptual or unconscious is
because perception and action provide merely current interactions, while
the or conscious way of thinking ‘relates to one’s past
interactions with one’s surroundings’ (1996: 19). So, in order to
understand what an engagement is, there needs to be a non-engaged
Phenomenon, namely, the conscious ability to identify oneself as an object
Which involves temporal
ion of self as a sort of
objects. Self is
parallel to what he
causal properties:
Having said that, Campbell takes the not
Which has causal properties as well as other
for in terms of the notion of person. So
about the notion of an object, a person nae Oe
spe itera causal connectedness and the common cause Identi
n is defined by sameness of self over time, that is the of
of self. The common cause defines the causal
se with environmentor place. The engagement ofthe self need nee
constraint-- the non-engaged wayof thinking about the self. That is the
structure of the self, which makes content of thought about the
gelf possible. In brief, for Campbell, the internal causal structure provides
the non-engaged self-consciousness, which constrains the engagement or
the common cause. But such a notion of self means that the objectivity of
objects is still retained even though there is no engagement.
The reason why Campbell is reluctant to account for the
objectivity of objects as what is immanent in engagement is that he is
worried about the pragmatic view which accounts for engagement as what
provides a practical value, rather than truth-values. (see ibid.) For him, in
order to understand the possibility of engagement, we need the
‘disengaged’ way of thinking about objects, which is not necessarily
characterized in terms of engagement. So an independent normative
ctiterion is required, thatis, the temporal frame of reference. But in order
‘o gain that notion of objective temporal structure, Campbell seems to
Presuppose the idea that there is a reality of the past which is
independently characterized from our egocentric way of thinking. In other
Words, as the level of conceptual structure is what provides objectivity,
Campbell seems to leave the non-conceptual level as the level fae
in behaviour, not in thought. That is because al
to bean engagement with objects. once tere iso OF =
. ement in spatial
to be engaged with, then there 1s 10 h 2000 unt
shat both are not independently characterizable— tay
of an object. However, the Problems thas nck, both
does not turn out to be a notion of objects i wien account
engaged and by which content is provided. That ig to say, ates are
engagement requires the rationality constraint, In the following, I show, i
that Campbell’s notion of object does not meet the
constraint.
23,2.Can Objectivity be in the Engagement?
In order to show that Campbell’s notion of ‘object’ is not what is
within reach of our rational attention, I rely on two following arguments,
First, once object-identification and object-engagement are shown to be
possible in both spatial and temporal identification, there is no need to
appeal to the non-engaged wayof thinking of objectivity. Second, if that
is so, then it means that the spatio and temporal structure of an object can
be accounted for in an objective frame of reference, which cannot be
characterized independently from the engagement with an object.
However, although Campbell’s account of objects is provided in an
objective frame of reference, that is, self-consciousness as a detached way
of thinking, it is not the notion of object the identification of which can
rationalise a subject’s behaviour toward the object. So, the notion of
object has to be defined in terms of its causal relations which involves its
Tational structure in a way which the object provides a rationalisation of a
Subject’s behaviour,
Saying that we need a rational structure of an= 2g sense, that
“tonalises human behaviour can be accounted for in Brewer © The
om.
“the object as a causal structure has to provide reasons for acto
bed, can be illustrated following Brewer's
On that idea. According to Brewer (1995), ©
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ction pecause action itself does not Provide
by . Teasong
Action as a blind behaviour does not for belief about
0 constitut
source of knowledge. What provide the go of or
a Urce know
ae rather perceptual experiences and their obj ledge or contentTespect to
perspective structure. (Brewer 1999:212) Brewer “love,
pence takes object-identification as whatis in both exer )
@ saporal That is because what provi andvides is
ne sceptual experience under the Spatio-temporal structure. Both spatial
aud temporal identification involve an engaged behaviour. However, for
Brewer, perceptual experience is prior to actions because what provides
content is perception, not actions, | elaborate argument against
Campbell below.
Brewer’s argument against Campbell is this. He argues that
although Campbell’s distinction between a detached and a practical grasp
of causal relations is a distinction based on the egocentric grasp of spatial
representation, rather than a distinction based on the nature of the spatial
representation itself, such a distinction cannot provide the detached
objectivity that Campbell wants, that is, the notion of an object under a
teflective temporal frame of reference. That is because, on egocentric
sensitivity to a place, it is possible for a subject to have both a reflective
thought and practical grasp of the causal relations of the place to other
Places, For example, a representation of a place I have now and where I
am in it can be the representation which is the basis for reflective thought
about the spatial relation which other objects can have related to mY
Place, e.g. about the people whowill take different routes to oa place,
"hich Way will be shorter or longer. However, this represent” ioe
tule out the possibility that I can use it to do something rowers
The point is that, for Brewer, does n0
vetical necessity that a spatial Tepresentation hag
and practical, rather it can be reflective ang pict On,
of reference of spatial representation can be both reflective
then the objective frame of reference cannot be fly and
ized as being a reflective, non-practical objectivity,
the egocentric
character
This means that the asymmetry of the spatial and temporal
ijentification does not seem to be true. Brewer employs the same strategy
io show further that in identifying a place, it is possible that its
identification depends on an object; and that in temporal identification, it
is possible to have a practical grasp of object. For example, it is possible
to think about space by thinking aboutan object relating to place, e.g. an
animal may think of a place as “where a particular youngster is waiting to
be fed..”(ibid.:34). In parallel, it is not necessary that temporal
identification does not require an engagement, because time can be
identified by engagement in terms of some unreflective activities. An
behaviour may rely on duration between some events in their
lives, For example, the adult males monkeyofa certain type will go off
hunting at some fixed duration after the first birth in a new spring.
(ibid.:32),
Ifit is right that object-identification is necessary in both place
‘nd time, then the notion of objectivity as a non-engaged way of thinking
Not attainable. However, Brewer’s objections are based on empirical
While Campbell’s notion of object is constructed on 8 logical
er’s objections show"Le. a causal structure of object. But if Brew
lication 15that :
notion of objectis not a logical the ch
.
wae count of the notion of object requires an account "pt
VeS perce . . thatit involves Pe
ptual experiences. This means
in thought as well as in action. The notion °
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an egocentric way of thinking about .involves an object j
and actions are connected, M the sense that
nin place and time shows ie OF abjectPerception as an egocentric
vaio? with an object plays a crucial role in rationalising en
One way fo $99 1 85 Brewer (1995) th
yee ption and inferences or deductive Teasoning are cognitive
which provide sources of knowledge fora subject. These cognitive
capacities provide reasons for action in the sense that the action causally
depends on the reason in virtue of its rationalising an action. This
that mental causation or the cognitive capacities have both aspects of
causation and rationalisation. An accountof perceptual belief, which is
causal and rational, needs to be given in terms of the perspectival,
egocentric spatial content of perceptual experience. This egocentric
relation is significant not in terms of theoretical or explicit knowledge
whose inferential rules just run by themselves and thereby leads to regress
of interpretation; but rather in terms of consequences for action and
perception of objects. The egocentric relation enables the perceiver to
locate objects as they are relative to her understanding. However, as
Brewer said, the term ‘perception’ can be taken not only ina literal sense
of the perceptual experience, but also in a sense of a perceptual metaphor,
namely, perception is understanding. That is because in order to account
for causation in terms of rationalisation, “it is a matter of seeing why one
istight in doing as one does” (ibid.:247). So one needs to know reasons
fot action. The idea of the subjective point of view provides the
content that connects object, perception and inferences wih
aking cannot be
Hence, consciousness as a reflective WaY of thinking
usness is thetak £0 to bea non-engaged way 0 f thinking, rather consci0
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relation of the subject’s perceptual experience and an obj
stich DAS consequences for action. Engagement does not mean sonia
ie sense of causally consequential behaviour of the Perspectival way of
sinking. AD account of actions requires the egocentric perception of a
subject toward an object. Otherwise, we cannot see how the objectivity of
content involves the self-consciousness or the egocentric view which
provides an objectivity of objects as mind-independent. This can be put as
Brewer said that “objective knowledge is possible from within the
subjective perspective of (1999:202), which reveals the
mind-independent object from various different perspectives and different
circumstances.
It might be asked whether the egocentric relation can provide
friction within the objective constraint on our engagement. For Campbell,
itis not possible that friction is provided within engagement. That is
because his notion of engagement means the egocentric behaviour of a
subject toward space, which is an unconscious activity. In order that such
an engagement provides content, we need an account of how a conscious
“ay of thinking gets applied to the engagement, namely, the self-
*onsciousness, (see 1994) So it can be said that Campbell’s account of
“tent is a two-level account. Certainly, Campbell’s position requires
that self-consciousness requires both the egocentric and allocentric or
Objective frame of reference in a way that the former is internal to the
"(See 1996:17) But as self-consciousness is a narrative WY vot
ig, itis like a descriptive way of thinking in which me which
objects. So, what we need is the notion unt for
*° in thought and which provides the rations iin the
Stee Still the objectivity of thought content is
nt,
2i1
The second argument against Campbell’
8 view is hence
asthe notion of objectivity cannot be 8s follows,
thinks legitimately accounted for asa
conscious detached way of thinking, we need account of ow
objectivity can be intrinsic to egocentric engagement with an 4
way t0 accountfor this is to allow that egocentri © Spatial ex
a conscious wayof thinking about space is possible. In other wordi
possible that the egocentric spatial way of thinking cannot be
characterized independently from the objective way of thinking, This point
can be seen from Evans’s illustration of the distinction between ‘this-
thought’ (object-identification) and ‘here-thought’ (place-identificati )
Thedistinction is this: while a ‘this-thought’ can be identified only
from the information-link or perception, a ‘here-thought’ can be identified
from both perception and action. That is to say, a thought about a place
does not need to be characterized by where an object is. Rather it can be
characterized in terms of one’s disposition to move in the environment; or
by having a thought like over there, on the left. That is because a ‘here-
thought’ is a thought which involves the egocentric spatial way of
Which is defined by the place where I am.
The significance of the idea of object-dependence concem -
idea that contentis individuated dependently on the existence of the
in the sense of knowing-which object one has thought el
demonstrative knowledge about place and time, that is to
Which Place/time, rather than know-where and when ra ‘here-
of descriptive knowledge. Spatialds the way
ss iat Provides an idea of egocentric spatial en Itis
ing about space whichis related to our point ° an object
the Sense that whee is the place.
itis our Perception of the place and oUF scion
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here-thought’ is different from a ‘this-thought’
uhisthought” requires an object as what Provides content, but a “here.
ght’ requires either perception of the place where | am of actions
toward the place.
in the sense that
Hence error concerning a ‘this-thought’ is error about an object,
namely, one does not have ‘this-thought’ if there is no object which the
thought is about. By contrast, error concerning a *here-thought’ is error
about our perception and action. That is to say, error about a place is not
that there is no place, rather it is because either our perception is
malfunctioning or we cannot act toward the place at all. Suppose I said,
“It’s hot here.”, the possibility of error in this case is not that there is no
place that is called ‘here’, rather if that sentence is false, it is false because
of my own experience (I may be having a hallucination due to taking some
drugs). However, error in this sense is not the sort of error deriving from
stror about knowledge of identity. That is because demonstrative
knowledge is not derived from identity knowledge, namely, knowledge
about an identity statement. The sentence, “It’s hot here.” provides a
demonstrative thought because it is not derived from the identification
that ‘here = the place x ’; otherwise, the meaning of the sentence “It’s hot
here,” is hot at the place x.” which provides descriptive knowledge.
Hence a sentence with a demonstrative identification is immune £0
“rough misidentification because the demonstrative
* Content deriving from knowledge of identity, 5° cme
MeN Will be never misidentified.
Pgocentric spatial thinking may be said t provide—
Which is derived from the ability to locate onal ina way
Which ; *hat the Subject of thought is an object ea orate‘is identification-free in the objective SP8* m™
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‘
sense, space can be said to be identified by kno Wing-which place
pout, rather than by the identificatin Soe faea n of other Material 0
£0 centric space is hence not a non-engaged Way of thinkino. jaking; father it is a.
/conceptually structured engagement.
Parallel to the temporal identification, demonstrative thoughts
about time cannot be identified independently from our wayof thinking
about For Evans, recognition based identification provides
information based on time and memory because it is a sort of
identification the information of which derives from our ability to
recognise or re-identify an object as the same again. However, although
memory is different from perception in the sense that perception gains the
information from objects, memory is only the ability to retain the
information, this does not refute the idea that the source of memory
information is the object from which demonstrative thoughts derive. (see
Evans 1982:272) Campbell’s notion of temporal identification is an
identification which is based on recognition and memory in the sense that
they are what constitute an idea of object, rather than what retain
information about an object. This is at risk of taking temporal
as the source of information, instead of taking oa *
“curve. The problem is that once there is no contrast between ale
a independent entity and an object as being conceptually
there is no fiction to be found in such of objec: an
“a ‘*™poral identification is a detached oF objective way “oa
jch memory
bell? g Sense implies that the notion of object from whi vets
wai information is the notion of object whic account of
ently from our rational attention to i. ™ t require a0
‘ no
ral identification is an account which doc
OSE
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account of engagementin action for the Snttification,
Howe * vate Said, temporal identification involves self.
consciousness which is non-engaged. This shows that his of the
gelf as an object is not the sort of self which is within our rational
attention. That sort of self turns out to be the self which threatens a
regress of the infinite subject of thought. Hence, in order to avoid that
regress, We need an account in which the temporal frame of reference is
connected with our egocentric way of thinking, that is, the availability of
[-thoughts. Self-consciousness and our ability to keep track of time
cannot be separated. In other words, temporal identification cannot be
characterized independently from the engagement of thought about the
self. In this sense, the self is an object which can be located in an
objective framework. This can be taken in the sense that the self is one of
the objects relating to other objects in a given environment. So it can be
said that what provides the objective wayof thinking cannot be said to be
characterized independently from the notion of ‘object’ or the self.
Concerning this issue, in particular, the notion of the self, I will turn to in
the next chapter.
3.Conclusion
There are two aspects underpinning the notion of object-
“neagement: the idea of object-dependence and the notion of engagement
*S what shows the interplay between mind and world. The former aspect
discussed in this chapter, namely, the idea of je
Which an Object is singled out by the knowing-which requirement
Sue of objectivity of objects. This chapter proposes .
'e the characterization of which involves demonstrative ~ sii
ely Practice as object-engagement. Such a notion of practice al
Unt of content which meets both the constrain
notion of
f the world and
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ie rationality constraint ofa subject's points of view, 1 isthe
bat called a one-level account but tWo-staged approach, that j vi
provides the of sonient structure of practice to ans
gorms are not only intrinsic but also provide friction to the engagement
rhe notion of practice in this sense requires an account of an intra-
personal engagement rather than an inter-personal engagement, {tis an
intra-personal engagement whichis constrained by the world. The intra-
personal engagement requires the understanding of the self as an object
relating with other objects in the world in the egocentric way of thinking.
However, the objectivity of objects can be found within the engagement
with objects. What needs to be further investigated is the second aspect
of the notion of practice: the notion of engagement which is involved with
the notion of self, agency and actions. An account of action is required in
away that content can be provided based on the egocentric relation
between a subject and an object. This will be done in the next chapter.
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Notes
‘
ituti le’ here is i
| The term constitutive ro! used in the sense
ier a one-level account of content but a two- OF which I shall call later in this
oo which what constitutes content is the conceptual approach, namely,
at, which needs to be approached on the basis of
the
dj ed engagement
object, the distinct;
peacorke’s notion of constitutive role which is a two-level S is in Contrast with
2 t have discussed the details of the rule-following consi rs(Peacocke 1983)
as it stands here, I am concerned mainly with th chapter one.
ice with the idea of normativity which i the connection of the notion of
practice wi se is characterized in terms of rule-following.
In other words, actions are explained in terms of intentional attitudes, e.g. beliefs,
desires.
‘cg Davidson 1980
although I agree with him that an accountof understanding requires the
non-behaviourist account, my view is different from him in that, for Campbell, practice
does not individuate content. This point is related to his view on object-identification,
which will be discussed below.
The debate on what the ‘forms of life’ is mostly based on the community’s view. See
eg.Hunter,J.F.M. (1971); Garver,N. (1994); Baker&Hacker (1985); Winch,P. (1958)
"see Evans,G. 1982 on the Generality Constraint as structure of thought. As he said
that the constraint is not about how the subject manipulates symbols and it is not about
the language of thought which there is no semantics attached to, but rather itisa
conceptual point about our conceptual abilities. (pp.100-101)
The issue of how concepts and content are related has already been discussed in
chapter 2.
Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘seeing-as’ of the duck-rabbit picture is also the issue here.
That is to say, content of thought derives from our way of thinking about the objectint
which can be characterized in terms of selective attention. But the crucial ots
constrains the content is not only the seeing-as, but it is also the picture Hse is not
case, the duck-rabbit picture) which does not allow the attention 0 fe raeon
fet. In this sense, to take a constraint as a social practioe doesTATg
of seing-as, mainly because the we have
ptive thought about the picture, which does not answer f0
thought about. ge between these two
i bri
rough my proposed idea of practice can be said to be ‘cli that practice is the
it is different from Campbell‘s view. Mine docs nt derstand how those two
On, rather what I propose is that there is a way t0 that there is an
realms by showingcannot be independently characterized, that IS. °Y | suis account does not
Le! °f Practice which can provide that understanding©+. iready there in the
Wenigities into the world, because practice in tha
Nh
Peacocke means “Evidence*” which a ae and in that, a5
ings’ for instance experiences which may su she concepts fom
Which the roscoe may have evidence® ers witht idea in 8
Ne thought that p is built up."(1983: 113) has revised his idea
his reply to criticism (1991),
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ot
rebut
McDowell’s criticism,” I will show later that
ly
pis TP
14g McDowell 1990, there are four points on which he criticises
with Evans’idea, namely, perceptual dem, Peacocke as
js relevant the object-dependence thesis. in the next Gemonstratives first because it
atthe notion of self-identification which will concer the issue of first-
and memory demonstratives. Peacocke’s general character of th Person thought
sap icit i Cory of thought— the
monolithic approach
is implic t n both parts.
4 coe my definition of Russells Specific notion of object-dependence which is
differentiated from Russellian notion or neo-Russellian in chapter two
(1985b) notion of “dynamic thought’ is hence different from Campbell's
disengaged way of thinking over time. Dynamic thought involves our ability to keep
track of object over a period a time. But in this sense, time is characterized in terms of
the egocentric way of thinking about the object which is conceptually structured, rather
than in terms of the non-egocentric or disengaged wayof thinking.
there may be a slight difference between my position and Brewer
(1996,1999) in the following way. Although Brewer thinks that the connection
between perception and action is coordinative, he takes perception, actually, perceptual
understanding, as what provides content rather than actions. So there is a priority of
perception to actions in his account of content. But my position is that both perception
and action are connected in a way which is embedded in a structure of practice, the
objectivity of which lies in the world and the consequential connection of actions
toward things. In other words, I take both notions of perception and action as being
constitutively connected, and both are what accountfor the notion of object-
engagement. So, the notion of perception cannot be accounted for independently from
actions. On this issue, Brewer is right to insist that the connection between perception
and actions is co-ordinative. This issue can be seen in his dispute with Peacocke
(1983), in which Brewer denies that content of thought can be given in terms 0895
of action. For him, he is concerned with the perspectival structure
ofthought” (1999:209), differentfrom Peacocke, whohe said, 's ie ae
in terms of intentional action. I will discuss this issue i ouobject namely,
fn them focuses on the subject’s aspect of the engagement Wl
7 ion of'agency and actions. . inst
| mention this point here only for providing a supporting nee
Dbell’s account of object. The issue on time and demonstrat
: int here.
“ered independently as a separate issue which does not concert mY
218
chapter Five: Practice: Agency and An Engagement
The notion of ‘practice’ which Provides the abo
requires afl account of how the world interweaves with the rational mental
aspect of a subject of thought. That is to Say, it is in the Practice of object-
engagement, that the objectivity constraint meets the rationality
constraint. The last chapter focused on the idea of object-dependence, in
particular, on the aspect of the objectivity constraint. This chapter will
focus on the subject’s side of the engagement with objects, namely, the
rationality constraint; in other words, it will focus on the notion of the
of thought
subject of the engagement. The notion of subject is crucial for an account
of the possibility of content because the information link requires the
relation of a subject and object. So there must be the subject of thought
which holds the link with its object. But the notion of the subject has to be
characterized as an object in an objective order. The main reason is that
the notion of the subject as a spatial and temporal object provides an
perspective toward things, the content of which is the
of the subject in acting. That is to say, thought about fe
of the engagementoran I-thought involves the .athe
as an object in the spatio-temporal frame ofre wich
Content of which is characterized by the way the subject
terizesMier objects in the environment. In other words, what that
eg OT thoughts is the subject's intentions) and
. in this sense is not only the subject as locat cterization of
“me, but also iousness. The eae
the subject of self-consci or the self
tion a f self-consciousniess
Subject’ as the subject 0 f self-consciousness-
from the subject as an object © subject #522
. idea 0tone what connects them requires the idea
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of thought is immanent to the engagement Of a subject with an obj
put it in terms of the one-level account of d come To
mentioned in the last chapter, the Perceptual-link wesink cannot be characterized
independently from the conceptual or rational engag ofthe
3 that conception
cannot be accounted for independently from a point of view. In
this sense, the notion of ‘subject’ cannot be accounted for in such a way
In order to gain the objective conception of ‘object’
that there is a gap betweenthe subject as a bodily subject and the subject
asa subject of thinking. To put it briefly, the one-level account concerning
the notion of subject is that:
(OL) the point of view and the subject as the owner of such point
of view cannot be characterized independently.
This is to contrast with two-level account, namely:
(TL) the point of view and the subject can be characterized
independently,
My contention in this chapter is to defend OL. For OL to be .
Possible, the notion of the subject has to be accounted for in “ns 0
: actions*Sency, that is, the notion of the self has to be defined in terms .
the idea that there Is an
to .Ward an Object; however, this cannot of
in“St Who acts as a subject. And if the subject is to be defined
view cannot
i Means that according to OL, the notion of pointof ion. It is
re terized independ ly from the notion of intentional acto
enti ject who
of hat it is to be 2 ub)
Do. agency which defines W
of an intentional action
In other words, the notion © with
0 rationally
idea of what it is for a subject to be
Orig!
Concerning the structure of this cha sin the
gurther the debate between Peacockeand McDowellmt
Problem with °
peacocke’s two-level account is parallel to the
objects in the last chapter, that is the problem tha the 1.
shought is unowned. Briefly, according to Peacocke (1983), experi
are not individuated in terms of their subject, rather in terms ofa mixed
descriptive-demonstrative mode ‘the person who has those ence’
The problem is that if experiences are characterized independently from
their subject, then the notion of action and agency is threatened. The
person thought and demonstrative content. The
second section provides the idea of what it is to characterize the notion of
the self in terms of agency. In this part, I consider a contrast between
Peacocke and Brewer’s view (1992,1999) in order to show that
Peacocke’s account of intentional action which is accounted for in terms
of the egocentricity of spatial thought is not the sort of the egocentric
thought the content of which is intrinsic in action. That is because, for
Peacocke, action is a manifestation or an application of egocentric
setsitivity in the sense that the egocentric sensitivity can be characterized
independently to action. The problem is that it opens a gap for accounting
for how action gets its content. The egocentric sensitivity provides a
“mative constraint on action. But if norms are to be
“xttinsically to action, the problem, as already discussed in chapter one, 5
"ati invites the dilemma of the regress of interpretations of actionane
a °fno norms in action. It may not be
° tothe two-component ae model is implicit in
there is a possibility that such 8
Vie a roblem is
fy An alternative account which may not face wa r benad in B whose is not to
2 f
$ account of an agent the action ° ee TH
independently from the egocentricity ©
ie ome pric spatial
*he idea of a subject as an agent whose
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+ is intrinsic to action. The notion Of practicg
an objects hence requires the notion of the self as an
ement is intrinsically egocentric. If practice ig n mea
jen account of content requires both the rationality Content,
served from the egocentric pointof view of the subject and is
aspect which is derived from the world, Once the subject's 2
ihe world can be contrasted with or make friction with,
1, [-Thoughts and Demonstrative* Content
Self-identification is a way of thinking about a subject of thought
with an ‘I’-thought. In having thought about oneself, it is necessary that
there must be a subject who thinks, rather than merely the phenomenon of
thinking without its subject, namely, a demonstrative identification ‘this’-
thought or ‘this-experience. That is because first-person thought is
thought about a subject which is both the subject of self-consciousness
and the subject as an object or a person, whereas demonstrative thought is
the thought about a perceptual object. However,a characterization of
first-person thought can be said to have a common characteristic with
demonstrative thought, that is, thought about the self is non-mediated, or
non-descriptive. Hence I take the content of I-thought as having a
demonstrative* content. | call it demonstrative* content, $0 that it is not
‘0 be confused with the demonstrative identification of the self, namely,
the of the self to mere experiences of actions the owner of
“tch is characterized independently. I expand this idea below:
“pe is
T’-thought is a way of thinking about oneself.” The 1 thought
sich is directed to the world. The idea Of self ag" ijea that a WAY of thinking of the self requires a
namely, the idea that a thought content is
not
is n0 object. In the case of ‘I’ Possible ifthere -thoughts, the Possibility of the
shought about oneself depends on the idea that if there is no Subject
thought as am owner of which experiences one has, then there is no
thought about the subject. The subject of thought needs to be
for in terms of a person, so that knowledge aboutthe self can be said to
be knowledge about the objective world in which one is an element. Such
an account of the person cannot be characterized independently from an
account of self-consciousness in following sense.
A wayof thinking about the subject allows the possibility of
different predications about the subject, that is, the Generality Constraint
applies to self-consciousness thoughts.(see Evans1982:209) It can be
illustrated in the following way: the ‘I’-thought grounds on ‘I’-Ideas or
concepts of self-conscious properties, which conform to the Generality
Constraint, namely, the constraint that enables predications about oneself
to be possible grounded on knowledgeof the identity that (I= Xt) is true.
the fundamental identification of a person as an object which is
available to other persons at time t. The Generality Constraint ae
"© understand thoughts about oneself in terms of a temporal contimuation +
"thas ‘Thad a headache”, ‘I am ill’, ‘I shall ground on he
Of the knowledge that I’ picks out an object, one may say, in the third-
. rationalise“a Sense, that is, the sense which is available for others to
"Y actions,
something
However, taking ‘T-thoughts in that way is
idea of demonstrative content in accounting for
That is to say, the content of the ne
character with other singular and acq based
jons, Le. place-identification (‘here’
ident
et aie and object
The crucial diference is that
se shoughts the content of which are about a subject of thought and
saion, wile the content ofa “this’-thought is about an object and a
spere’-thowght is abouta place. (ibid.:207) In short, the essence of an
shought OF self-consciousness is self-reference, that is, thinking about a
subject of judgements. However, as Evans said, an ‘T’-thought is ta
‘here’-thought in the sense that they share the same kinds of elements:
« involving sensitivity of thoughts to certain information, and
an element involving the way in which thoughts are manifested in action.”
(ibid.) But the main differences are that in the case of an ‘T’-thought, I
manifest a self-conscious thoughtin acting, not in knowing which object
to act on (in the sense of “I do not move myself”, rather “I myself
move.”); and that the knowledgeI have is the knowledge of myself as
someone who has knowledge and makes judgements about myself,
different from knowledge about a place.
Although thoughts about the self do not refer to an external object
ina similar sense as ‘here’ refers to a place and ‘this’ refers to an object,
these thoughts have a common characteristic of immunity to error through
‘T’-thoughts refer to a person as an object in the sense
"et an expression that “Someone is moving, but is it me who is moving?”
“Os tot make sense, (see ibid.:218) In other words, ‘I’-thoughts have @
ww Whichis derived from identification-free knowledge, namely, the
wt that does not rest on the identity of ‘I’ with descripene
“the person who has the experiences”. So, in this sense,
the idea of a subject as that which isthe owner ofthe
ence i characterized ina non-descriptive Sense; in other—
about is non-mediate and direct ,
‘i which has a demonstrative conteny.
whatI have illustrated above is the idea of the one-leve| account,
pais diferent fFom She two-level account which is claimed to be mor
sper inthe SENSE that it is not necessary that individuation of experie
of its subject. The two-level account takes ‘I’-thoughts to have
, demonstrative content in the sense which is a mixture of descriptive and
demonstrative mode of thought. Thatis to say, the relation between the
sibject of thought and self-conscious experience can be defined in terms
of the ‘constitutive role’ of a description of the (type) self, i.e. ‘the person
with these conscious states’ (e.g.Peacocke1983: 148) However, as I will
stow, although both the two-level and one-level accounts contend that
the notion of the self requires characterization in terms of intentional
action or the notion of agency, once the notion of subject is not
necessarily required in the former account, the notion of agency is
problematic. The two-level account of the content of I-thoughts cannot
a Satisfactory account of the notion of the self in terms of agency.
Iwill expand this point after the following section. In the following, I
discuss the debate between McDowell and Peacocke on I-thoughts which
Sparallel to the debate on object-identification, namely, the problem
abo   Ut the two-level account of content.
1) of Experience
"he debate between Peacocke and McDowell concerns the issue
Particular experiences or conscious states.
* argument is briefly this: if an ‘I’-thought is individuated in
Tather than in terms of the possessor of theMes then the Problem is that it begs for an explanation of how the
on of @ subject is constitutive ofpotio
°F CONSCIOUS states
.-h are not individuated in terms of their powhic:
SSessorg, What Pp,
argues is that, parallel to demonstrative
n of j i
vra ‘’-thought is that a thinker has »rest .
stout a particular experience demonstratively* «_
expetience without having any independent identification of himseip»
(1991:129) In other words, for him, a demonstrative identificatio
particular experience in terms of its Possessor does not require
the actual identification of its possessor in thought. (see ibid.) 1 expand
their arguments below,
According to McDowell (1990), parallel to the ‘know-which’
requirement, an -thought requires ‘knowing-whose’ thought it is about.
An ‘T’-thought is constituted by the Substance or possessor of content,
knowing-whose is required for the individuation of contents
ofan ‘T-thought in the Sense that it gives rise to the phenomenon of
immunity to error through misidentification. This means that self-
“tsciousness and ©xperiences are individuated in terms of their
Possessorg
Contrast, for Peacocke, “Persons or minds are individuated by
"token ©xperiences rather than conversely,..” (1983:179) or as
: “Token which are fotal in the sense that their type
that ie What it is like (visually, aurally, etc.) for someone who has
individuate minds or centres of rte
nin. because, for Peacocke, there is no unified sense
ity ty t0 error through misidentification conceming ‘ as That
ole to types of case of such an inwmunity firstly,
°F the infallibility of ‘1’ in “I’m in pain.” ; and secondly,
jot ssible misidentification of ‘I’ due to beliefs about the world, even
ough never failed to refer, such as, judgements based on
memory
“1 Was On an Ocean liner” and those based on Perceptual
experiences, e.g. “I'ma Sitting at a desk.”, However, there ig q unified
account of ‘I’ in these two cases, thatis, the account in terms of the
constitutive role of (type) self, ‘the person with these conscious states’
(ibid.:175) which requires “the thesis that token mental events are
individuated by the persons who have them”(ibid.:176), In other words, a
demonstrative mode of presentation has the constitutive role in the sense
that a mode of presentation may be determined by a description, ie. the
content of the first-person mode of presentation can be ascribed by the
descriptive-demonstrative “the person who has these conscious
sates” (ibid :109)
An important implication of Peacocke’s account is that a brain ina
‘at can think about its pain if there are suitable conditions and evidences
frit to know which person has the experience of pain. For him, an
of first-person thought requires an account of the possibility of
NE fare, So an important problem is concerned with how to
in the case of the absolute to error through
like {'m in pain.”, when ‘I’ has no reference, as in the
wigs “Vat. However, the brain in a vat is not embodied to aid anvie
__ in an objective order. So it cannot be said that
can have an idea of itself as both a subject and an object of
ity,» McDowell argues that Peacocke cannot maintain
My can be in terms of ‘the person who
"Rese experiences’ and the idea that the content of
OF the evidential sensitivity of the possessor of the
“ST will explain.
According to McDowell, the brain in a vat do
thoughts, because it can at most Tespond to g
person's being in pain. (see McDowell 1990:261)
pai.” which has no owner is not an expression
judged, rather it is unavailable. The case ofa
©8 Not have first.
Pain, not to thar
The “T'm in
Whose content is infallibly
brain in a vat would be the
case in which there is no ‘I’-thought because there is no Substance for the
know-which requirement: to know which object it has thought about or 6
know whose pain it is. So the ‘I’ is not available for the judgment. If the
brain in a vat can have ‘I’-thought in terms of Peacocke’s notion of a
constitutive role which is expressed by “the person who has these
conscious states”, then the brain in a vat needs to have an independent
ability to demonstratively identify itself as the person who has these
conscious states. But there is no ‘I? or the possessor of such states which
is independent from the States, so the vat brain can only descriptively
individuate the conscious states (: the person who has these conscious
States). If'so, McDowell thinks that Peacocke’s constitutive role provides
* explanatory work for the ‘T’-thought the content of which is non-
This means that Peacocke’s idea of first-person thought does
"Ot provide the idea of the person as an owner of his experiences, rather it
“fers 4Neo-Humean view of persons, i.e. a person is independently
by his mental experiences.
Peacocke’s response is that his position is not neo-Humean. That is
nis te thesis that Particular experiences and conscious states are
is in terms of their subjects can be understood in at leas8 Which Provide a metaphysical claim about individuation of indi
“tig "temas of thei Possessors, This is different from the neo-Humean
periences. The first"Vie, claim about thought about shat the identity
fe Peacocke calls the Strong Thesis which says what i
"Pring depends on the identity of a subject. (1991:127)
from the neo-Humean which holds that
its subject. That is to Say,
gubject is not varied if experiences
€Xperiences uniquely
while the Strong Thesis holds that a
ore Varied, the neo-Humean holds thet
a subject is varied if experiences are varied, According to the former,
experiences ca be individuated in terms of their subject. For
Peacocke,
McDowell’s criticism is aimed at the neo rather than at his
position.
However, even though his position is not neo-Humean, the Strong
Thesis can be rejected by the split-brain case, ie. “In split-brain case there can
betwo experiences which are of the same subjective type, occurring to the same
human being at the same time.”(ibid.:127) It seems that, in this case, there are
different centres of consciousness of different experiences of the subject. The
problem is: what individuates these different centres of consciousness, if the
Strong Thesis insists both that the subject of experience is the centre of
consciousness and that experiences are individuated by the subject? Peacocke
thioks that what is required for individuating those experiences cannot be an
independent ability as McDowell says. That is because saying that there are two
Particular experiences of the same subjective type at the same time already
assumes
“the existence of two distinct experiences in advance when making the
Wo selections, Andif, to avoid this, there is said to be only one
Particular experience, it can be placed in only one of the selections, with
the result that we do not have a correct characterization of the stream of
“nsciousness corresponding to the selection which does not include
that one Particular experience.”(ibid.)
7 itself that
heivig This plies that, for Peacocke, it is the experience (s) Hse
"tinge Particular experience _ rather than the subject of
"He thinks that though the Strong Thesis can be
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of the split-brain case, his position can be endorsed ta Second
maf saying that experiences are individuated in terms of a
no the Weaker Thesis. That is the thesis that
“particular experiences are individuated at least in Part by the
spatio-temporal objects of whose psychological histories they form
a patt, in the sense in which even the human being whose brain is
temporarily split has a psychological history. "(ibid,: 128)
person,
For Peacocke, this thesis is still not the neo-Humean account of
the self. That is because the weaker thesis at least assumes that there is a
common psychological history before the split of the experiences. We can
think about experiences in a demonstrative way withouthaving the
independent ability to identify them in terms of the actual possessor. As he
says, “A thinker can think about a particular experience demonstratively in
part because it is this experience, without having any independent
identification of himself.”(ibid.:129)
However, from the Weaker Thesis, it seems that Peacocke takes
memory as a way of individuating an experience or as a way of gaining
knowledge. That is a problem because memory is not what provides
knowledge, rather it is a faculty which ‘retains’ knowledge of past
(see Evans 1982:235) So saying that individuation of an
Petience can be done in terms of its psychological histories seems to be
"ing the question of what individuates experience ifa person is
in terms of experience. The problem for Peacocke’s view is
“= he Seems to presuppose that individuation of an experience isa
~~ Matter from self-identification because he wants to maintain both
of subject as the subject of «ences and the idea that
fon of experiences is not in terms of a person- Thinking —_
Sit impossible to see how one can have a thought about himeelf in ®
non-descriptive way without referring to experience as being individuated
by a descriptive sense of a subject. The problem about thinking about the
self in a descriptive way is that it does not offer an immediate knowledge
about the self, rather it begs for a further interpretation for how content
about the self is possible.
Actually, Evans raises a point on the brain in a vat that what is
presupposed in this case is the thought that self-identification is the
physical-identification, rather than the thought which shows how mental
and physical is intertwined in having demonstrative* identification of the
self as a person or an object. (see ibid.:255) In particular, Evans argues
that the brain in a vat cannot be counted as a subject of experience who
has self-knowledge because his experiences cannot be identified as the
experiences of ‘which person’ in an objective order. Self-identification
requires a capacity of a subject to locate himself as an element or object in
the objective order. A capacity to locate oneself is a practical ability in the
sense that the subject acts, rather than he acts on himself. (I run; not that I
make myself running.) (see ibid.:207) Self-identification cannot be
accounted for in the sense that a subject acts on himself because self.
identification is an immediate direct identification. To have such a direct
identification, whatI called demonstrative* identification, the account of
the self requires an account of agency or action in which the subject acts.
This has an implication in accounting for a notion of intentional action.
Thatis to say, intentional actions cannot be accounted for as a causal
consequence of self-identification. Rather they are constitutive of the
content of ‘I’-thoughts in the sense of the one-level sense in which action
is not to be viewed separately from the subject’s thought and intention.
Peacocke’s view on first-person thought, indeed, involves the idea
faction, but in a two-level sense. That is to say, action is a causal
231
consequence of self-identification or an egocentric identification’ of
objects in the environment in the sense that such egocentricity is
characterized independently of action. That is because, for Peacocke,
although action is a manifestation or evidence or an application of the
egocentric identification, which interacts with belief, desire and intention
(even though the intention is fixed), action still can be said to have content
if it is answerable to objects in external world. (1983:77) It means that the
egocentricity and intention is something independently characterizable
from action. In the following section, I consider Peacocke’s view on
intentional action in order to show that Peacocke’s account of T'-thoughts
cannot offer the notion of agency which is required for an account of a
demonstrative* content. Then I contrast his account with Brewer’s
account of the notion of self-location and agency.
2. Agency and the Self as an Object
Both Peacocke and Brewer share with Evans the basic idea that
egocentric spatial thought is a thought which is practical or behavioral in
nature. (see Brewer 1992: 27-28, Evans 1982:160) Thatis to say, in
thinking about space, a subject has to be able to place himself in relation
to objects around him from his egocentric perspective non-descriptively.
In having ‘here’-thoughts, a subject acts on a place rather than perceiving
it as the place he occupies. The latter is a descriptive way of thinking
about place. The significance of the egocentricity of thought or as
Peacockecalls it ‘perspectival sensitivity’, for Peacocke, is thatit provides
a distinction to action with spatial content and that without content. It is
also the distinction for being self-consciousness. For Brewer, the
*gocentricity of thought provides the idea of self-location which accounts
for the idea of agency. The difference between Brewer and Peacocke, as
Brewer perceives it, is that Brewer is concerned with the role of the
Petspectival sensitivity in thought, rather than merely in intentional action.
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(Brewer 1999:207) However, such a difference has an implication in that
Peacocke’s account of perspectival sensitivity cannot account for how
content is possible within the structure of perspectival sensitivity in
intentional action, the account of which cannot be separately
characterized. Meanwhile, Brewer’s view provides the idea of agency to
which the perspectival sensitivity is intrinsic to action. That is to say,
perspectival sensitivity is in the co-ordination of perceptual experience
and action, which can be accounted for in terms of intentional action. For
Brewer, perceptual experience which provides content requires the idea of
being an agent whose action is intentional in respect to objects in the
environment, so that the account of intentional action is constitutive of the
perspectival sensitivity of an agent to things. A consequence of this is that
the notion of the subject as defined in terms of agency is necessary in an
account for content. In the following, I begin with Peacocke’s account of
the notion of intentional action and then contrast this with Brewer’s
account.
2.1. The extrinsic egocentriciy to intentional action
Peacocke’s account of action is based on the idea of the self the
identification of which is not immediate. It can be seen from his agreement
with Perry (1979) that first-person thoughts involve actions because
actions are consequences of the subject's first-person belief. If Clark Kent
believes “Clark Kent is superman.” but fails to believe “I am Clark Kent.”,
he will not act according to the belief that he is superman. Action relates
to the ‘constitutive role’ of ‘I’-thoughts because ‘I’-thoughts are
Constitutive of the first-person mode of presentation (orthe first-person
Way of thinking the type mode of presentation of which is expressed by
the word But the notion of belief whichleads to action is the notion
Which has to be accounted for in terms of desire and intention, That is to
“, ifthe first-person belief does not lead to a formation of new beliefs,
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then it means that the subject has no intention or decision to act. For
Peacocke, the self can undertake an intentional action in the sense that the
first-person mode of presentation (x) has an intentional action only if he
has some intention to form the belief that (x) is F. This is based on the
principle for explaining action that if someonehas an intention that the
self v at a particular time, then he tries to v at that time. (1983:129) It
seems that the subject’s intention is another subject different from the self
which has belief. This issue, however, is beyond my concern here. The
point is that, for Peacocke, what explains action is the intention of the
subject which interacts with belief. However, what makes action
intentional is not only intention, belief and desire, but also a set of
attitudes which give perspectival sensitivity to things in the subject’s
environment. (ibid.:77)
According to Peacocke, an intentional action is a manifestation of
perspectival sensitivity. By perspectival sensitivity, he means, literally
a matter, in actual and counterfactual circumstances, of the sensitivity of
the subject’s intentional actions to variations in his perspective on the
world.” (ibid.:69) A subject who possesses content is the subject who has
a perspectival sensitivity or egocentric sensitivity concerning his
environment. Thatis in contrast with a subject’s actions that relate to
objects in their environmentin a stimulus response fashion in an
immediate environment. Such an action cannotbe said to have content
because the subject’s action is determined by objects in a way which does
hot take account of the subject’s intention and experiences. If a subject
desires an object in his surrounding, his behaviour toward the object will
be spatially sensitive in the way that he can change his position in order to
keep track of the object. His movement manifests perspectival sensitivity;
in other words, perspectival sensitivity is what ascribes content to actions,
Perspectivally sensitive actions involve the subject’s complex array
of abilities, which can be accounted for in terms of a holistic structure of
the subject’s intention and other actions. (ibid.:63-64) In other words, 2
purely physical stimulus-response account of action cannot account for
how it integrates with other actions and with belief in making a holistic
sense of behaviour. In contrast, an intentional characterization of action
does not require that account because it is already integrated with the
holistic structure of belief-desire. However, for Peacocke, his perspectival
holism has two- tiers. That is to say, an action is intentional not only
according to the structure of belief-desire and other actions in other
circumstances, but also to the fact that even though the desires are
constant, action can be said to be intentional. As Peacockeputs the latter
tier that,
“even when we hold the desires of the agentfixed, the statement
that a certain movement is a manifestation of propositional
attitudes about external objects, rather than a mere response to a
stimulus, is answerable to facts about what the agent would do if
differently situated with respect to the objects and places on which
he is acting.” (ibid.: 77)
Briefly, Peacocke’s main idea here is that possession of content
has to be accounted for in terms of intentional action which manifests
perspectival sensitivity. For him, the perspectival sensitivity is actually a
mental map of an organism’s environment. (ibid.:76) However,it is a
mental map which cannot be applied without temporal qualifications, That
is to say, the sensitivity manifests content which depends on time. That is
because possessing the mental map requires the bility of the subject to
keep track of his Position in relation to objects on the map at different
times. Moreover, possessing the map cannot be a general explanation of
the perspectival sensitivity of a subject’s actions. That is because
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possessing the map requires the subject to apply or use it, that is, to be
able to self-consciously keep track of his position on the map. As he said,
“Gf one can do this, one will already be capable of perspectival
sensitivity in some range of cases; and if one cannot, one will be
unable to use the map. It follows that possession of the map
cannot explain all cases of perspectival sensitivity.” (ibid.)
This means that what explains some cases of perspectival sensitivity is the
use of the map.
From the above quote, Peacocke seems to assume something
circular here; that is to say, possession of the map is assumed to exist in
any case whether or not a subject can manifest it. If that is right, the
problem is that once an intentional action is considered to be an
application of a mental map which is separately characterizable from
Possession of it, there is a problem of regresses of interpretations of the
mental map. The question is: whatis it to have a right application?
Peacocke’s answeris that there needs to be a non-defeasible explanation
of action. That is whathe calls the ‘tightness constraint’ of intentional
action, namely, the constraint for rationalising action concerning which set
of attitudes is the relative attitude to action. (see ibid.: 78) Such a
constraint provides an individuation of an intentional action. It answers
the question of what sort of content an action is about. For example, a
Subject is moving toward an object lying together with other objects on a
table in a room. What rationalises his movement (that it is about the
object of his attention) will be table-relative, rather than room-relative, if a
description of his movement contains the claim that he always acts toward
the object of his attention from whatever directions he moves toward the
table. So he is sensitive to the spatial relation between the table and the
Object. His Movement will be room-relative if a description of the object
of his attention, say a cup, may contain something like, “The cup is two
feet from the middle of the north window and two from the door.”.
(ibid.:80) The point of the matter is that what rationalises action is
determined by the tightness constraint that there are no other descriptions
which have more expressive power than the concept in the set of attitudes
which is relative to the intentional action.
However, Peacocke’s notion of tightness condition employs a
defeasibility notion. A characteristic of such a notion is that it rules out
some other possibilities which account for content. But as I have already
argued in the first chapter, this sort of strategy does not seem to be
plausible in accounting for content because a defeasibility condition
merely provides a further interpretation of a normative constraint on
content. Peacocke needs to rely on such a condition simply because there
is a problem in his account that possession of perspectival sensitivity or
the mental map is something to be manifested in actions. The problem is
due to the idea that the possession and the application are characterized
separately. So, actions turn out to be something which is independent
from the perspectival sensitivity of thought to the environment, thatis,
actions are extrinsically characterized to thought which is egocentric. This
has an important result in characterizing the notion of the self as an agent
because if actions are explained on their own without referring to what
gives them content, there will be a gap that needs to be explained
Concerning how theintentionality of action or its content and action get
connected. An implication is that there is no immediate knowledge about
the self engaging with objects in environment, which is the crucial
characteristic of being an agent.
So whatis wrong with Peacocke’s view is that the only way for
individuating content according to the perspectival sensitivity is to be
in terms of how the agent responds to the world in action. What we
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need is an account of action which has a combinatorial structure with
intention, so that it can be said that the perspectival sensitivity is operating
intrinsically to the intentional action. This means that the notion of agency
requires an account in which perspectival sensitivity is in thought, rather
than merely in action, The difference between them maybe said to be
based on different approaches to the notion of perspectival sensitivity.
That is to say, to focus on the role of the perspectival sensitivity in action
is to approach the notion of perspectival sensitivity external to thought or
from the third-person point of view, while to focus on the role of the
Perspectival sensitivity in thought is to approach the notion ‘internal’ to
thoughtor from the first-person point of view. As mentioned above, one
reason why Peacocke’s notion of perspectival sensitivity turns out to be
extrinsic to thought may be due to his understanding of the idea of self-
identification that undermines the notion of the subject as a possessor of
experiences. According to such an understanding, the notion of the self is
not directly identified: there is a separation of the self'as a subject of
intention and a subject of action. To approach the notion of Perspectival
Sensitivity ‘internally’, we need an accountof the notion of Perspectival
Sensitivity intrinsic to thoughtand thereby to action. So I turn to
account of self-location which Provides the idea of how being an agent
involves being able to engage with objects in thought.
2.2. The intrinsic egocentricity in action
According to Brewer (1999), an account of Content can be
Provided within the account of the possession of perspectival Sensitivity,
That is to Say, an account of contentin the world independent to thought
“an be given in terms of a subject’s conception of objects of his thought
nd of objects in the world independentto his thought. It means that
"ind-independent objects are determined by the perspective-dependent
thoughts about their identity, which in turn control and co-ordinate
ad
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intentional action with these objects in the world around the subject.
(1999: 210) So, in that sense, content can be provided by perspectival
sensitivity in both action and thought.
The possibility of perspectival sensitivity in both action and
thought is characterized as having two components. The first component
is this — in having perspectival sensitivity, a subject has the ability to keep
track of an object. But this means that a subject can recognize the object’s
numerical identity over time. That is to say, the subject may changehis
belief but recognize that change as of the same object of his attention
when it changes its position over time or even when it appears to be
rather different in an unusual visual appearance or in different
circumstances, My cat may walk from here to there; it may be hidden
under the table in a dark room where I maynot be able to tell exactly
whetherit is my cat; but in having a perspectival sensitivity to the cat
means that I can recognize my cat even though its properties are changing
over time. The second component is that the ability to recognize the
identity of the object is possible even though its spatio-temporal
continuity is interrupted. For example, a book was on a table, even
though it was moved awayfor a time, one can still recognize it as the
same book which was once placed on a table. These components mean
that in having perspectival sensitivity to things, there is a coordination of
object independentto thought and object dependent to a subject’s
Perspective. The point for Brewer is that this is the reason that perceptual
demonstrative content is provided by the egocentricity in thought of a
subject.
It can be seen that Brewer’s notion of perspectival sensitivity is
more centered on the aspect of the subject’s thought than on the aspect of
Mere action which is the focus of Peacocke’s notion of perspectival
sensitivity. As mentioned above, for Peacocke, perspectival sensitivity is
the ability to keep track of the object over time in the sense that it is a
manifestation of our possession of sensitivity. It turns out that
perspectival sensitivity is extrinsic to action. If the idea of perspectival
sensitivity provides the idea that the objectivity of thought can be
immanent to thought, then Peacocke’s view on this matter means that the
objectivity of thoughtis to be characterized independently to thought. The
problemis that it requires an additional componentfor individuating
content of thought, namely, the tightness constraint. Such a component
means that content is not possible within the realm of perceptual
experiences, so that we need to construct a further condition for
interpreting experience. In contrast, for Brewer, perceptual experiences
provide content because perspectival sensitivity involves the egocentric
spatial perception interacting with our actions. But this also means that
there is a possibility that our basic actions (i.e. actions in a stimulus-
response fashion) can be perspectival, which also accounts for content of
the self. That is to say, the notion of the self is defined in terms of actions
which are perspectival. What provides content of the self is an interaction
between perceptual experience and basic actions. Basic action is defined
in terms of the ability to keep track of an object, which requires the idea
of self-locating spatial perception.
Brewer’s example involves an experiment on a baby. The baby is
expected to see a stimulus object to appear at a window on oneside ofa
room, when a buzzer sounds. But he will be rotated about the center of a
room at the same time. The pointis this -- if the baby turns to a wrong
side where there is no stimulus object, it means that he has learnt merely a
Spatial response; butif turning to a right side, it means that he can identify
the object by an egocentric frame of reference, that is, he can represent
the spatial relation between him and the object. In other words, the baby
manifests his egocentric identification of a place and his ability to keep
track of it during his changing positions over time. (see Brewer
1992:27,n.6.) The experiment shows that in acting purposively to the
stimulus object, the baby has an idea of self-location or the egocentric
spatial way of thinking. In other words, in turning to the right side, the
baby has an egocentric thought which has content.° Perceptual spatial
content is derived from the way a subject locates itself in respect to
objects in the environment or the ability to locate oneself as a center of
the environment. It is in this sense that self-location provides the idea of
agency, such that actions are controlled by the co-ordination of the
perspectival sensitivity with perceptual objects in the environment.
Perceptions hence provide one with the purposive action or intentional
action toward objects; and self-location provides content of the self
because in acting toward objects in the world, we are agents.
Such an idea of self-location provides the idea that a subject
possesses spatial content in a way that does not require the two-level
accountof intentional action as in Peacocke’s account. In other words,
there is no gap between the basic actions or the sort of actions which
Peacocke characterizes as the stimulus-response behaviour and the
intentional actions or the sort of actions under the conceptual ascription
of intention and belief. That is because the basic action is, one maysay,
already conceptual in the one-level sense. This means that intentional
action involves possession of the egocentric spatial content because the
Content of the self-location is defined in the immediate interaction with
Objects in the subject’s environment.
If Brewer is right, the notion of agency is to be characterized in
terms of a primitive possessor of spatial content. That is to say, the notion
ofan agent cannot be characterized independently from our perceptual
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experiences and their practical capacity. But even though the self-location
bas a practical aspect, this does not mean that all actions can be
rationalised in terms of perceptual interaction with objects. In other
words, this does not mean that there is no distinction between merely
responsive action and intentional action. A problem maybe this-- if what
rationalises action is the egocentric sensitivity which determines our
conception of objects in the mind-independent world, then asking for an
extrinsic criterion for distinguishing a rational action from a non-rational
one is misplaced because there seems to be only an intrinsic criterion for
rationalising action.
Responding to such a problem depends on the meaning of
‘intrinsic’. That is to say, if ‘intrinsic’ means something internally
possessed, in which perceptual experience is to be defined by sense-data,
then there will be no continuation of thought in our perspective. But if
‘intrinsic’ means something intra-personal or the interweaving between
our perspective and object in the mind-independent world, then the idea
of keeping track of the object over time is dynamic over time because the
object is not determined by a subject’s will, although it is not
independently characterizable. So, what is required in order to make the
distinction between responsive action and intentional action involves the
subject’s ability to keep track of an object over time. That is to say, there
is no dynamic thoughtin the responsive action. The dynamic thought
offers the idea of object-identification that provides the idea of the same
object again in different times, In accounting for self-location as what
characterizes the notion of agency, we need an account of the dynamic
thought of the subject toward the object. This also means that the notion
Of'the self is not the notion which can be characterized in term of
Sxperiences which do not have continuation in thought. Rather it requires
the interaction of perception and action under the idea of our attentive
ability. Such an ability is a self-conscious ability the object of which is the
self. This provides the idea that a subject can have an objective reflection
of the self. On this basis, we gain the idea of how the notion of the self
involves the notion of agency
In sum, I have argued that in order to find out what it is to be a
possessor of content, it is necessary that there is an information link which
holds between a subject and an object. The link which provides content is
made possible only because the notion of the subject is characterized as
what engages with objects, namely, the notion of being an agent. The
notion of the self or the ‘I’-thought hence requires an account of the self
as both an object and a self-consciousness. Individuation of a particular
experience or conscious states of a subject is necessarily in terms of the
subject of the experiences in the sense which offers a demonstrative*
content. Otherwise, the notion of the self cannot be characterized in terms
of agency which requires the non-mediate knowledge about the self.
Without the notion of the subject as an agent, there will be no notion of
Point of view the characterization of which provides the rationality
constraint on content.
3.Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that the idea of practice as object-
which provides content that meets the rationality constraint
the notion of the Self being characterized as an agent. That is
because thought about the self is thought about acting which is
interrelated with the Perceptual experiences of the subject. It is in this
Sense that the notion of agency is defined by the notion of intentional
action, ie. action which is egocentrically directed toward perceptual
objects. The notion of intentional action is one-level, namely, action is
of the egocentricity of a subject toward object. This is in
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contrast with two-level account which characterizes the egocentricity
independent from action. On this account, the problem is then that there is
a gap between thought or intention and action that requires a further
explanation. The one-level account provides the idea that the rationality
constraint is possible only when there is a perspectival sensitivity of the
subject toward objects and that the perspectival sensitivity which is in our
engagement with objects provides content. This means that an account of
content requires the notion of the subject as an owner of experiences.
Without the subject, the information link with an object is not possible,
and thereby content is not possible.
2
This answers the question that I set up at the outset that the notion
of practice as object-engagement provides an account for what it is to be
a possessor of content. In particular, being a possessor of content involves
being an agent who engages with objects in the world. This means that the
only notion of practice which satisfies that idea requires the account of
what it is to be an agent who engages with an object, which is an intra-
personal notion of practice. Such an accountof practice can meet both
constraints on content, namely, the constraint from the spatio-temporal
world which is mind-independentand the constraint from the rational
psychological space of a subject. By contrast, the notion of practice which
confers the source of norms in inter-personal engagement fails to satisfy,
in particular, the worldly constraint.
The intra-personal notion of practice provides the idea that norms
are intrinsic to object-engagement such that although the world is
independentfrom us, it is not independently characterized from our
grasp of it. Such a notion of practice provides demonstrative
content, ie, the content of thought about objects with which we have 8
direct acquaintance, However, the object of demonstrative thoughts is not
the idea of thought about objects like Russell’s sense-data the notion of
which is not mind-independent. Demonstrative thought is object-
dependent, but it concerns objects with which our egocentric point of
view is required in the engagement. The egocentricity can be accounted
for in terms of perceptual attention to the object, which is selective.
Selective attention to an object is what connects the idea of object-
dependence with the rationality of egocentricity, and is what provides
demonstrative thoughts. This means that although thought about the
object is selective or egocentrically sensitive, the object is independent
from our will. If the object is not mind-independent, then the rationality
principle that it is rationally possible to have different thoughts about the
object would not be possible.
Thenotion of selective attention is to be accounted for in terms of
the capacity of a subject to keep track of the object over time. It is this
notion which answers the question why having a demonstrative thought is
a thought the content of which derives from the causal relation between
subject and object, butit is a relation which is normative. By keeping
track of the object over time, the object as a semantic value of thought is
what enables different thoughts (or a rational value) about it to be
possible. The idea of keeping track of the object suggests the role of skill
and care in the engagement with the object. (see Evans 1982:237) It is
because both constraints of content--the worldly constraint and the
rationality constraint -- cannot be separated. The notion of still and care
in this sense is a normative notion. This notion is the foundation for
developing the idea of virtuous action in the area of ethics and applied
philosophy. (e.g. see McDowell 1979,1998c)
It can be said that the idea of practice, as I have mentioned in the
introduction, as being confined within the social ontology, detaches the
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world from its rational space, so that there is a separation of the
relation and its conceptual relation. An example of this may be
. . . in
Maclntyre’s idea of virtue which has its source of normativity in social
practice. (1981) The notion of practice for him is to be {fom
mere skill. That is because, for Macintyre, in acts, there is no
virtuous aspect which is the crucial characteristic of practice. But that ig
because his idea of practice already assumes the Separation between the
world and its normative character. As with the views of Rouse (1996)
and other social practice views, their worry is due to the understanding
that the notion of practice as a direct engagement with the world is not
possible because the causal link with the world is not normative. But that
understanding has taken for granted the separation between the causal link
and the normative link, so that the source of normativity is conferred to
the social ontology instead of the world. But if what I have shown in the
thesis is correct, the ontological notion of practice as an engagement with
objects in the world is possible. Hence I conclude that if the notion of
Practice is required as what provides an understanding of the connection
of our thoughts and the world, then it is necessary to grasp the notion of
Practice as an object-engagement of agents.
Notes
1
To think along the same line ‘ath the last chapter thatthe one-level account is two.
staged and the two-level account is monolithic, it may be put like this that these
accounts have different implications. That is to say, OLis two-staged in the sense that
although the point of view andthe subject cannot be characterized independently, the
is required as what individuates the point of view and contrast,
TL is monolithic in the sense that the individuation of experiences does not require the
subject. However, I will not state such implications by using the same terminology of
‘two-staged’/ ‘monolithic’. That is because when saying that the one-level account is
two-staged in the last chapter, that was concerning with the relation between two
stages of thought, namely, the information link and the conceptual link. So, to avoid
confusions, I will not follow the same structure as the last chapter, although the
implications can be taken as I have put here.
I construe the idea of I-thoughts following Evans 1982, in order to show whyI-
thought has a demonstrative* content. This is important because it shows why an
accountof the subject of thought cannot be an account which employs descriptive
thoughts or thoughts about the experiences of the subject, which are not individuated
in terms of the subject of the experience, rather in terms of the description of the
experiences themselves. This is the main characteristic of Peacocke‘s ;
This is not the notion of keeping track of an object because the subject is not an object
for one to keep track of it, in the sense of demonstrative identification. Rather this idea
an be taken as the cognitive dynamics of I-thought which allows a possibility of the
thought about oneself to be the thought about an object in an environment. (cf.
Cassam, Q. 1997: 189) first
{twill be more obvious later that Peacocke's account of theaan .
den boughtin a similar way as demonstrative pai will not last
Sastrative identification of experiences of a subject. (e.g. ive* content in myBhis I-thought in this sense does not provide demonstrative* contthe self. This meansi his I-thought provides a descriptive knowledge of5 “oughtis unowned. tric
i songme's notion of mental map or perspectival sensitivity as the cepem
6. , as I will explain below. ibed content.
"turning to the wrong side, the baby’s action cannot be ascribed
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